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Article 
Hate Speech on Social Media: 
Content Moderation in Context 
RICHARD ASHBY WILSON & MOLLY K. LAND 
For all practical purposes, the policy of social media companies to suppress 
hate speech on their platforms means that the longstanding debate in the United 
States about whether to limit hate speech in the public square has been resolved in 
favor of vigorous regulation. Nonetheless, revisiting these debates provides 
insights essential for developing more empirically-based and narrowly tailored 
policies regarding online hate. 
First, a central issue in the hate speech debate is the extent to which hate 
speech contributes to violence. Those in favor of more robust regulation claim a 
connection to violence, while others dismiss these arguments as tenuous. The data 
generated by social media, however, now allow researchers to empirically test 
whether there are measurable harms resulting from hate speech. These data can 
assist in formulating evidence-based policies to address the most significant harms 
of hate speech, while avoiding overbroad regulation. 
Second, reexamining the U.S. debate about hate speech also reveals the 
serious missteps of social media policies that prohibit hate speech without regard 
to context. The policies that social media companies have developed define hate 
speech solely with respect to the content of the message. As the early advocates of 
limits on hate speech made clear, the meaning, force, and consequences of speech 
acts are deeply contextual, and it is impossible to understand the harms of hate 
speech without reference to political realities and power asymmetries. Regulation 
that is abstracted from context will inevitably be overbroad. 
This Article revisits these debates and considers how they map onto the 
platform law of content moderation, where emerging evidence indicates a 
correlation between hate speech online, virulent nationalism, and violence against 
minorities and activists. It concludes by advocating specific recommendations to 
bring greater consideration of context into the speech-regulation policies and 
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Hate Speech on Social Media: 
Content Moderation in Context 
RICHARD ASHBY WILSON & MOLLY K. LAND * 
INTRODUCTION 
Hate speech and hate crimes are trending. In the past five years, there 
has been an upsurge in extreme nationalist and nativist political ideology in 
mainstream politics globally. In the United States, the President regularly 
mobilizes a political constituency by vilifying Mexican immigrants as 
“criminals” and “rapists” who “infest” America,1 and by promoting a “zero 
tolerance” policy at the border that punitively separates children from their 
parents, including persons exercising their right to apply for asylum.2 Data 
suggest a connection between this rise in rhetoric to increases in hate 
crimes in the United States.3 Similar trends are evident abroad as well. In 
the United Kingdom, the 2016 Brexit referendum elicited conspicuous 
expressions of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment and coincided 
with the sharpest increase in religiously and racially motivated hate crimes 
ever recorded in British history.4  
In the United States, there has been vigorous debate on the regulation 
of hate speech for decades, but the dominant legal frameworks for 
addressing the harms in hate speech were created in a world without the 
internet and urgently need updating. Historically, those advocating for the 
suppression of hate speech concentrated their efforts on measures that 
                                                                                                                     
* Richard Ashby Wilson is the Gladstein Chair of Human Rights and Professor of Law and 
Anthropology at the University of Connecticut School of Law. Molly Land is the Catherine Roraback 
Professor of Law and Human Rights at the University of Connecticut School of Law and Associate 
Director of the Human Rights Institute. We extend our thanks to Nadine Strossen for her astute 
comments on our arguments, and to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review for their careful 
feedback and editing. We are grateful to Allaina Murphy and Danielle Nadeau for research assistance. 
1 Andrés Oppenheimer, Immigrant Families Don’t “Infest” America—But Trump’s Racist 
Rhetoric Does, MIAMI HERALD (June 20, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-
columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article213543104.html.  
 2  Catherine E. Shoichet, ‘Zero Tolerance’ a Year Later: How the US Family Separations Crisis 
Erupted, CNN (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/04/us/immigrant-family-
separations-timeline. 
3 Griffin Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of President Trump’s Election on Hate Crimes 3 
(Jan. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3102652. 
4 May Bulman, Brexit Vote Sees Highest Spike in Religious and Racial Hate Crimes Ever 
Recorded, INDEPENDENT (July 7, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/racist-
hate-crimes-surge-to-record-high-after-brexit-vote-new-figures-reveal-a7829551.html.  
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compelled gatekeepers, such as district attorneys, newspaper editors, 
publishers, or university provosts, to restrict certain classes of speech. 
Now, in the cacophony on social media, gatekeeping itself has been 
transformed.5 Governments still attempt to regulate speech through 
gatekeepers such as social media platforms, but the sheer volume of speech 
involved requires operationalizing the definition of hate speech through 
algorithmic processes and tens of thousands of human content moderators.  
Governments are no longer the primary regulators of speech.6 Their 
regulatory capacity has been far outstripped by some of the largest 
companies in the world by public stock valuation,7 which together regulate 
the speech of 3.7 billion active social media users.8 Facebook, which 
moderates the online speech of over 2.4 billion active monthly users, is the 
largest publisher of content in human history.9 In a reversal of the historic 
roles, private corporations have even become the de facto regulators of 
government speech, as when Facebook banned the Commander-in-Chief of 
Myanmar’s military from the platform and removed over 400 other news, 
entertainment, and lifestyle pages linked to the military.10 
For all practical purposes, the decision of social media companies to 
prohibit hate speech on their platforms means that the longstanding debate 
in the United States about whether to limit hate speech in the public square 
has been resolved in favor of regulation. The new realities of the internet 
do not mean that the prior debates on hate speech are irrelevant, however. 
Instead, we contend that a reexamination of the debates over hate speech 
that occurred in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s can help chart a 
course toward a more empirically-based and narrowly tailored policy 
regarding online hate speech. 
Social media policy might be informed by the terms of the U.S. hate 
speech debate in two vital ways. First, social media creates data that allow 
us to determine whether hate speech that nonetheless falls short of direct 
incitement can still contribute to violence. Those in favor of more robust 
                                                                                                                     
5 EMILY B. LAIDLAW, REGULATING SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE: GATEKEEPERS, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, at xi–xii (2015) (describing gatekeeping by private companies on 
the internet). 
6 See DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET 112 
(2019) (noting that “a few private companies” control social media). 
7 See FB Facebook, Inc. Class A Common Stock, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-
activity/stocks/fb (last visited Jan. 14, 2020) (listing Facebook’s common stock value); GOOG 
Alphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/goog 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2020) (listing Google’s capital stock value). 
8 SIMON KEMP, DIGITAL 2019: Q4 GLOBAL DIGITAL STATSHOT 6, 
https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/key/NSBCWzcfsbGXTg (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).   
9 Facebook Q3 2019 Results, FACEBOOK, https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/ 
2019/q3/Q3-2019-Earnings-Presentation.pdf (last visited May 1, 2020). 
10 Removing Myanmar Military Officials from Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/. 
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regulation of hate speech have long claimed a connection to violence, 
while free speech advocates have dismissed such claims as too tenuous to 
support regulation.11 The data now available on social media, however, 
allow researchers to empirically test whether there are visible, measurable 
harms resulting from hate speech. Studies thus far indicate that speech that 
denigrates and generates discriminatory animus against social groups such 
as immigrants or religious minorities does increase the risk of real-world 
violence against them.12 Thus, contrary to justifications underlying the 
highly deferential standard of the U.S. First Amendment, it is no longer 
possible to discount the real-world risks of hate speech that falls short of 
incitement or true threat.  
Second, reexamining the U.S. debate about hate speech also reveals the 
serious shortcomings of social media policies that seek to regulate content 
without reference to context. The policies that social media companies 
have developed define hate speech based on content alone. Currently, they 
have no mechanism for taking into account the context of the speech. 
However, if there is one thing that we can learn from Critical Race 
Theorists who sought to ban “assaultive speech,”13 it is that words and 
meaning are deeply contextual. Defining hate speech in ways that are 
abstracted from local realities, relationships, and power will inevitably be 
overbroad.  
Third, our approach draws from theories of legal pluralism to highlight 
how prevailing social norms about the regulation of speech have been as 
influential as legal doctrine in shaping the regulatory frameworks that have 
emerged in the past five years.14 Legal pluralism embraces the mutually 
constitutive nature of law and social norms and shares with Critical Race 
Theory an account of how law is embedded in and often reinforces 
inequality based on status. The greater part of political discourse currently 
takes place online on privately-owned fora where standard international 
and domestic legal protections in general do not apply.15 In that space, 
                                                                                                                     
11 See John T. Bennett, The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the Empirical and Legal Bases of 
Hate Speech Regulation, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445, 498 (2016) (“The harm caused by words is 
nebulous, easily exaggerated, and readily contrived.”). 
12 See infra Part II.  
13 See Charles R. Lawrence III et al., Introduction to WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 1 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).  
14 See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (2007) 
(discussing the applicability of global legal pluralism); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 869, 875–79 (1988) (reviewing the history and relevance of the theory of legal pluralism); 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 39 (2002) (defending the idea of legal pluralism from its critics). 
15 Companies have limited direct obligations under the human rights standards that govern 
freedom of expression. See Molly K. Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 393, 444–48 (2013); see also Molly K. Land, Against Privatized Censorship: Proposals for 
Responsible Delegation, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. 363, 392–93 (2020) (examining application of international 
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changing social norms around hate speech have become a driver of 
increased regulation. Hate speech is being censored at a scale that was 
unthinkable twenty-five years ago. On the one hand, this may well be 
justified given the emerging consensus in social science research that there 
is a correlation between hate speech on social media and offline violence. 
However, the hate speech policies of social media platforms go beyond 
what was urged by even the most ardent proponents of banning hate speech 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This Article examines this debate in Part I, recalling both the 
arguments of those who advocated in favor of greater regulation of hate 
speech, as well as the responses of those who worried that such restrictions 
would stifle dissent. Part II then examines how these debates play out 
against the background of social media, where emerging evidence indicates 
a correlation between hate speech online, virulent nationalism, and 
violence against minorities and activists. In Part III, we evaluate the 
platform law of hate speech, arguing that social media regulation is 
abstracted from context and power and, thus, is substantially overbroad. 
Finally, in Part IV, we suggest recommendations for how social media 
platforms might alter their policies and procedures to better account for the 
context of online speech. 
I. DEBATING HATE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
Although legal interpretations of the U.S. First Amendment have 
changed significantly over the last century, current jurisprudence is highly 
deferential to speech. A high water mark for the First Amendment was 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964, which applied a heightened 
standard for public officials in defamation lawsuits.16 This was followed by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1968, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a statute that had been the basis for the conviction of a 
KKK member for inciting speech that included racist and anti-Semitic 
elements.17 In the decades that followed, a debate raged about whether the 
pendulum had swung too far and whether the robust protections of the First 
Amendment for racist speech carried too many risks for vulnerable 
minority groups.18 
                                                                                                                     
law to the speech-regulating activities of social media companies). 
16 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
17 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam). 
18 See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (1986) (defending Brandenburg’s approach to racist speech); Richard Delgado, Words That 
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 
(1982) (advocating a tort remedy for racist speech); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist 
Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321 (1989) (arguing that public 
prosecution is an appropriate response to racist speech of the Ku Klux Klan). 
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A. The Case for Restricting Hate Speech 
In the hate speech debate in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the first challenge was to define the type of speech that required restriction. 
Advocates argued that speech should be considered hate speech when it is 
used as a weapon to “ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade.”19 
Mari Matsuda, a leading advocate of restrictions on “words that wound,” 
argued that racist speech presents ideas “so historically untenable, so 
dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the 
very classes of human beings who are least equipped to respond that it is 
properly treated as outside the realm of protected discourse.”20 Another 
influential  definition conceived hate speech capaciously, as “any form of 
expression through which speakers primarily intend to vilify, humiliate, or 
incite hatred against their targets,” and proposed defining “hate speech” as 
attacks “so virulent that an observer would have great difficulty separating 
the message delivered from the attack against the victim.”21  
Proponents of restricting hate speech focused their attention on 
changing the culture of political dialogue at universities in the United 
States. This was a response to a genuine problem, namely the perception 
that universities were an unreceptive environment for members of racial 
and ethnic minorities, female students, and other historically disadvantaged 
groups who had only gained significant access to elite public and private 
universities in the previous decade.22 They encouraged university 
administrators to promulgate campus speech codes, citing studies that 
racist or sexist language and conduct can create a hostile learning 
environment.23 Campus speech codes were often broadly worded and 
restricted speech that was already prohibited (e.g., true threats, incitement) 
along with speech protected by the First Amendment and prevalent in 
public and private discourse (e.g., racist speech, or speech that intends to 
humiliate).24 In the five years between 1986 and 1991, approximately 137 
                                                                                                                     
19 Lawrence et al., supra note 13, at 1. 
20 Matsuda, supra note 18, at 2357. 
21 Kenneth D. Ward, Free Speech and the Development of Liberal Virtues: An Examination of the 
Controversies Involving Flag-Burning and Hate Speech, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 765–66 (1998). 
22 Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 119, 164–65 (1991) (“If we can ever construct rules that successfully balance the rights 
and liberties of dominant and subordinate groups in hopes of creating a more just and equal society, the 
university, increasingly a site of racist and sexist incidents, seems like an appropriate and necessary 
place to begin.”). 
23 Id. at 177 n.223 (“[The National ACLU] urges each university . . . ‘to develop comprehensive 
plans aimed at reducing prejudice, responding promptly to incidents of bigotry and discriminatory 
harassment, and protecting students from any such further incidents.’”).  
24 See Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins but Race Loses in 
America, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 153, 158–59 (1999) (providing examples of prohibited 
“discriminatory harassment” at the University of Michigan and University of Wisconsin). 
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colleges and universities adopted new speech codes.25 Their half-life was 
rather short, and all the campus speech codes challenged in the courts by 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) were struck down on First 
Amendment grounds.26 The message from the courts was clear: State 
universities must permit all speech that the government cannot itself 
censor.  
Current approaches adopted by proponents of hate speech regulation 
bear little resemblance to the early campus codes. Jeremy Waldron’s 
influential book, for example, emphasizes the broader dignitary harms in 
hate speech, illustrated not through social science studies or other 
empirical evidence, but through hypothetical scenarios—such as one in 
which a Muslim father has to explain to his son and daughter why there is 
an ethnic slur daubed on a wall in their neighborhood blaming Muslims for 
9/11.27 Waldron reviews various formulations of hate speech without 
endorsing any of them, and instead builds his case around the concept of 
group libel or defamation, as contemplated by the Beauharnais case of 
1952.28 Chris Demaske similarly makes an expansive argument for 
regulating hate speech based upon a positive case to achieve greater social 
equality.29 
International law, in turn, is more permissive of regulation than the 
U.S. First Amendment but does not go as far as Waldron or Demaske, and 
requires that hate speech express an explicit intent to incite harm or possess 
an identifiable causal nexus to actual harm. For instance, a 2019 report by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression emphasized the empirical connection 
between hate speech and incitement to violence in contemplating 
companies’ hate speech policies.30 Others have proposed definitions of 
“hate speech” closer to incitement or threat, forms of speech that are 
already banned by law in the United States and most other countries.  
                                                                                                                     
25 Id. at 158; see also Steven R. Glaser, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, but Words Can 
Never Hurt Me: Regulating Speech on University Campuses, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 267 (1992) 
(developing a critical view of campus hate speech codes); Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The 
Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 486 (2009) 
(analyzing the legality of speech codes on college campuses). 
26 NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP 
31 (2018). Relevant cases include: DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 482 (E.D. Mich. 1993); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
27 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 1 (2012). 
28 Id. at 51–52 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 283–84 (1952) (Reed, J., dissenting); 
343 U.S. at 292 (Jackson, J., dissenting); and 343 U.S. at 271–72 (Black, J., dissenting)). 
29 Chris Demaske, Social Justice, Recognition Theory and the First Amendment: A New Approach 
to Hate Speech Restriction, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y, 347, 393 (2019). 
30 David Kaye, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019). 
 
2021] HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA 1037 
Synthesizing free speech theory and Critical Race Theory, Andrew 
Sellars identifies eight traits indicative of hate speech: (1) the speech 
targets a group, or individual as a member of a group; (2) the content in the 
message expresses hatred; (3) the speech causes harm; (4) the speaker 
intends harm; (5) the speech incites harmful acts beyond the speech itself; 
(6) the speech is either public or directed at a member of the group; (7) the 
context makes a violent response possible; and (8) the speech has no 
redeeming purpose.31 In sum, modern legal definitions of hate speech have 
moved away from prohibiting merely offensive speech and concentrated 
more on incitement or threat, that is, forms of speech that are already 
banned by most national legal systems. 
B. The Freedom of Expression Riposte 
The U.S. Supreme Court has eschewed a constitutional definition of 
hate speech and repeatedly rejected efforts to establish a hate speech 
exception to the First Amendment.32 Thus, much hate speech in the United 
States, even that which is highly offensive, is protected speech. Current 
constitutional law only suppresses hate speech that also represents a “true 
threat” or incitement to imminent lawless acts.33 Even then, any regulation 
of inciting or threatening speech must be consistent with the 
long-established principles of viewpoint and content neutrality that prevent 
the state from disfavoring certain messages, ideas, subject matter, or 
opinions, for instance, simply because they are offensive or disagreeable.34  
Nadine Strossen’s book, Hate: Why We Should Resist It with 
Counterspeech, Not Censorship, distills the modern “free speech 
advocacy” standpoint. Strossen starts with the observation that there is no 
clear and consistent definition of “hate speech.”35 Hate speech is not a term 
of legal art and, in her view, it is factually wrong to assert that “hate speech 
                                                                                                                     
31 ANDREW F. SELLARS, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y RESEARCH, DEFINING 
HATE SPEECH 25–31 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2882244. 
32 See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (“[T]he proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”); Snyder v. Phelps, 
562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (“As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful 
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”). 
33 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 
(1969) (per curiam). See Richard Ashby Wilson & Jordan Kiper, Incitement in an Era of Populism: 
Updating Brandenburg After Charlottesville, 5 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 56, 62–72 (2020) (reviewing the 
legal history of incitement and true threat). 
34 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (stating that laws restricting speech 
based on its content are presumptively unconstitutional); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 
2222 (2015) (holding that laws may not restrict speech based on its content). See David L. Hudson, Jr., 
The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 70 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 259, 260 (2019) (reviewing the central analytical role of the content-discrimination principle in 
First Amendment jurisprudence). 
35 STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 3. 
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is not free speech.”36 According to Strossen, the term is deployed to 
demonize views people find offensive and to punish a broad swathe of 
expression, including political discourse that is integral to democratic 
deliberation.37 Reviewing hate speech laws in the United States and 
globally, Strossen concludes that it is not possible to draft hate speech laws 
that are not “unduly vague,” overbroad, and counter-productive.38 She 
critiques the legal systems of Germany, France, and other European 
countries, which convict hundreds of defendants a year for offenses as 
imprecise as “incitement to hatred,” including a number of cases that seem 
disproportionately chilling of political speech.39 
Strossen correctly observes that speech regulations tend to disfavor 
minority viewpoints. Indeed, there is a long, repressive history of 
government censorship in the United States going back to the Early 
Republic.40 In the 1830s, Southern states banned abolitionist speech on the 
grounds that it had the potential to incite violence and rebellion.41 For 
much of the twentieth century, incitement law was used to stifle socialist 
thought and speech, including the mere reading and discussion of books by 
Marx and Engels.42 Strossen observes that the Republican National 
Committee and some state legislatures have included the Black Lives 
Matter movement in resolutions condemning hate speech.43 She concludes 
that government censorship of political speech is a greater threat than 
individuals expressing discriminatory bias, and she endorses the aphorism, 
“[t]he cure is worse than the disease” when it comes to hate speech 
regulation.44  
There is ample recent evidence to support the observation that 
censorious regimes frequently abuse incitement laws to stifle political and 
religious dissent. For instance, in 2019, the Chinese government convicted 
a Christian pastor for incitement of subversion of state power and 
sentenced him to nine years in prison for saying that the Chinese 
Communist Party’s ideology was “morally incompatible with the Christian 
                                                                                                                     
36 Id. at 1, 3. 
37 Id. at 1.  
38 Id. at 13. 
39 See id. at 83–86 (discussing hate speech laws around the world).  
40 See, e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW 2 (2010) (describing the 
repressive speech laws of the first fifty years of the republic). 
41 See id. at 340 (discussing prohibitions on abolitionist speech).   
42 See Wilson & Kiper, supra note 33, at 65–69 (reviewing the legal suppression of socialists and 
communists in the United States during the twentieth century). See generally John F. Wirenius, The 
Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 DRAKE L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (1994) (reciting the history of First Amendment jurisprudence in the twentieth century). 
43 STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 17. 
44 Id. at 14. 
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faith.”45 In the same year, the Governor of South Dakota proposed new 
legislation banning “incitement to riot” to stamp out protest by indigenous 
and environmental activists at the Keystone XL pipeline.46 Around the 
world, defamation laws are used to target and silence human rights 
defenders.47 
Strossen’s thesis, which is representative of free speech advocacy more 
generally, can be summarized in three points: (1) there is insufficient 
evidence that hate speech falling short of incitement or true threat causes 
the harms attributed to it; (2) hate speech laws do not effectively reduce 
such putative harms; and (3) even if hate speech laws did reduce the feared 
harms, the damage to democratic legitimacy and freedom of speech would 
be too great to justify them.48 By the early 2000s, the free speech advocates 
had largely won the argument, at least in U.S. courts. Although a number 
of scholars continued to write about the need to mitigate the harms of hate 
speech, their efforts at changing policy were largely unsuccessful, and 
municipalities, states, and state universities generally refrained from 
proclaiming hate speech codes.49 The apparent success of free speech 
advocacy was, however, short-lived. 
II. THE HARMS OF ONLINE HATE SPEECH 
Debates about the scope of acceptable political speech are adamantine 
and date back at least to Aristotle’s Rhetoric,50 but what is new and 
different about the present moment is the outsized role played in popular 
political discourse by a small number of global technology corporations. In 
the past ten years, the rise of social media companies and their content 
moderation policies have transformed the hate speech debate. We are now 
in a brave new world in which the First Amendment applies to only a 
fraction of public discourse about the issues of the day. Democratic 
                                                                                                                     
45 Eva Dou, Activist Chinese Pastor Gets Nine-Year Prison Sentence, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 
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11577698307. 
46 Stephen Groves, South Dakota Governor Plans Revision of Riot-boosting Laws, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Dec. 16, 2019), https://apnews.com/42f4533aac4913f2bb686d8d06c14b7b; see also South 
Dakota Governor Drops Anti-Protest Laws in Settlement Agreement with ACLU, ACLU (Oct. 24, 
2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/south-dakota-governor-drops-anti-protest-laws-settlement-
agreement-aclu (announcing settlement agreement with ACLU). 
47 OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDELINES ON 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 70 (2014). 
48 STROSSEN, supra note 26, at 36. 
49 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 778, 798–99 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS 
OF AMERICA (1999)) (advocating for solutions such as hate speech codes and the application of tort 
principles in order to limit hate speech on college campuses). 
50 See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 3–6 (Paul Negri & Jenny Bak eds., W. Rhys Roberts trans., Dover 
2004) (1910) (outlining Aristotle’s views on political speech). 
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deliberation now happens online, and in particular, on Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and Reddit, which are owned by private corporations that set 
their own terms and conditions.51 Across the world, social media is the 
town square in which current affairs are discussed and political opinions 
hashed out.52 
There is much that is positive about the relationship between 
democracy and social media. Information flows more freely and quickly in 
the body politic. Government and citizens can communicate directly, 
without the filter of traditional media, and in this way social media shrinks 
the space between citizens and their official representatives, permitting 
average people to pose questions to officials and state their views on policy 
issues. Social media can also enhance accountability of state institutions by 
providing video evidence of violence and violations of rights committed by 
police or the security forces.53  
At the same time, it is indisputable that social media is being exploited 
to promote populist and nativist politics around the globe. The number of 
populist governments has doubled worldwide since the early 2000s, and 
populist leaders have been elected in Brazil, Guatemala, Hungary, India, 
the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and Venezuela, among other places.54 As part of a “cultural backlash” 
against elites, populists win approval by harshly criticizing and even 
ridiculing established political elites and nostalgically harking back to 
bygone days when (it is imagined) things were better for working people.55 
                                                                                                                     
51 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2004) (arguing that private 
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52 See NANJALA NYABOLA, DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, ANALOGUE POLITICS: HOW THE INTERNET 
ERA IS TRANSFORMING POLITICS IN KENYA 1 (2018) (showing the connectedness of Kenyan citizens 
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Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1355–56 
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53 Sam Gregory, Cameras Everywhere Revisited: How Digital Technologies and Social Media 
Aid and Inhibit Human Rights Documentation and Advocacy, 11 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 373, 374 (2019). 
54 Paul Lewis et al., Revealed: The Rise and Rise of Populist Rhetoric, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6 2019, 
9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-
of-populist-rhetoric; Richard Javad Heydarian, Understanding Duterte’s Mind-Boggling Rise to Power, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/ 
2018/03/20/duterte/; Clarence Page, Comedians as Populist Leaders? Ukrainian Comic—And Our 
Own President—Proves It’s No Joke, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 23, 2019, 2:05 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/ columns/clarence-page/ct-perspec-page-ukraine-president-donald-
trump-comedian-slovenia-guatemala-20190423-story.html. 
55 Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic 
Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash 3 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty, Working Paper No. RWP16-026, 
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659.  
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Populist speech is often graphic and brimming with crude insults, racial 
resentment, chauvinistic intolerance, and xenophobia.56 
For some observers, the simultaneous rise of social media and populist 
politics is no coincidence, as social media “privileges discourse that is 
simple, impulsive, and uncivil” and debases serious-minded democratic 
deliberation.57 Observers blame social media for the creation of “echo 
chambers” of like-minded individuals and the deepening of political 
polarization that allows populist politics to take root and thrive.58 Others go 
a step further and claim that online disinformation campaigns have 
undermined democratic elections and influenced the outcome of the Brexit 
vote and the 2016 presidential election in the United States. Susan Morgan, 
for example, notes that, “days before the election, messages circulated on 
social media that Hillary Clinton had died. And in some key battlegrounds, 
messages were targeted at Democrat voters claiming that the date of the 
election had changed.”59  
Once populist leaders achieve political power, they frequently take 
advantage of the affordances of social media—including the ability to 
transmit and amplify their messages directly to a wide audience—to 
consolidate their hold on government.60 In some cases, they mobilize troll 
armies to flood social media with disinformation and angry rhetoric 
targeting their political opponents, a phenomenon that has been termed  
“digital populism.”61 “Digital authoritarianism” is another newly coined 
term that describes the more sinister uses of social media by states or 
state-aligned actors that includes surveilling, harassing, threatening, and 
inciting violence against their political opponents.62  
                                                                                                                     
56 Id. at 7; see also Jonathan T. Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist Political 
Views: The Case of Donald Trump 1 (Working Paper, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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57 Brian L. Ott, The Age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the Politics of Debasement, 34 
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The fact that hate speech has moved online means that its character and 
effects are much easier to study than when it was confined to traditional 
media.63 Indeed, social scientists have begun to identify a correlation 
between online hate speech and offline violence.64 The preponderance of 
studies conducted during the recent upsurge of right-wing populism 
pinpoint both direct and systemic harmful effects of hate speech. The Irish 
human rights organization Front Line Defenders writes that, “[t]here is a 
well-evidenced link between defamatory attacks online and in 
pro-government media and an escalation to physical attacks on individuals 
and their families.”65  
Establishing that hate speech on social media directly causes or even 
correlates with hate crimes is always difficult, but there is a growing body 
of evidence that widespread attacks on immigrants and other minorities in 
recent years have been instigated online. Social scientists such as Edwards 
and Rushin have found evidence for what they call the  “Trump effect”—a 
correlation between Trump’s election and an increase in hate crimes in the 
United States during 2016.66 Using panel regressions, they find that 
“counties that voted for President Trump by the widest margins in the 
presidential election also experienced the largest increases in reported hate 
crimes.”67 They conclude that Trump’s election may have resulted in 
approximately 410 additional hate crimes nationally per quarter, or 2048 
additional hate crimes since his electoral victory.68 Additionally, Müller 
and Schwarz identify a statistically significant correlation between 
anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim tweets and actual physical attacks on 
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Muslims and immigrants in Germany and the United States in 2016.69 In a 
study of 100 U.S. cities between 2011-2016, Relia et al. find that hate 
crimes correlate with tweets containing targeted discrimination on the basis 
of race, ethnicity, and national-origin.70 
The genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar stands out as the most 
egregious and harmful use of social media by a government thus far. 
According to a report on the situation in Myanmar issued by the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, anti-Muslim rhetoric 
and threats of violence against Rohingya were posted on Facebook by 
high-ranking members of Myanmar’s military and Buddhist nationalists 
beginning in 2012.71 In two waves of violence in 2016 and 2017, military 
and non-Rohingya civilians violently attacked Muslim Rohingya villages 
in Rakhine State.72 The most conservative estimate is that the Myanmar 
armed forces (“Tatmadaw”) killed 10,000 Rohingya civilians,73 but some 
observers put the number higher.74 As of September 2018, there had been 
6097 documented incidences of gender-based violence, including sexual 
violence,75 and approximately 780,000 Rohingya had been forcibly 
displaced to neighboring Bangladesh.76 
Posts on Facebook are believed to have both incited specific acts of 
violence against the Rohingya and contributed to a general climate that 
made the genocide possible. A UN-sponsored fact-finding mission 
documented over 150 public social media accounts, pages, and groups on 
Facebook that “regularly spread messages amounting to hate speech 
against Muslims in general or Rohingya in particular.”77 The report noted a 
number of these accounts were “particularly influential” in light of “the 
number of followers (all over 10,000, but some over 1 million), the high 
levels of engagement of the followers with the posts (commenting and 
sharing), and the frequency of new posts (often daily, if not hourly).”78 The 
Myanmar government deployed online narratives evoking several different 
themes about the supposed threat posed by the Rohingya Muslims, 
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including descriptions of them as “an existential threat to the country,” “a 
threat to Burmese racial purity,” and “a threat to Buddhist religious 
sanctity.”79 According to the UN mission, “[s]uch narratives latch onto 
long-standing anti-Muslim prejudices and stereotypes; they are designed to 
stoke fear.”80 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that these campaigns were influential in 
inciting specific attacks. For example, while a widespread and systematic 
attack on the Rohingya civilian population was underway, young soldiers 
in the Myanmar military posted derogatory and inciting messages on 
Facebook containing the same narratives deployed by propaganda 
accounts. On August 26, 2017, a soldier wrote that he could not wait to be 
deployed to Rakhine State because the “Muslim dogs” represented a threat 
to the citizens, and the next day he posted, “on the battlefield, whoever is 
quick will get to eat you, Muslim dogs.”81 On August 27, 2017, a police 
officer involved in forcibly removing and killing Rohingya civilians posted 
that he “[h]a[s] been wanting to kill these ‘Kalar’ for so long. Only got to 
kill them just now.”82 In its assessment of the situation, the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court noted: “A lieutenant of the 
33rd LID deployed to Rakhine in early August 2017 posted a ‘smirking 
emoji’ on Facebook, along with the commentary, ‘[i]f they’re Bengali [. . .] 
they’ll be killed.’”83 In a report released in 2018, Reuters documented more 
than 1000 posts, comments, images, and videos on Facebook attacking the 
Rohingya or Muslims generally in extremely derogatory terms and 
threatening them with violence.84 All the posts were in the Burmese 
language. Further, the UN mission affirmed that in addition to direct 
incitement, anti-Rohingya speech on social media “contributed to and 
exacerbated a climate in which hate speech thrives and in which 
individuals and groups may be more receptive to calls of incitement to 
violence.”85 
The impact of these derogatory messages was amplified by the lack of 
alternative channels for information and low levels of digital literacy in 
Myanmar. The dependence of the population on Facebook for internet 
access is so great that, “[t]he word ‘Facebook’ has become synonymous 
with the internet itself in Myanmar.”86 The Report of the Independent 
                                                                                                                     
79 Id. ¶¶ 1315–17. 
80 Id. ¶ 1314. 
81 Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 71, ¶ 176. 
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International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded, “[t]he role of 
social media is significant. Facebook has been a useful instrument for those 
seeking to spread hate, in a context where, for most users, Facebook is the 
Internet.”87 The use of Facebook by Myanmar’s military to incite and 
pursue genocide is not in dispute, and Facebook has since publicly 
accepted responsibility for its central role in the genocide.88 
Faced with the evidence from the above scenarios, it is no longer 
credible to maintain that hate speech that would be protected under the 
First Amendment (such as ethnic slurs or speech that denigrates a group 
but does not directly advocate violence) does not have the potential to 
cause substantial harm and injury. There is ample research showing that in 
certain circumstances hate speech correlates with, and possibly has a 
causal nexus to, measurable harms. Of course, an empirical consensus on 
the deleterious effects of denigrating and inciting speech does not in itself 
determine the normative question of hate speech regulation, since one 
might reasonably support freedom of expression for other reasons, 
including its value in the process of democratic decision-making. 
However, given the mounting evidence of the systemic and corrosive 
effects of hate speech, including speech that does not rise to the level of 
incitement or threat, we need to be asking what kinds of speech have which 
effects, and what would be the cost and consequences of taking action to 
address those effects. 
III. THE PLATFORM LAW OF HATE SPEECH 
David Kaye, the former UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and 
Protection of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, has used the term 
“platform law” to refer to the rules that social media companies have 
developed to determine what user-generated online content may be posted 
to their platforms.89 Platform law accurately captures the degree to which 
private corporations have established stable definitions of key terms like 
hate speech, operational rules about how to handle harmful or abusive 
content, and enduring mechanisms to enforce those rules. This Part 
discusses first how these platforms have defined “hate speech” and then 
introduces two significant limitations of this approach: the lack of 
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transparency and accountability in how platforms apply their rules, and 
their failure to consider the context of speech. 
A. Defining Hate Speech Online 
Although it is true that some platforms such as Gab, 4Chan, and 8Chan 
engage in little or no moderation of the content posted on their platforms,90 
most mainstream platforms actively moderate content. Platforms have 
responded to the criticism that they are too permissive of online hate 
speech by creating infrastructures of regulation, including algorithms that 
remove content and mechanisms by which users can flag potentially 
abusive content that is then sent to tens of thousands of moderators for 
review.91 The companies have wide discretion in designing their content 
moderation policies since they are not government institutions and 
therefore not directly subject to the First Amendment.92 Although they 
have been regulated in many places around the world and are increasingly 
subject to much more stringent legal requirements in Europe, they 
otherwise operate like private clubs that set their own terms of service, to 
which all users must agree in order to participate on the platform.  
In the early years, platform policies on the regulation of hate speech 
were strongly influenced by the First Amendment, but current hate speech 
policies of these private entities more closely resemble a European 
approach to speech regulation.93 The amount of hate speech that internet 
                                                                                                                     
90 See Jane Coasten, Gab, the Social Media Platform Favored by the Alleged Pittsburgh Shooter, 
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platforms remove is staggering, given that Facebook has over 2.4 billion 
active monthly users and Twitter has over 330 million monthly users94 
sending over 500 million tweets per day.95 In 2019, social media 
companies including Facebook, Google, and Twitter, removed seventy-two 
percent of hate speech on their platforms that violated the European 
Commission’s code of conduct.96 Facebook reported in 2017 that it was 
deleting nearly 288,000 hate speech posts per month,97 and this tripled to 
nearly 1 million hate speech posts per month by the third quarter of 2018.98 
In the first quarter of 2020, Facebook reported taking action on 9.6 million 
posts, or 3.2 million per month.99 The rate of removal can spike even 
higher during critical incidents, such as when the New Zealand mosque 
shooter streamed on Facebook Live in 2019.100 In the twenty-four hours 
after that tragedy, Facebook reported that it prevented the uploading of 
more than 1.2 million videos of the attack and removed approximately 
300,000 additional copies after they were posted.101   
Platform law employs capacious and far-reaching definitions of hate 
speech. For example, YouTube’s policy is to “remove content promoting 
violence or hatred against individuals or groups based on any of the 
following attributes: age, caste, disability, ethnicity, gender identity and 
expression, nationality, race, immigration status, religion, sex/gender, 
sexual orientation, victims of a major violent event and their kin, veteran 
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status.”102 Indeed, YouTube’s policy goes beyond Germany’s  incitement 
to hatred laws by prohibiting speech based on message alone and without 
reference to the potential for real-world impact.103 Twitter’s Hateful 
Conduct Policy hews more closely to the First Amendment and censors 
tweets that  “promote violence against or directly attack or threaten other 
people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, caste, sexual 
orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or 
serious disease.”104 Except for hateful images or symbols in a profile image 
or header that express hate towards a person, group, or protected category, 
Twitter’s rules allow hate speech as long as it does not incite violence or 
attack someone on the basis of their membership in a group.105  
Of the mainstream social media companies, Facebook’s definition of 
hate speech is the broadest and is implemented by the most aggressive 
procedures for moderating content. Facebook defines hate speech as “a 
direct attack on people based on what we call protected characteristics—
race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, 
caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease or disability.”106 
Facebook also provides “some protections for immigration status.”107 It 
defines an attack “as violent or dehumanizing speech, statements of 
inferiority, or calls for exclusion or segregation.”108 
Facebook separates attacks into three tiers: Tier 1 attacks are those that 
target a person or group of people who share one of the above-listed 
characteristics or immigration status, when the attack is violent or 
dehumanizing speech.109 Dehumanizing speech involves referring to or 
comparing the target to, among other things, insects, animals, filth, disease, 
or criminals.110 Tier 2 attacks target persons or groups sharing the 
above-listed characteristics, when the attack includes statements of 
inferiority or an image implying a person’s or a group’s physical, mental, 
or moral deficiency or expressions of contempt or disgust.111 Tier 3 attacks 
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are calls to exclude or segregate a person or group of people based on the 
above-listed characteristics and content that describes or negatively targets 
people with slurs; slurs are defined as words commonly used as “insulting 
labels for the above-listed characteristics.”112  
Platform law is enforced by automated content tools and human 
moderators who assess content that has been reported by users.113 
Facebook has spent half a billion dollars on creating a regulatory structure 
that outsources the bulk of its content moderation to approximately 15,000 
third-party contractors who employ over 35,000 moderators.114 Harmful 
online content is classified through both automated moderation tools 
(algorithms) as well as user flagging.115 Algorithms identify particular 
classes of harmful material such as child pornography, extremist content, 
and hate speech.116 Additionally, Facebook and Twitter rely on users to 
identify harmful content, and each has created a flagging mechanism for 
users to tag content that is then sent to a human reviewer.117  
The processes for identifying problematic content vary between 
Facebook and Twitter: Facebook allows users to report abusive content 
through a “Find Support or Report” link.118 Twitter outlines how to 
respond to offensive posts on its “About Online Abuse” page, which 
suggests unfollowing and blocking abusive accounts and reporting posts to 
Twitter.119  
At Facebook, a three-tier structure guides human content evaluation.120 
The bottom tier121 consists of tens of thousands of moderators  situated in 
various geographical locations around the world, clicking through 
hundreds of thousands of posts per day that have been flagged by users.122 
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They are the first reviewers of reported content, judging its admissibility 
using Facebook’s content moderation policies, and reviewing everything 
from attacks on race or sexual orientation to violent or pornographic 
content.123 Tens of thousands of content moderators work under reportedly 
grim conditions, and they typically have under a minute to make a decision 
about whether an item of content violates the platform’s rules.124  
Facebook’s moderators are instructed to follow an ever-changing 
document they call “the bible,” a 10,000-word document that has 
twenty-four different categories, broken down into three groups: harmful 
behavior, sensitive content, and legal violations.125 If a moderator is unsure 
whether a post is appropriate, they will escalate it to a more senior 
moderator, who is usually the supervisor of a content moderation center 
and has more experience in the field.126 Finally, if that moderator still 
cannot determine whether the post is appropriate, the matter is escalated 
again, often to lawyers or policy makers at the main Facebook 
headquarters in Palo Alto, California.127 
Over time, the regulatory reach and capacity of platform law has 
ratcheted up inexorably. It is worth noting that no rules or mechanisms 
governing the regulation of hate speech have been reversed or dismantled 
after they were designed and implemented. Furthermore, in 2018, 2019, 
and 2020, platforms made a flurry of policy changes, leading to new and 
even more protective community guidelines on hate speech. Google is at 
the forefront of addressing hate on its YouTube platform and made more 
than thirty policy updates in 2018 alone.128 YouTube’s policy changes had 
tangible consequences, including the removal of Alex Jones’ Infowars 
Channel for hateful posts about Muslims and transgender people.129 In June 
2019, YouTube announced plans to remove thousands of videos and 
channels that advocated neo-Nazism, and in December it banned videos 
that “maliciously insult” people based on race, gender, or sexual 
orientation.130 Also in 2019, Facebook decided to remove all white 
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nationalist groups’ pages, depriving them of the ability to promote white 
supremacist ideas on a mainstream platform.131 At around the same time, 
Twitter banned speech that dehumanizes a group of people based on their 
religion.132  
In 2020, bowing to pressure to create an impartial regulatory 
mechanism to review its content removal decisions, Facebook created an 
oversight board managed by an independent trust.133 The board of forty 
members134 is empowered to review individual cases of content removal 
referred by Facebook or brought by users who disagree with Facebook’s 
decision to remove their post.135  
Some commentators hailed the oversight board as a “Supreme 
Court”136 that will be “completely autonomous to Facebook”137 and “can 
overrule Zuckerberg.”138 However, its authority will be quite limited, and 
its autonomy is circumscribed in important ways. Specifically, there is no 
provision in the bylaws for the board to review material that remains 
posted on the platform, only content that Facebook has taken down.139 
Further, the board lacks the authority to review Facebook’s content 
moderation policies or procedures that guide removal decisions, including 
the algorithm that curates users’ feeds and prioritizes hateful content.140 In 
addition, the board’s rulings must comply with “Facebook’s content 
policies and values,”141 which limits its ability to apply alternative sources 
of guidance, such as international human rights law.  
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The board’s decisions are binding on just one case at a time and do not 
unambiguously establish a policy precedent for all similar cases, a power 
that would be essential to ensuring that the board’s decisions would have 
policy impact. Facebook must implement a board decision within a 
week,142 unless the decision would be illegal according to national law. It is 
unclear how the board and Facebook will navigate jurisdictional issues 
surrounding national laws on hate speech and disinformation.143  
The board’s authority is limited in both scope and speed. The board 
cannot review content on Facebook Dating or Marketplace, or messages 
sent through WhatsApp, Messenger, or Instagram Direct, all services 
owned by Facebook.144 Since its review process can take ninety days,145 the 
board cannot act expeditiously to tackle viral content contributing to 
imminent public violence, as occurred during the genocide of the 
Rohingya.146 The bylaws make allowance for expedited review requests 
which might speed the process up, but “expedited” can still mean up to 
thirty days.147 Finally, the board can amend certain sections of the bylaws, 
but on the fundamental question of case review procedures (i.e., which 
cases are selected and how they are reviewed), Facebook reserves its right 
to veto any board amendments it disagrees with.148 
As a result of these substantial restrictions, some critics have written 
off the oversight board as “toothless”149 and inherently unable to address 
the source of Facebook’s content moderation problems, namely its 
“attention economy”150 business model that incentivizes contentious and 
hateful speech to sell more advertising.151 They have also portrayed the 
board as a half-measure to forestall government oversight and anti-trust 
investigations, an assertion that seemed vindicated in May 2020 when 
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Facebook launched an advocacy group called “American Edge” to lobby in 
Washington against regulation of the tech sector.152 
B. The Limits of Platform Law 
Social media companies today prohibit hate speech on their platforms. 
If promulgated by federal, state, or municipal authorities in the United 
States, platform law would undoubtedly violate the First Amendment, 
which prevents suppression of speech based on its content or viewpoint.153 
The U.S. government could not ban speech that “maliciously insults”154 a 
person based on their sexual orientation (YouTube),155 or forbid speech 
that dehumanizes a group based on religion (Twitter),156 since both would 
violate constitutional prohibitions on content or viewpoint discrimination. 
But despite Strossen’s call for platforms to refrain from removing 
“expression that the First Amendment shields from government 
censorship,”157 the companies have been charting a different course guided 
more by social norms than law. Social media platforms have created 
systems for suppressing speech—including speech protected under 
national and international law—in what has functionally become our 
public square. Indeed, according to the platforms, approximately 90% of 
hate speech is currently removed by automated evaluation tools even 
before it is seen by viewers.158 
Given that these platforms operate globally and a majority of their 
users are located outside the United States,159 a U.S.-centric approach to 
regulation of speech would not be appropriate, effective, or legitimate. 
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Further, although in the United States there is no legal compulsion for 
companies to limit hate speech—under § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, platforms cannot be held liable for content posted on 
their platforms160—the laws of other jurisdictions are increasingly 
imposing such liability. In addition, there are a host of commercial reasons 
for companies to moderate. Moderation of uncomfortable speech—as 
much as First Amendment advocates may resist it—is part and parcel of 
the service that social media companies offer. As Tarleton Gillespie 
explains, “moderation, far from being occasional or ancillary, is in fact an 
essential, constant, and definitional part of what platforms do. Moderation 
is the essence of platforms. It is the commodity they offer. It is their central 
value proposition.”161 Platforms remove hate speech to create the 
environment they believe their users want and to comply with legislation in 
the national jurisdictions in which they operate. 
Moreover, this ever-increasing prohibition on hate speech in platform 
law coincides with shifts in public attitudes in the United States. 
Successive surveys indicate that U.S. users broadly endorse what the 
companies are doing. In a 2018 survey in the United States conducted by 
the Anti-Defamation League, fifty-nine percent of respondents believed 
that “online hate and harassment make hate crimes more common.”162 A 
survey of 1500 undergraduate students at public and private universities in 
the United States found that fewer than half of respondents believed that 
the First Amendment protected “hate speech.”163 There was little variation 
by political affiliation or type of college (private v. public) but significant 
gender variation, with only thirty-one percent of females versus fifty-one 
percent of males indicating a belief that hate speech was constitutionally 
protected.164 These results have been confirmed by subsequent surveys of 
college students, with one finding that only thirty-five percent of students 
think hate speech should be protected by the First Amendment.165 Almost 
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one-half of students (forty-eight percent) think the First Amendment 
should not protect hate speech,166 and a majority (fifty-six percent) “agree 
that there are times when a college or university should withdraw a guest 
speaker’s invitation after the event has been announced.”167  
Thus, the emergence of robust hate speech regulation on social media 
is not an aberration but a product of broader cultural shifts. Platform law 
has been driven more by the social norms of users and the desire of the 
companies to bridge U.S. and European approaches to hate speech than by 
the constitutional jurisprudence of the First Amendment.168 Hate speech 
regulation by platforms in turn shapes social norms by helping to 
normalize regulation in the minds of social media users. Legal theorists 
need to be aware of these broad social dynamics since changes in 
real-world speech regulation on social media do not exclusively emanate 
from the rarified domain of statutes and case law. 
Nonetheless, one need not be a free speech absolutist to be concerned 
about the emergent system of platform law of hate speech. Two concerns 
will be discussed here. First, even those who have advocated regulation of 
hate speech have not proposed that this regulation be carried out by private 
actors unaccountable to the public for their decisions. Many observers have 
expressed unease with the fact that speech is regulated by unaccountable 
private companies whose primary obligations are neither to voters nor to 
society at large, but to shareholders.169 Rather than constrain this exercise 
of power, national governments are compounding it further by outsourcing 
their speech regulating powers to private companies with little or no 
oversight.170 For example, in 2017, Germany passed the NetzDG (Network 
Enforcement Law)171 that established measures imposing fines up to €50 
million if platforms fail to remove speech that is “manifestly unlawful”172 
under German law (including hate speech, defamation, and inciting 
speech) from their platform in as little as twenty-four hours.173  
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Then there are legitimate concerns about the process of regulating hate 
speech itself. David Kaye states that content policies must be consistent 
with the principle of legality, in which “[t]he restriction must be provided 
by laws that are precise, public and transparent.”174 Platform law regulating 
hate speech, however, is anything but transparent. Although social media 
companies openly post their hate speech policies, they do not explain how 
their policies are translated into lines of operational machine code that 
identify and remove posts before they even appear on the platform. The 
use of artificial intelligence (AI) by social media companies for content 
moderation remains a black box. This matters because it has been widely 
observed that AI is poor at taking linguistic, cultural, and societal context 
into account and its design often reproduces many of the social biases and 
discriminatory schema that it is meant to regulate.175 As Tim Wu wryly 
observes, AI is “inherently inhuman, and prone, at least for the foreseeable 
future, to make absurd errors that can be funny, horrific, or both.”176 
We know little about how companies make determinations in hard 
cases. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Facebook announced 
that its depleted pool of content reviewers would prioritize content “related 
to real-world harm,”177 but we do not know what Facebook’s criteria are 
for determining speech that is most likely to cause harm, or how these 
criteria are operationalized through automated tools. The process of turning 
policy into an ex ante content removal application is currently opaque and 
not open to independent scrutiny. Without more information about how 
decisions are made—such as, for example, through Kaye’s suggestion that 
companies publish their “caselaw”—it is difficult for users to know what 
rules are actually governing their speech, and how automated tools enforce 
these rules to remove content before users even see it.178 
A little more is known about human content evaluation systems, but it 
is clear that they are not a panacea to the ills of hate speech either. The 
working conditions of the tens of thousands of content moderators located 
in warehouses in the Philippines, Ukraine, Ireland, and other places have 
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been studied by researchers, and the conditions are distressing.179 Silicon 
Valley moderators, paid the federal minimum wage of fifteen dollars per 
hour without any health care or retirement benefits, are said to have the 
“worst job in technology.”180 Sarah Roberts documents the deleterious 
psychological effects of viewing child pornography, hate speech against 
marginalised groups, and users encouraging other users to commit suicide 
for eight hours a day, as well as how in 2018 and 2019 a group of former 
content moderators filed lawsuits in California and Dublin, Ireland against 
Facebook.181  
There are also legitimate concerns about the accuracy of content policy 
enforcement. According to a study by ProPublica, human moderators 
inconsistently apply the guidelines in “the bible” of Facebook content 
evaluation.182 ProPublica conducted a crowd-sourced study of 900 posts 
flagged by users as potential violations of Facebook’s Community 
Guidelines and asked the company about a random sample of forty-nine 
posts.183 The company admitted that moderators made mistakes in their 
review of nearly half of them (twenty-two).184  
Further, governments can and do take advantage of the real problems 
presented by online hate speech and disinformation in order to control 
social media and, in so doing, stifle public dissent.185 Digital 
authoritarianism is a real and growing phenomenon. There are more and 
more examples with each passing day, as outright authoritarian 
governments or illiberal democracies have realized that, in order to win the 
propaganda war, they need to control social media.186 For example, 
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Singapore’s recent crackdown on fake news has garnered significant 
controversy. The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 
came into effect in Singapore in late 2019.187 One of its first official 
measures was to compel Facebook to include a disclaimer at the bottom of 
a post accusing the government of running rigged elections stating, 
“[Facebook] is legally required to tell you that the Singapore government 
says this post has false information.”188 The Act also bans the use of fake 
accounts or bots to spread “false statements,” and imposes penalties of 
over $700,000 and/or a prison sentence of up to six years.189 In Nigeria, a 
bill called the “Protection from Internet Falsehoods and Manipulation and 
Other Related Matters Bill 2019,” which is almost identical to the 
Singapore Act, has catalyzed significant opposition.190 Around the world, 
broad definitions of hate speech and other prohibited content in platform 
law are used by governments to suppress the speech of activists and 
minority groups.191 
The current regime of hate speech regulation by social media platforms 
is also flawed because it is deeply acontextual. This regime is more 
aggressive than the approach advocated by Critical Race Theorists such as 
Matsuda and Lawrence thirty years ago, when they defended municipal 
hate crimes ordinances.192 Certainly, the basic outlines of platform hate 
speech law prohibit the kind of speech that these theorists were critiquing. 
For example, Facebook’s platform law prohibits dehumanizing speech and 
statements of inferiority based on race.193 Twitter’s policy against 
dehumanizing speech prohibits users from “[d]irect[ing] hate against a 
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protected category (e.g., race, religion, gender, orientation, disability).”194 
A Twitter user who encounters a toxic tweet “can report abusive or 
harmful content directly from a tweet or profile.”195 These policies resonate 
with the arguments of Charles Lawrence, who urged regulation of “group 
defamation”196—“insulting words” that are “aimed at an entire group with 
the effect of causing significant harm to individual group members.”197  
However, Facebook’s policies are far broader than anything suggested 
by Lawrence or Matsuda. A central idea of Critical Race Theory is 
“skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color 
blindness, and meritocracy.”198 Critical race scholars reject false 
equivalences and seek to recognize and embed in regulation a recognition 
of power. Matsuda, for example, advocated prohibition of speech only 
when it meets three criteria: “1. The message is of racial inferiority[;] 2. 
The message is directed against a historically oppressed group[; and] 3. 
The message is persecutory, hateful, and degrading.”199 The second 
element, that the speech be directed to a vulnerable group, “recogniz[es] 
the connection of racism to power and subordination.”200 These limiting 
principles—treating as particularly harmful speech that is directed to a 
member of a vulnerable group as opposed to any speech that is hateful 
regardless of its target—“narrows the field of interference with speech.”201 
In support of this limiting principle, Lawrence argued that the impact 
of speech crucially depends on the status of the listener to whom it is 
directed. He recounts the story of one of his students who was targeted by 
homophobic insults that left the student “in a state of semishock, nauseous, 
dizzy, unable to muster the witty, sarcastic, articulate rejoinder he was 
accustomed to making.”202 When asked if he reacted similarly to insults 
directed against him on the basis of his membership in a less vulnerable 
group—for example, insults such as “honkey,” “chauvinist pig,” or 
“mick”—the student said that he had not experienced the same effects. 
Lawrence notes: “The question of power, of the context of the power 
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relationships within which speech takes place, and the connection to 
violence must be considered as we decide how best to foster the freest and 
fullest dialogue within our communities.”203  
Social media prohibitions on hate speech, in contrast, prohibit speech 
based on content rather than context. There is no consideration of local 
context, country- or region-specific meanings, the identity of the speaker or 
the target, or the relationship between speaker and listener. For example, 
under Facebook’s hate speech policy, “white people” constitute a protected 
group. An attack on someone based on their membership in a group 
defined by whiteness triggers Facebook’s hate speech policy because, 
under this policy, it is an attack based on race.  
This deliberate disregard of power and context leads to overbroad and 
even irrational results. For example, because of the unfortunate way in 
which Facebook operationalized its policy, this meant that at one point in 
time, posts about “white men” would violate its community standards, 
while posts about “black children” would not.204 (In short, this was because 
“men” is a protected category but “children” is not—thus, a post about 
“white men” could be a slur about a racial category while a post about 
“black children,” a subset of an unprotected category, was not.) For those 
seeking to talk about racism—which may require discussing the actions of 
white people—Facebook’s approach is a real barrier.205 Definitions of hate 
speech that try to treat all speech as equivalent without regard to context 
end up taking down speech that—while perhaps uncomfortable—is also 
essential for important issues of public discourse. 
Given the extensive regulation that now applies to speech on 
platforms, the debate about whether or not to regulate hate speech in these 
domains is for all practical purposes over. Now, it is more a matter of how 
speech will be restricted and with what consequences. What is urgently 
needed, however, is a recalibration of platform hate speech policies to 
integrate context and thus narrow its scope to prohibit only the most 
harmful instances of hate speech and to protect robust freedom of 
expression. The next part discusses how this might be accomplished. 
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IV. TOWARDS CONTEXT-SPECIFIC CONTENT MODERATION 
Although limits on hate speech on social media platforms may be 
inevitable at this point in time, the approach that companies have adopted 
to implement these limits is simultaneously overbroad and under-inclusive. 
Because they don’t consider the context of speech, SMCs end up 
restricting speech that is either benign or in the public interest (or both), 
while missing pervasive denigrating speech with corrosive environmental 
effects. The purpose of this Part is to discuss the importance of context in 
distinguishing between speech that is harmful and that which is merely 
uncomfortable; describe the ways in which platform law fails to consider 
context; and provide recommendations for contextual moderation. 
A. The Role of Context 
In understanding the meaning of a speech act, context is everything. 
This is evident in both U.S. and international approaches to freedom of 
expression. David Kaye has called on platforms to use international human 
rights law as the basis for their approach to content moderation.206 Given 
that a majority of users are located outside the United States,207 and 
recognizing the wide variation in national laws on freedom of expression, 
human rights law provides a helpful and practical baseline.  
International law regarding speech regulation requires consideration of 
context. In his report to the UN General Assembly regarding online hate 
speech, Kaye recommends that “any enforcement of hate speech rules 
involves an evaluation of context and the harm that the content imposes on 
users and the public.”208 In particular, context is essential to assessing the 
impact of speech. Human rights law requires that any limits on speech be 
proportional to the legitimate ends that they serve,209 and determining 
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proportionality requires assessing speech in its context.210 We insist on this 
principle as critical to the conversation about online hate speech: the need 
to evaluate expression in the context of its usage. In our understanding, the 
full meaning and potential effect of any speech act lies with the intent of 
the speaker, the content of the expression, and the context in which it is 
uttered.  
This view is consistent with the entire thrust of philosophy of language 
since the middle of the twentieth century. In the ordinary language 
philosophy of John L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
meaning is not to be found in the semantic genealogy of an expression or 
its putative essence, but instead in its immediate and contextual usage in a 
community of speakers who follow the rules of particular 
“language-games.”211 This theory of language is encapsulated in 
Wittgenstein’s statement that “the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language.”212 Derrida extends the analysis further by noting that, like a 
signature, the meaning of a word or expression can never be fixed because 
it is dependent on the setting in which it is communicated, consumed, and 
(re)positioned, and its context constantly changes over time.213 
Contextual analysis of an utterance has also been an essential 
component of First Amendment jurisprudence for the past one hundred 
years. In Schenck, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes replaced the overly 
broad “bad tendency” standard with the more stringent clear and present 
danger test,214 which asked “whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”215 We 
understand Holmes’s emphasis on the circumstances of speech acts and 
their proximity to “substantial evils” as an instruction to consider speech in 
its context of usage.  
In First Amendment jurisprudence, it is now received wisdom that “the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is 
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done.”216 Brandenburg v. Ohio established that for an expression to 
constitute incitement, it had to be likely that it would cause imminent 
lawless action, thus requiring an analysis of the circumstances of inciting 
speech.217 In a workplace milieu, courts have held that the determination of 
whether an employee’s speech is a matter of public concern depends on the 
“content, form, and context” of their statement.218 Contextual evaluation 
has become increasingly relevant in recent years, as courts scramble to 
adapt First Amendment law to the fast-moving advertising, internet, and 
social media environment, and address the challenges raised by hate 
speech and terrorist propaganda.219  
The reasons for a contextual analysis are plainly evident. The same 
words that are benign in a peaceful setting may constitute incitement in a 
violent situation: “[An] utterance in a context of violence can lose its 
significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of 
force.”220 Because the impact of speech depends on the context in which it 
is uttered, it is not possible to respond to anti-Rohingya sentiment—in a 
country where an authoritarian military government is engaged in 
genocidal acts against that population—using the same framework that one 
adopts to tackle the use of racial slurs in conversations between individuals 
in an established democracy.221 
B. Law Without Context 
Most platform policies readily acknowledge that context is relevant to 
content moderation. YouTube, for example, states that, “context matters, 
so some videos could remain up because they discuss topics like pending 
legislation, aim to condemn or expose hate, or provide analysis of current 
events.”222 Twitter says that context is important when evaluating 
harassment and it needs to hear from the person being targeted to most 
effectively review this type of content.223 
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Practically, however, platform consideration of “context” is limited to 
what appears in the post itself. Thus, in distinguishing satire from a slur, 
Twitter’s rules focus on the words used in the post, but do not reference 
external information or events to which that post might pertain, the specific 
meaning those words might have in that region, or the local context in 
which the post originated. Such a limited definition of context renders the 
resulting assessment of harm vastly underdetermined. 
In part, platform law is defined without reference to context because of 
the problem of scale. In their efforts to ensure consistent application of 
their standards, platforms have created ostensibly “objective” rules that are 
designed to be applied by any moderator, regardless of that moderator’s 
knowledge or expertise.224 Under this approach, context can only be 
defined with reference to information that would be available to a 
moderator who does not have any pre-existing knowledge of the context. 
The companies admit how difficult it is to contextualize posts, and they 
have not yet found ways to more systematically integrate geographically 
localized meanings into their policies and practices.225 Thus, contemporary 
content evaluation procedures, and especially their automated tools, are 
largely detached from their socio-cultural and political contexts. This is 
apparent in all of the main elements of content evaluation: user flagging, 
artificial intelligence, and the growing ranks of human content moderators. 
One way that social media companies purport to respond to the context 
of posts is through user flagging of content, and Twitter and Facebook both 
rely on user flagging to identify violations of their terms of service.226 In 
the past, Facebook relied almost completely on user flagging for content 
evaluation.227 After the genocide of the Rohingya, Facebook defended its 
inaction by stating that not enough of the offensive and inciting posts were 
flagged by users, so it could not review and remove them.228 And for 
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Twitter, certain objectionable content is only considered for removal if the 
target of the post flags the concern.229 
User flagging alone, however, provides very little information about 
context. When they flag a post, users are generally able to choose from a 
range of pre-determined choices about why they are objecting to a 
particular piece of content. On Facebook, for example, users can flag 
speech as “hate speech” based on particular grounds such as “race or 
ethnicity,” but they are not allowed to offer further explanation.230 Further, 
user flagging is not a reliable mechanism for identifying harmful speech 
because users may not be equally able or motivated, or technologically 
literate enough, to flag harmful content consistently. The user flagging 
system may also be “gamed” by coordinated campaigns to silence 
individuals or viewpoints.231 User flagging also shifts the burden of 
protection onto vulnerable groups, who may be wary of condemning a post 
by a high-ranking member of the military or government. In cases of 
coordinated or systematic harassment, the targets of abuse may be unable 
to report all incidences of threatening or abusive language that is being 
directed toward them. “Flagging fatigue” by individuals or groups “who 
are frequently attacked coupled with a process that depends on users 
reporting every instance of harmful behavior represents a troubling aspect 
of content moderation practices.”232 
Content review through automated means is also devoid of context. 
Since 2018, companies have relied more heavily on automated content 
moderation tools to determine whether a post merits further evaluation by 
content moderators.233 Facebook, the biggest regulator of speech in the 
world,234 has nearly replaced user flagging with AI.235 According to 
Facebook, in the first three months of 2020, 88.8% of hate speech was 
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identified through automated means before it was seen by viewers.236 
Using AI is arguably indispensable given the scale of online content 
moderation requirements and because of its ability to identify coordinated 
inauthentic behavior (i.e., integrated networks of “bots”), yet there are 
obvious drawbacks to an over-reliance on automated tools. As David Kaye 
has noted, social media companies “use the power of artificial intelligence 
to drive these systems, but the systems are notoriously bad at evaluating 
context.”237  
AI may be indispensable for moderating content at scale, but what is 
lost is the context of usage that confers meaning, including physical 
signals, cultural particularity, and the social or political situation. 
Algorithmic identification is imprecise and unlikely to allow for contextual 
cues that might be necessary to distinguish extremist speech from parody, 
documentary footage, or legitimate protest.238 As a result, some speech 
may be removed that is intended to challenge or lampoon hate speech. As 
York and Zuckerman note, “content moderation decisions are often highly 
subjective when made by humans, a problem that algorithms—designed by 
humans—are unlikely to solve.”239 Next, AI is only as effective as the data 
it analyzes, and AI is often reliant on large datasets that may incorporate 
information generated by biased methods, with the result that AI 
reproduces the bias against historically disadvantaged populations.240 
Deploying artificial intelligence to flag content comes with the risk of 
over-censorship.  
There are also limits on the extent to which human moderators can 
consider context. Human moderators usually have less than a minute to 
review a post,241 and such brevity does not permit a wider consideration of 
the circumstances. Moderators review only one isolated post at a time or a 
short thread of several posts and may not see the entire ecosystem of posts 
in a locale. In this model, moderators may not appreciate the fact that posts 
are repeated in great numbers and may have cumulative effects.  
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A lack of a diverse moderation workforce also inhibits consideration of 
context. Before 2018, there were simply not enough content moderators.242 
Although in the intervening period, platforms have added tens of thousands 
of human moderators, there are still not enough of them for minority 
languages.243 Even if there are numerous moderators in a major language 
such as English, Spanish, or Hindi, content moderators are often too far 
removed, both in terms of physical location and the local information they 
are provided, from the speech contexts they moderate. Content moderators 
may know little or nothing about the social, cultural, and political 
dimensions of the context from which a post emanates. A content 
moderator located in a distant country may not be aware of widespread 
election unrest, outbursts of communal violence, or a pattern of violence 
against sexual minorities in a locale. Since each moderator only sees a 
small sliver of the total range of expression about a topic or person, 
campaigns of systemic harassment are harder to identify.244 
Then there are the multiple challenges of the universal and the 
particular in language. All languages are highly nuanced, with each word 
having many shades of meaning that depend on a number of factors 
including the speaker’s intention, the listener’s expectations, and the 
context in which an utterance is made. Even if a content moderator is a 
native speaker of a language, they may not be familiar with idiomatic 
usage in a locale far removed from their own personal experience. This is 
especially true of world languages and regional languages with hundreds of 
millions of speakers. For instance, we would not expect a Spanish speaker 
from Madrid to comprehend slang used on the streets of Guatemala City. 
Calling someone a “communist” or “destabilizer” may be benign in Madrid 
but constitute incitement to violence in Guatemala as a result of the 
countries’ different political histories.245 Yet there are credible reports of 
                                                                                                                     
242 Civil society groups in Myanmar have indicated that Facebook did not have enough content 
reviewers who could speak Burmese during the time of the Rohingya genocide. Rajagopalan et al., 
supra note 86. 
243 Id. 
244 The Twitter Rules indicate: 
Some Tweets may seem to be abusive when viewed in isolation, but may not be 
when viewed in the context of a larger conversation. When we review this type of 
content, it may not be clear whether it is intended to harass an individual, or if it is 
part of a consensual conversation. To help our teams understand the context of a 
conversation, we may need to hear directly from the person being targeted, to ensure 
that we have the information needed prior to taking any enforcement action. 
Abusive Behavior, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/abusive-behavior (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
245 ABBAS ET AL., supra note 232, at 31–32 (describing the inciting implications of terms such as 
“communist,” “destabilizer,” and “terrorist” in Guatemala). 
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content moderators using Google Translate to gauge the meaning of a post 
they are reviewing.246 
Social media companies have global lists of words and expressions 
that are banned, and these lists are universal; that is, they generally do not 
vary according to country or region.247As Chinmayi Arun observes, 
however, “[h]armful speech can be hyper-localised, significant in just one 
village or district, such that even people from the same state might not 
understand. This is the sort of thing that local police and local journalists 
might notice and address but a global corporation might miss 
completely.”248 Highly local terms, such as the anti-Muslim racial epithet 
“kalar” that was repeatedly posted on Facebook by members of the 
Myanmar military during their genocidal campaign against the Rohingya, 
are often missed by content evaluation procedures either because they are 
in minority languages or because they are not on the list of universal hate 
speech terms.249 
Alongside localized slurs, there is the problem of coded incitement and 
implicit threats that do not present as hate speech or violate hate speech 
guidelines, but are understood as incitements or threats by those with the 
requisite cultural knowledge. The genocidal campaign against the 
Rohingya in Myanmar raised with particular urgency the importance of 
identifying coded or euphemistic speech threats. For example, the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar noted that it 
was difficult to identify online hate speech against the Rohingya because 
of “[s]ubtleties in the Myanmar language and the use of fables and 
allegories.”250  
Coded speech is present in virtually all instances of genocide and mass 
atrocity. For instance, after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had to decide whether exhortations 
from leaders such as Jean-Paul Akayesu calling on Rwandans to go “to 
work” and to fight and kill “the Inkotanyi” (literally in Kinyarwanda, 
“warriors”) represented incitement to genocide against the Tutsi 
                                                                                                                     
246 Max Fisher, Inside Facebook’s Secret Rulebook for Global Political Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/world/facebook-moderators.html.  
247 Billy Perrigo, Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before. But There’s 
a Catch, TIME (Nov. 27, 2019, 4:42 AM), https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/ 
(“The algorithms Facebook currently uses to remove hate speech only work in certain languages.”). 
248 Chinmayi Arun, Rebalancing Regulation of Speech: Hyper-Local Content on Global Web-
Based Platforms, MEDIUM (Mar. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/rebalancing-
regulation-of-speech-hyper-local-content-on-global-web-based-platforms-1-386d65d86e32. 
249 Perrigo, supra note 247; see also Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for 
Provisional Measures (Gam. v. Myan.), Application, ¶¶ 38–39, 44–45 (Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178/institution-proceedings. 
250 Myanmar Report, supra note 77, ¶ 1311. 
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minority.251 On the basis of expert testimony from Rwandan sociolinguist 
Mathias Ruzindana about the use of veiled incitement by Hutu Power 
extremists, the ICTR decided that both expressions did constitute direct 
and public incitement to exterminate Tutsis.252 Social media posts by a 
modern-day Akayesu implicitly inciting harm by encouraging his followers 
to “go to work” would likely not be removed under current content 
moderation policies because implicit speech requires sufficient contextual 
information to render its meaning evident.253 Current content moderation 
policies do not integrate contextual factors into the decision-making and 
thus may permit coded calls to violence.254  
C. Recommendations 
There are a number of steps that companies could take to ensure that 
context is taken into account more systematically with the aim of 
enhancing accurate content evaluation. We recognize that meticulous 
contextual analysis is demanding logistically, as well as resource-intensive, 
and we do not minimize the challenges ahead. However, there are a few 
actions that might be taken to bring more context into account while 
regulating hate speech. Many of these recommendations are likely 
implemented most effectively at higher levels of review; as a result, 
context-based moderation may require an expansion of the workforce at 
those senior levels as well as higher rates of escalation from front-line 
moderators to more senior levels of review. 
First, platforms could start by pausing the dramatic shift in recent years 
towards artificial intelligence and by conducting a thorough, transparent, 
and independent review of the implications of automation. Along with 
independent experts, social media companies should examine the degree to 
which their content-generating algorithms elevate hateful speech on user 
feeds or perpetuate unconscious biases against particular minority groups. 
Companies must disclose the rate of false positives in their flagging 
algorithms and investigate how much hate-filled content remains online 
because it is coded or implicitly stated in a way that avoids the algorithm. 
Companies should design an iterative process in which AI and human 
content moderation are integrated and in which both are fully informed and 
updated by “a sufficiently large, trained team of internet company 
employees who are cognizant of relevant social, political, and cultural 
history and context.”255  
                                                                                                                     
251 RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL SPEECH 
CRIMES 191 (2017). 
252 Id. at 192.  
253 Id. at 190–92. 
254 Hamilton & Land, supra note 221, at 144. 
255 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ET AL., supra note 231, at 5. 
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Second, we encourage companies to move away from a 
one-size-fits-all model of hate speech regulation and to build a number of 
different models that are appropriate to the conditions on the ground in the 
countries concerned. The work of programmers must be informed by 
country specialists as they construct automated tools that are sensitive to 
and responsive to local circumstances. This integration of human and 
machine systems could lead to the kind of “hybrid social-ordering 
systems” that Wu has proposed.256 In sum, we endorse a human rights 
approach to artificial intelligence that prioritizes procedural fairness, 
transparency, and disclosure, and implies a commitment to human rights 
audits and regular reviews of potential discrimination in AI systems.257 
Next, companies could take steps towards a pluralistic model of 
content moderation, starting with sub-regional or country-specific lists of 
slurs and hateful expressions that are drawn up after consultation with local 
civil society organizations, sociolinguists, and other experts. Facebook, for 
example, maintains country-specific lists of slurs based on input from civil 
society and experts,258 and we recommend that other platforms adopt the 
same approach. Platforms could also create teams of moderators that look 
not at a single post or thread, but at the total range of expression in a 
country or region about a person, group, or topical area. When reviewing 
content, moderators should be allowed to take into consideration external 
information about the political and cultural context of a country and in 
particular indicators of the risk of violence against an individual or group. 
Platforms could employ moderators who speak the local dialects of the 
language and who are culturally and linguistically close enough to the 
sources of the posts to be able to detect coded hate speech, threats, and 
incitement. As David Kaye stated, human content evaluation  
must be based on real learning from the communities in 
which hate speech may be found, that is, people who can 
understand the “code” that language sometimes deploys to 
hide incitement to violence, evaluate the speaker’s intent, 
consider the nature of the speaker and audience and evaluate 
the environment in which hate speech can lead to violent 
acts. None of these things are possible with artificial 
                                                                                                                     
256 Wu, supra note 175, at 2021. 
257 Kaye, supra note 175, ¶ 47 (advancing a human rights approach to artificial intelligence). 
258 Understanding Social Media and Conflict, FACEBOOK, https://about.fb.com/news/ 
2019/06/social-media-and-conflict/amp/ (last updated May 21, 2020); see also Sara Rieger, Facebook 
to Investigate Whether Anti-Indigenous Slur Should Be Added to Hate Speech Guidelines, CBC (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/facebook-indigenous-slur-1.4877225. 
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intelligence alone, and the definitions and strategies should 
reflect the nuances of the problem.259 
There ought to be some flexibility in the categories of persons who are 
protected under platform law, and these categories should be determined in 
light of local circumstances. In some contexts, the list of categories 
currently protected by platform law is underinclusive. For example, human 
rights defenders, including judges and prosecutors involved in 
anti-corruption efforts, have been subjected to coordinated online hate 
campaigns in Guatemala, Colombia, and Mexico in recent years.260 In 
these three countries alone, over 200 human rights defenders are killed 
every year, about half of the global total.261 Where human rights work is 
such a hazardous undertaking, it makes sense to designate human rights 
defenders as a protected category until the attacks start to decline. If there 
are other occupational groups who are not presently protected, such as 
social workers or humanitarian aid workers, then they too may be brought 
temporarily into the scope of protection. 
We recommend that companies run a small number of pilot projects in 
at-risk countries that have experienced, or are currently experiencing, 
violent clashes during an election cycle; where minority groups are being 
persecuted in large numbers; or where watchdog groups, governments, or 
international agencies have identified a risk of mass atrocities or genocide. 
For countries receiving heightened scrutiny, companies could create 
specialist content evaluation teams with a short (three to six month), 
renewable mandate. Content regulation policy would be the product of 
consultations between multiple stakeholders including companies, 
governments, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, and civil society organizations with relevant human rights 
expertise. Content moderation itself would be carried out by local and 
native speakers of the relevant language(s) who are advised by expert 
policy analysts who know the history, culture, and politics of the country. 
Some companies such as Twitter have explored “trusted partner” 
programs where they consult with local users and prioritize their flagging 
of problematic posts.262 Trusted individuals or organizations can serve to 
identify problematic posts and alert companies through their content 
                                                                                                                     
259 Kaye, supra note 206, ¶ 50; see also Jessica Dheere, Considering Countering Violent 
Extremism in Lebanon, SMEX (May 1, 2016), https://smex.org/considering-countering-violent-
extremism-in-lebanon/ (recommending that companies hire and train teams of moderators “with 
cultural and linguistic sensitivity”).  
260 FRONT LINE DEFS., GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2018, supra note 65, at 16 (reporting incidents of 
threats, attacks, and intimidation in Guatemala, Columbia, and Mexico, and that WhatsApp has become 
a “powerful tool to disseminate hate messages”); see also FRONT LINE DEFS., STOP THE KILLINGS 26 
(2018) (describing intimidation of judges and public prosecutors in Guatemala). 
261  FRONT LINE DEFS., GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2018, supra note 65, at 4. 
262 ABBAS ET AL., supra note 232, at 39. 
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moderation processes. This would also allow for the identification of 
harmful posts without having to rely on vulnerable targets, since the act of 
reporting can put a target in danger. Trusted flaggers are likely to be more 
attuned to problematic posts because they have greater knowledge of the 
area, understand the context of the language used, and know how to 
navigate the content moderation process in general.263 For example, Waze 
uses data to identify which users are trustworthy content moderators on the 
basis of positive feedback that the information they provide is accurate and 
reliable.264 A similar approach might allow Facebook and Twitter to more 
effectively flag harmful speech.  
Special content evaluation teams in at-risk countries ought to scrutinize 
carefully the social media posts of senior political leaders. There has been 
recent controversy over whether hate speech posted by senior politicians 
ought to be tolerated on the grounds that it is newsworthy and has 
public-interest value. In 2019, Facebook indicated that it would implement 
a newsworthy exemption for politicians.265 In 2020, Twitter began to label 
President Donald J. Trump’s tweets with a fact-check label after he falsely 
claimed that mail-in ballots were fraudulent.266  
We have serious concerns about a newsworthiness exception as a 
global default on the grounds that senior politicians have played a vital role 
in inciting mass violence in almost all prior instances of genocide and 
crimes against humanity.267 The weight of social science evidence finds 
that “incitement is almost certainly more harmful when uttered by leaders 
than by other users.”268 For instance, political scientist Scott Straus 
analyzed twenty-four cases of mass violence in Africa and discovered that 
the most critical factor in each case was government authorities who 
encouraged violence and also coordinated it through their speech acts.269 
Other studies corroborate Straus’s findings and show that the greater the 
authority of the speaker, the more likely verbal instructions to commit 
                                                                                                                     
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 39–40; Places, WAZEOPEDIA, https://wazeopedia.waze.com/wiki/Canada/Places 
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genocide). 
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violent acts will be acted upon.270 Given these findings, a newsworthiness 
exemption for politicians might be re-examined in at-risk country settings, 
even if only on a temporary basis.  
Finally, and perhaps most ambitiously, we could envisage a 
reorganization of companies’ organizational structures and business 
models from industrial to artisanal models of content moderation.271 Social 
media companies generate their revenue from advertising, and internet 
advertising represented the largest and fastest-growing share of the 
advertising market by type of media, totaling $107 billion in 2018.272 In 
2019, Facebook’s third quarter results reported that it is on track to make 
over $60 billion in advertising revenue.273 Internet advertising is the only 
media type experiencing double digit (and nearly 20%) growth year after 
year.274 No self-respecting bricks-and-mortar advertising agency would 
operate in a market of any size without a physical presence or connection 
with a local subsidiary,275 but social media platforms dispensed with this 
model to establish, at lightning speed, global empires from their 
headquarters in San Francisco or Palo Alto.  
The corollaries and shortcomings of this unprecedented growth are 
now evident. Platforms are de facto global advertising companies that have 
yet to fully come to terms with this reality. In order to become truly global 
companies, they need to genuinely engage with the world. Otherwise, their 
policies and procedures, even with plenty of multi-stakeholder 
consultation, will continue to appear to be a form of U.S. cultural 
imperialism to many users outside the United States.276 This must, of 
course, be balanced against the safety needs of employees who may be 
targets for authoritarian governments. But decentralization of moderation 
                                                                                                                     
270 SARAH SORIAL, SEDITION AND THE ADVOCACY OF VIOLENCE: FREE SPEECH AND COUNTER-
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would be an important means toward greater democratization and 
contextualization of content governance. 
An artisanal content moderation model could involve dispensing with a 
universal list of hate speech terms implemented by automated tools and 
content moderators far removed from the circumstances of the speech. 
Companies are advised to open local offices or bureaus in each of the 
countries in which they operate, staffed by well-trained and recompensed 
local employees, at least some of whom are experienced investigative 
journalists. Their role would be to design and implement social media 
policy and content moderation procedures relating to disinformation, hate 
speech, and other forms of problematic expression, tailored to that country 
or region’s specific context. Review of escalated moderation cases would 
be conducted in-house and would draw on locally generated and 
continually revised lists of terms and expressions that are likely to harm. 
Local gatekeepers would consciously gatekeep and do so in a way that is 
transparent. The companies’ headquarters could exercise oversight and 
capacity building and support and maintain the automated tools, but local 
offices would have substantial leeway in content moderation policy 
formulation and application. This implies an openness on the part of 
companies to the “geographical segmentation” of their content moderation 
policies, and an acceptance of global legal pluralism in platform law.277 
The concerns stated earlier about Facebook’s oversight board are 
justified, but the board’s creation also presents opportunities for a more 
context-specific moderation policy. The list of the first twenty members is 
promising.278 The board is geographically diverse and includes 
representation from Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as North 
America and Europe.279 It comprises a former editor of The Guardian, a 
Nobel Prize winner, a former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Peaceful Assembly and Association, constitutional and human rights law 
professors, and others with a demonstrated commitment to freedom of 
expression and a willingness to denounce governments for human rights 
violations.280 The board may shed light on the currently opaque process of 
content moderation, as Facebook must respond publicly to all board 
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decisions and provide regular updates.281 The board can issue advisory 
statements on policy matters and Facebook must respond to those within 
thirty days.282 As Kadri and Klonick have suggested in their critique of 
Facebook’s “newsworthiness” exception,283 the board may be able to 
provide greater transparency on how concepts such as these are defined 
and applied. 
The critics are right that the board lacks the authority to address 
essential issues, and the board should consider amendments to the bylaws 
immediately and before it starts operations. The board’s competence 
should be expanded to include review of account removals 
(“deplatforming”) and content left up on the platform, as well as content 
taken down. The board should be able to consider content removed by 
Facebook in compliance with national laws restricting speech. The board 
should also have the authority to review and make binding decisions on the 
policies, practices, and procedures relating to content removal and political 
advertising. This could include policies that govern decisions about which 
terms violate platform law, such as key terms like “abusive” or 
“threatening.” Additionally, it could encompass procedures such as 
Facebooks’ algorithm for curating users’ personal feeds and news feeds. 
For the board to be effective and promote meaningful accountability, the 
bylaws must clearly state that its decisions constitute precedent, in the legal 
sense that they govern Facebook’s handling of all similar cases. To 
enhance transparency, the board should report quarterly rather than 
annually.284 Finally, the current bylaws do not take context sufficiently into 
account and need to be revised to require staff to provide the board with a 
summary analysis of the relevant political, social, and cultural context of 
each user post under review, including information on the range of posts 
associated with it.  
CONCLUSION 
The time-honored hate speech debate has now been superseded by the 
content regulation policies and procedures of global platforms that remove 
tens of thousands of abusive and inciting posts every day. The question is 
now not whether hate speech should be regulated in the public sphere, but 
how. We urge companies to develop and enhance a contextual element of 
their analysis, particularly in countries with a history of intergroup 
violence and weak state institutions. There are a number of measures that 
platforms could take to improve their content moderation policies and 
                                                                                                                     
281 Bylaws, art. 2, § 2.3.2. 
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consider context in their evaluation of potential hate speech, including 
drawing up localized lists of banned expression, ensuring that content 
moderators are native speakers of languages, and developing procedures to 
evaluate coded speech. In at-risk countries, companies should follow a 
more intensive strategy in which they provide heightened scrutiny of 
potentially harmful content, employ content moderators who are native and 
local speakers of languages, engage the guidance and assistance of local 
personnel and country experts in developing context-specific content 
moderation policies, consider the status of the speaker in evaluating the 
effect of speech on their platforms, and improve flagging processes to 
facilitate the gathering of context-specific information. These measures are 
not designed to be more restrictive of hate speech, but to ensure that any 
restrictions that are implemented are more precise, informed, and accurate.   
Some of these measures are easily implemented, others require a 
sea-change in company mission and philosophy. Platforms are unlikely to 
embark upon a radical restructuring on the merits of well-reasoned 
arguments alone. However, we believe the current approach to moderation 
will become increasingly untenable. Users may be unwilling to tolerate a 
toxic environment, but it is also unclear whether they will tolerate a private 
platform broadly censoring their speech. Governments are requiring an 
adherence to national hate speech policies with little guidance on what that 
requires. Furthermore, events like the genocide of the Rohingya in which a 
company badly mishandles a situation can cause severe reputational 
damage. Until companies revise their content moderation policies to 
integrate the context in which speech occurs, they will remain exposed to 
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The Power of the Civic Mindset:  
A Conceptual Framework for Overcoming Political 
Polarization 
DANIEL L. SHAPIRO 
This Article proposes a new conceptual paradigm for overcoming political 
polarization—the civic mindset. I argue that the primary psychological barrier to 
bridging political divides is an adversarial state of mind called the partisan mindset, 
and I explain its specific characteristics, fundamental operating principles, and 
triggers. To combat polarization, I introduce the civic mindset, elucidate its basic 
features and functions, and explain how societal embrace of this unique outlook can 
advance a vibrant political space within which partisan competition and national 
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The Power of the Civic Mindset:  
A Conceptual Framework for Overcoming Political 
Polarization 
DANIEL L. SHAPIRO * 
INTRODUCTION 
By design, democracy generates political tension. Opposing advocacy 
groups lobby for legislation, competing political parties must write, debate, 
and pass laws, and government branches conflict due to intentional overlap 
in responsibilities.1 But while tension is expected, contemporary politics is 
on fire.2 Political elites humiliate one another, legislators strategize ways to 
“win” a policy dispute and showcase the other party’s loss, and community 
members refuse to interact with their counterpart—generating a kind of 
“political warfare” that risks uprooting democratic institutions and the belief 
in their efficacy.3 Partisanship is natural, but intense polarization can 
jeopardize the system itself.  
Understanding the factors that contribute to political polarization can 
direct us to strategies to combat them. Social scientists have uncovered a 
variety of reasons for political divisiveness including economic disparities, 
discriminatory laws, gerrymandering, and media bias.4 While such structural 
                                                                                                                     
* Daniel L. Shapiro, Ph.D., is Founder and Director of the Harvard International Negotiation 
Program, Associate Professor of Psychology at Harvard Medical School / McLean Hospital, and Faculty 
Affiliate at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Adam Kuegler, 
Alexandria Madjeric, Hannah Kalichman, and the entire team at the Connecticut Law Review for 
outstanding feedback and editorial assistance. This Article benefitted from perspectives on civil discourse 
examined at the Connecticut Law Review’s symposium, How We Argue: The Moral Foundations of 
Politics and Law. I would like to thank fellow panelists Richard Wilson, David Gergen, Carol Anderson, 
and Leah Rigueur. I also am grateful to Mikhaila Fogel for her insights on how to sharpen the concept of 
the civic mindset. 
1 Separation of Powers—An Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx. 
2 An alternative metaphor may be that political sentiments are becoming colder. A Pew Research 
Center study found that between 2016 and 2019, the number of Republicans who gave Democrats a 
“cold” rating on a “feeling thermometer” from 1–100 rose by 14% and the number of Democrats who 
gave Republicans a cold rating grew by 16%. Growing Shares in Both Parties Give “Cold” Ratings to 
Those in Opposing Party, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.people-
press.org/2019/10/10/partisan-antipathy-more-intense-more-personal/pp_2019-10-10_state-of-
parties_0-01/ (showing a “feeling thermometer” to demonstrate how partisans give members of the 
opposite party a “cold rating”). 
3 Sean Theriault, Partisan Warfare Is the Problem, in POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 11, 11–15 (Daniel J. Hopkins & John Sides eds., 2015). 
4 See 2 RED AND BLUE NATION? CONSEQUENCES AND CORRECTION OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED 
 
 
1080 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:3 
forces predispose citizens to polarization, the ultimate arbiter of political 
behavior is the human heart.5 Political action from policy negotiations to 
voting behavior is heavily informed by mood, emotion, and attitude.6 In 
contemporary society, politics has become so emotionally charged that 
brutal partisan politics is the norm—resulting in gridlock, harsh character 
judgments, and, perhaps most ominously, threat to the survival of the 
democratic system.7  
This Article offers a new conceptual approach for overcoming 
polarization. I argue that the major psychological barrier to political 
cooperation is a divisive outlook I term the partisan mindset—a state of mind 
with specific characteristics, fundamental operating principles, and triggers. 
To overcome this psychological obstacle, I conceptualize an alternative state 
of mind—the civic mindset—that motivates concern for our own political 
interests and the legitimate interests of the multitude of political groups 
within society, resulting in a vibrant political space within which partisan 
competition and national unity can thrive. 
I. WHAT’S YOUR POLITICAL MINDSET? 
Mindset frames how we see the world and our place in it—including 
what we attend to, what we ignore, and how we make meaning of events.  
Politicians who view themselves as adversaries can spend years 
unsuccessfully debating legislation while political allies can solve the same 
issue in a single hallway conversation. The way they view their relationship 
has a big impact on the outcome of their exchange.  
Drawing on relational identity theory,8 I conceive of political mindset as 
the lens through which we make sense of the political landscape and orient 
relationally to political stakeholders. This mindset patterns our cognitive and 
emotional world, providing us with affectively tinged assumptions about 
whom to trust or doubt. In the public arena, the mindset we adopt acts as a 
pair of glasses that colors the way we perceive the entire political landscape 
and our place in it. We easily can detect the political mindset in a neighbor 
                                                                                                                     
POLITICS (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2008) (containing a variety of essays discussing the 
roots of political divisiveness in the United States). 
5 See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS 
AND RELIGION 34 (2012) (discussing the role human emotion plays in policial behavior and noting “[t]he 
head can’t even do head stuff without the heart”).  
6 See id. at 152–53 (discussing how the two ends of the political spectrum rely on “moral 
foundations”). 
7 See Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How a Democracy Dies, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.–Feb. 2018, 
at 17, 19 (discussing how modern politics poses a threat to the U.S. democratic system). 
8 See Daniel L. Shapiro, Relational Identity Theory: A Systematic Approach for Transforming the 
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who asks us, “Why on earth did you vote for that candidate?” This person 
holds an adversarial mindset and is primed to attack our views.  
We tend to assume everyone wears distorting glasses but us. We think 
others see the world through glasses that bias their understanding of reality, 
whereas we see the world as it is, a glass-less truth. But this is obviously not 
true. Social cognition predisposes everyone toward a biased interpretation 
of reality.9 Consequently, becoming aware of our own mindset frees us to 
decide whether to adopt a more constructive one. 
In the following sections, I introduce two mindsets that offer us choice 
on how to view the political landscape. One fuels polarization; the other 
quells it. 
 
Chart 1. Two fundamental political mindsets. 
 
II. THE PARTISAN MINDSET 
The political mindset most responsible for fueling polarization is what I 
term the partisan mindset, a divisive outlook that pits us against another 
political entity.10 This Section describes the nature and attributes of the 
partisan mindset, its operating principles, and the ways it gets fostered. 
To understand the partisan mindset, we must appreciate the basic 
elements and function of a tribe. I define a tribe as any group whose 
members view themselves as like-kinded, kin-like in their relational 
connection, and emotionally invested in the group’s enhancement.11 Being 
of like kind signifies that group members identify themselves as part of a 
shared political entity, whether a neighborhood organization, religious sect, 
or formal political party. Kin-like connection defines the nature of the 
relationship between members, who view themselves not as part of a loose 
affiliation or coalition but as members of an extended family, a deeply felt 
                                                                                                                     
9 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2011) (describing how human 
impressions, intuitions, and decisions are not conscious choices). 
10 See DANIEL SHAPIRO, NEGOTIATING THE NONNEGOTIABLE: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR MOST 
EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CONFLICTS, at xvii (2017). The partisan mindset is a politically nuanced 
subtype of the tribes effect described in NEGOTIATING THE NONNEGOTIABLE: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR 
MOST EMOTIONALLY CHARGED CONFLICTS 26 (2017). 
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bond. Emotional investment refers to the motivation of members to enhance 
the tribe’s status, power, and durability even in the face of personal sacrifice. 
The partisan mindset activates when we feel a threat to our tribal 
identity. Specific social cognitive conditions stimulate this perspective shift. 
At a bare minimum, there must be a salient threat to our identity, we must 
prioritize our tribal identity over other social identities, and the mindset itself 
must be cognitively accessible.12 The result is a relational outlook that 
predisposes us to experience divisive feelings, thoughts, and behavior 
toward the perceived source of threat. 
A. Key Attributes 
The partisan mindset has three major elements that affect our political 
worldview:13 
1. Adversarial 
We tend to view competing political parties through an adversarial lens 
that magnifies differences and minimizes similarities. A threat to our identity 
instigates a kind of relational amnesia, in which we ignore the countless 
personal and structural connections and fixate on political differences. 
Philosopher Martin Buber describes this movement toward disaffiliation as 
a shift from an “I-Thou” to an “I-It” relationship.14 A state of emotional 
arousal, such as that triggered during times of political tension, reduces the 
cognitive complexity of our social perceptions and results in polarized 
evaluations of our counterpart.15 At the extreme, daily confrontation with 
our own physical, mental, or collective mortality can heighten the perceived 
significance of our own group and lead us to devalue those who threaten our 
identity.16 
2. Self-righteous 
The partisan mindset involves the self-serving conviction that our 
political views are not only right, but morally superior. We assume that 
morality exists on a single, exclusive moral plane and reject the idea that 
multiple perceptions of political truth can coexist.17 Self-righteousness is 
                                                                                                                     
12 SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 342 
(2007). 
13 SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 27. 
14 MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 62–64 (Charles Scribner’s Sons trans., Touchstone 1st ed. 1996) 
(1970). 
15 Delroy L. Paulhus & David T. K. Lim, Arousal and Evaluative Extremity in Social Judgments: 
A Dynamic Complexity Model, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 90, 94 (1994). 
16 Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality 
Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural Worldview, 58 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 308, 317 (1990). 
17 The Pew Research Center found that in today’s polarized society, a majority of Democrats and 
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founded on arrogance and is distinguishable from righteous indignation—
the boiling anger that emerges when we confront injustice.  
3. Insular 
The partisan mindset locks us in a closed political system. We watch 
news shows that reinforce our political views, frequent social media sites 
that support our political values, build friendships with those who maintain 
similar perspectives, and resist talking politics with political counterparts. 
The more closely we follow public affairs, the more likely we are to express 
negative sentiments about the opposing party,18 bolstering hostility toward 
our political counterpart. 
B. Operating Principles 
The partisan mindset operates on a few basic principles. First, loyalty to 
the tribe takes priority.19 People who identify heavily with a political tribe 
will tend to make greater sacrifices for their own tribe than for other groups. 
Social evolutionists have discovered that the likelihood of our committing a 
costly altruistic action depends upon the genetic closeness to the recipient 
and the benefit to that person or group;20 we sacrifice more for those who 
share our bloodlines. Human psychology extends this tendency to 
individuals who are connected through perceived kinship, thus imbuing 
political tribes with substantial influence over political action. 
Second, partisan norms urge blind loyalty to the party platform—
regardless of the degree to which policies serve personal interest.21 This 
affords tribal leaders great personal power because they can rely on their 
political base to support their policies and block plans of political foes. But 
blind loyalty erodes merit-based decision making, because people care more 
about maintaining fidelity to their own political party than about finding 
ways to advance the legitimate interests of the multitude of political groups 
within society.   
Third, cooperation with political outgroups is taboo. During times of 
polarization, the mere act of being seen talking with members of another 
political party, let alone negotiating in good faith, can fuel accusations of 
betrayal and result in political and social punishment.   
                                                                                                                     
Republicans view the other side as closed-minded, and a substantial set of partisans judged their 
counterpart as immoral. Most Republicans and Democrats View Each Other as More Closed-Minded 
Than Other Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/10/10/how-
partisans-view-each-other/pp_2019-10-10_state-of-parties_2-01/; Growing Shares in Both Parties Give 
“Cold” Ratings to Those in Opposing Party, supra note 2. 
18 Most Republicans and Democrats View Each Other as More Closed-Minded Than Other 
Americans, supra note 17. 
19 Shapiro, supra note 8, at 638. 
20 W. D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1, 8 
(1964). 
21 Shapiro, supra note 8, at 635, 639. 
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In sum, the partisan mindset prioritizes allegiance to the tribe, fosters 
blind loyalty to the party platform, and condemns cross-party engagement.   
C. What Fosters the Partisan Mindset? 
There are many roads to political polarization—but through my 
international work in conflict resolution over the past thirty years, I have 
observed a prevalent dynamic that I call the “Declare-Defend-Descend 
Model.”   
Declare. This dynamic begins when a person or group communicates 
their political identity subtly or explicitly within a conversation or through a 
formal or informal platform. Consider an example between two attorneys, 
Leigh and Ron. As they enter the elevator to head home after work, Leigh 
says, “I can’t believe how awful that congressman’s speech was last night!” 
She implicitly declares aspects of her political identity through this 
statement. But Ron hears her words as an assault on his own sacred values, 
awakening the partisan mindset in him and impelling him to say, “I actually 
thought the congressman had a lot of guts to say what he did!” He declares 
his political identity. 
Defend. Now these lawyers are experiencing a clash of identities, and 
their conversation moves toward self-defensive measures.22 Ron frets over 
his working relationship with Leigh. Sharing opposing politics feels taboo, 
and he worries that if they delve too deeply into political conversation, they 
may never get out. Taboos protect their relationship and identities from 
harm. 
In an attempt to understand Leigh’s perspective, Ron asks, “Why didn’t 
you like the congressman’s speech?” His intention is admirable, but his tone 
exudes self-righteous indignation. The more Leigh justifies her stance, the 
more compelled he feels to argue back. He fights within himself to resist 
turning the conversation into a fierce debate and musters willpower not to 
pick apart her arguments one-by-one, let alone to dismiss her entire 
character. 
Descend. Finally, the time comes for Ron to share his own perspective. 
The moment he launches into his rationale, she attacks it with unexpected 
ferocity, and they get consumed in a vertigo-like swirl of exasperated anger. 
Fortunately, they temper their emotions and close the conversation on an 
amicable note. That night, Ron laments to a close friend, “How can Leigh—
in her right mind—criticize the congressman’s effectiveness?” The friend 
supports Ron’s perspective, bolstering his belief in the legitimacy of his 
claims and vindicating him of intellectual and moral ineptitude. This is 
identity politics in action—enlisting his friend to affirm his political stance 
so he can feel “in the right”—despite that same confirmation fortifying the 
                                                                                                                     
22 SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 148. 
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partisan mindset. Unsurprisingly, the relationship between Ron and Leigh 
descends. 
This experience illuminates a set of emotional dynamics that draws us 
into the partisan mindset. In my book, Negotiating the Nonnegotiable, I 
introduce these “lures,” which often affect our relationships outside of our 
conscious awareness:23 
• Vertigo is a warped state of consciousness in which a 
conflictual relationship consumes our emotional 
energies. In a polarized society, we can become 
obsessed with conflict amid the twenty-four-hour 
news cycle of “breaking news,” the constant stream of 
on-line partisan criticism, and daily political smears 
by public officials and activists.   
• An assault on the sacred is an attack on the most 
meaningful aspects of our identity, whether political 
values, views, or beliefs. Leaders easily can incite 
constituents to take political action by framing an 
issue as an assault on sacred beliefs, values, and 
allegiances. A politician, for example, may try to gain 
support for war by framing it as a critical means “to 
eliminate grave, imminent threats to the lives of our 
children here in our homeland.” 
• Taboos are social prohibitions—actions we are not 
supposed to do, thoughts we are not supposed to think, 
and emotions we are not supposed to feel. During 
times of political polarization, a taboo on cross-party 
engagement can affect people at all levels of society—
from senior leadership being accused of betrayal if 
they talk with the “enemy” to everyday citizens who 
avoid political or social conversation with colleagues 
holding opposing views.   
• The repetition compulsion lures us to repeat a 
dysfunctional pattern of behavior, as when officials 
predictably reach political stalemate at the same time 
each year over the same policy issue. This lure afflicts 
interpersonal relations, too. When discussing heated 
political issues, we may reenact a destructive dispute 
resolution behavior that we learned in our younger 
years, such as treating every conflict as a 
confrontation. 
                                                                                                                     
23 Id. at xvii. In Negotiating the Nonnegotiable, I call these forces the “five lures of the tribal mind.” 
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• Identity politics is the process of allying with a person 
or group in order to advance a political purpose. A 
political leader delivering a speech may state that “in 
the name of our lost soldiers and family members, in 
the name of our constitutional ideals, we must stick 
together to fight the evil enemy!” This leader builds 
affiliation with the audience through shared history 
and values, and uses those associations to garner 
political support for military action. 
These five lures pull us toward the partisan mindset in conflicts of all 
sizes, from international divides to everyday political disputes. In fact, if you 
re-read the argument between Ron and Leigh, you will notice that each of 
the lures was present and drew the colleagues toward the partisan mindset. 
The two lawyers’ relationship survived, but a democracy that operates 
purely on political tribalism has no backbone and slowly, piece by piece, can 
fall.24 It turns out, however, that the partisan mindset is not a fait accompli. 
I now introduce an alternative mindset that can be enlisted to increase 
societal cohesion and democratic ideals.  
III. THE CIVIC MINDSET 
The political mindset most responsible for bridging partisan divides in 
democratic societies is what I term the civic mindset, a unifying outlook that 
connects people together via identification as fellow citizens who work 
together to address the legitimate interests of political groups, resolve 
differing interests through mutually acceptable processes, and take 
communal need into account. This Section introduces the mindset, its 
operating principles, and the ways in which it is fostered. 
The origin of the word civic provides insight into its meaning. It derives 
from the French word civique, meaning citizen, and can be traced further 
back to the Latin phrase corona civica, a garland of oak leaves and acorns 
awarded to those who saved a fellow citizen from death.25 Civics invokes a 
sense of connection, duty, and responsibility to one’s homeland and the 
people who reside within it.  
I have chosen to describe the mindset as “civic,” not “civil.” While the 
two words are closely aligned and share a similar etymology, the word civil 
often implies respectful behavior, whereas the word civic emphasizes the 
overarching political identity that holds citizens together. My view is that a 
society with a strong enough civic foundation can withstand even fierce 
                                                                                                                     
24 STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 77 (2018). 
25 Civic, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries. 
com/us/definition/english/civic (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
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political debate and, in the ideal, emerge with new collective understandings 
and mutually beneficial action ideas.26   
The civic mindset embraces national identity—but not to the exclusion 
of tribal identity. In general, both dimensions are equally important to 
nurture within the democratic political sphere. A strong national identity 
encourages policies and political behavior that serve the common good, and 
inclusive politics empowers diverse groups to voice and address their unique 
concerns through the shared political system. While tension will inevitably 
emerge between national and tribal concerns, the civic mindset motivates 
the quest for a pareto-optimal system of political decision making that 
optimizes these two concerns to the extent possible. 
A. Key Attributes 
The civic mindset has three key characteristics that shape our political 
worldview: 
1. Cooperative – But Not Naïve 
The civic mindset motivates us to proactively seek opportunities for 
cross-party collaboration while recognizing the inherent competitiveness of 
politics. From a civic perspective, the purpose of the republic is to satisfy 
citizens’ interests through a combination of competition and cooperation. 
Social scientists call this a mixed-motive context, because there is an 
incentive for citizens to compete and to collaborate.27 Political parties must 
compete for votes and influence while the broader citizenry can cooperate 
on countless matters of common concern. Political tribes may battle over 
laws on abortion, but the entire society can work together on a public 
campaign to stop teen pregnancy. The civic mindset helps us see this kind 
of civic possibility. Additionally, this mindset reminds citizens from across 
political ideologies of the necessity to work together to strengthen core 
democratic institutions and procedures—the very structures in which 
political parties compete for power. 
2. Pluralistic 
In valuing the concept of citizenry, the civic mindset encourages 
toleration of diversity and the notion that multiple perceptions of truth can 
coexist. This does not mean we must abandon our convictions or assume 
                                                                                                                     
26 See, e.g., Civic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/civic (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (defining “civic” as “of or relating to a citizen, a city, 
citizenship, or community affairs”); Civil, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/civil (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (defining “civil” as “adequate in courtesy and 
politeness”). 
27 See, e.g., Philip S. Gallo, Jr. & Charles G. McClintock, Cooperative and Competitive Behavior 
in Mixed-Motive Games, J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68, 68 (1965) (explaining that in mixed-motive situations, 
the players’ goals are “partially coincident and partially in conflict”). 
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others’ beliefs are true. The minimal threshold of pluralism is toleration of 
diverse perspectives of truth—as long as those worldviews do not impinge 
upon anyone’s constitutional rights or dignity. While this creates space for 
all citizens’ voices, society still must decide the limits of pluralism. Should 
people tolerate multiple perceptions of truth, accept them at a distance, or 
revere them? Pluralism is key to civic life in a democracy, and it is the 
people’s responsibility to determine its bounds. 
3. Community-spirited 
The civic mindset emphasizes broadscale community welfare.28 This 
conception of civic responsibility stretches beyond the words in the 
Constitution to the spirit of democracy. We serve the broader community 
not solely because we must do so by law, but because we want to: we 
internalize an emotional commitment to form a “more perfect union.”29 This 
expansive identity creates political space for tribes of all types to feel 
emotionally included in society and to engage in the political process. Every 
citizen is an equal part of the national project. The mission of the United 
States Army, for example, is not to protect some citizens over others but to 
provide for “the defense of the United States, the Commonwealths and 
possessions and any areas occupied by the United States.”30 
Chart 2 summarizes the qualities of the partisan mindset and civic 
mindset. The partisan mindset lures us toward polarization whereas the civic 
mindset opens political space for cooperation. 
 
Chart 2. The contrasting characteristics of the partisan mindset and civic 
mindset. 
Partisan Mindset Civic Mindset 
1. Adversarial 1. Cooperative 
2. Self-righteous 2. Pluralistic 
3. Insular 3. Community-spirited 
B. Operating Principles 
The civic mindset operates on a few basic principles. First, loyalty to the 
republic takes on deep importance. Even kindergarteners in most U.S. states 
pledge allegiance every day “to the flag of the United States of America, and 
to the Republic for which it stands.”31 This does not mean we must abandon 
our tribal identity or view it as inferior, but that we locate it—in all its glory 
and wholeness—within the broader sphere of a civic identity, at least within 
                                                                                                                     
28 The preamble of the U.S. Declaration of Independence states that “all men are created equal.” 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
29 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
30 10 U.S.C. § 7062 (2018). 
31 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2018). 
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the context of political decision making. Much like the relationship between 
an eggshell and yolk, there is a symbiotic relationship between national and 
tribal identification. Widespread affiliation with the nation enhances the felt 
connection between tribes, which increases trust in the broader political 
system and better enables individual tribes to address their concerns. 
Second, wherever possible, political issues are tackled through 
cooperative decision making rather than through blind loyalty politics. 
Political tribes still compete for power and influence but also draw on cross-
party cooperation to optimize societal decision making. Inter-party 
cooperation may sound like a wishful vision within a polarized society, but 
this civic-minded outlook has proven successful at various points in 
American political history. A classic example is President Kennedy’s 
emphasis on public service. Other cultures also have leveraged the power of 
cross-group cooperation for societal benefit. Japanese economic scholars 
credit much of their country’s industrial success to the embrace of the 
philosophy of its Omi merchants who, beginning in the medieval period, 
measured success by the degree to which their business was good for 
themselves, the customer, and society.32 
Third, the civic mindset fosters the felt duty to negotiate across party 
lines to solve societal issues, and to feel ashamed if one fails to do so in good 
faith. If enough leaders and social influencers advocate for this approach, 
norms of political communication can shift.33 Strikingly, interstate war joins 
citizens of opposing political persuasions in a united front against an external 
enemy, producing a civic mindset of sorts. As polarization tears at the seams 
of democracy, citizens would be wise to adopt that same mindset. 
C. Fostering the Civic Mindset 
There are at least two major pathways to cultivate a civic mindset. The 
first is to adopt the role of a civic leader who acts cooperatively, thinks 
pluralistically, and engages with a community-minded spirit. Anyone can 
get involved in local politics, write an op-ed, start a political blog, or serve 
the community by volunteering at an eldercare facility or school. One also 
can encourage others to take up their civic duties. A simple example took 
place in my home last week. My fourteen-year old son Noah sometimes gets 
                                                                                                                     
32 Kenzo Moriguchi, Forum Holds Up Omi Feudal Merchants as Models of Corporate 
Responsibility, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 30, 2001), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2001/10/30/ 
events/forum-holds-up-omi-feudal-merchants-as-models-of-corporate-responsibility/#.XiqG9mhKh3h. 
33 What happens if one political party embraces a civic mindset and the other holds to a partisan 
outlook? One might assume that aggressive partisans would pressure civic-minded cooperators to 
accommodate to their demands. But this oversimplifies the mechanisms of politics. Within any political 
tribe, there are internal forces advocating for and against issues, there are backchannel negotiations 
affecting policy decisions, there are cross-party meetings between political advisors—and all of these 
forums offer the opportunity for the civic-minded leader to influence the decision-making process and to 
produce results that are better for each political tribe and for society as a whole. 
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into conflict with his eight-year-old brother Liam. I needed Noah to babysit 
Liam but was nervous that they might fight. I nearly told Noah not to bully 
his younger brother while I was gone but instead said, “While I’m out, can 
you help Liam make his breakfast?” Inviting Noah into the role of household 
helper fostered in him a kind of civic mindset that elevated his purpose and 
improved my sons’ dynamic that morning. 
Another method to foster the civic mindset is via a method I call the 
“Connect-Respect-Transcend Model,” which provides an overarching 
framework for interacting constructively across tribal lines. 
Connect. The first step is to build emotional connection.34 Recall Ron 
and Leigh’s conversation about the congressman’s speech. Before launching 
into identity declarations, they could have spent a few minutes catching up 
on each other’s lives. Small talk has big importance, for people come to view 
each other as multifaceted human beings rather than as partisan stereotypes, 
and their emotional connection creates a “holding environment” that can 
sustain the relationship even in the face of acrimony.35 Ron also could have 
been much more cautious in airing political differences. Rather than 
responding reflexively in political banter, he could have inquired about 
Leigh’s interest in talking politics. Though she initiated the conversation, 
she may have intended to make a simple declaration and not to engage in 
full-fledged political debate. With mutual consent, they could have entered 
the taboo territory of political dialogue with greater sensitivity. 
Respect. Ron could have demonstrated greater respect for Leigh’s views 
by asking open-ended questions: What provoked her strong reaction to the 
congressman’s talk? What values felt assaulted? He could have 
communicated his understanding of her views, checked in with her to make 
sure he understood correctly, and shared which values of hers most 
resonated with him. By respecting her experience, he could have built 
greater emotional connection. 
Resisting the repetition compulsion was paramount to the modest 
success of their conversation. Given the intensity of Ron’s political beliefs, 
he was hyperaware of the risk of their conversation becoming adversarial 
and sought to temper the expression of his strong views. Nevertheless, he 
could have suggested a simple process to guide their conversation, such as 
having them each share the personal significance of their views, turning the 
                                                                                                                     
34 Emotional connections must be built at the national as well as regional and interpersonal levels. 
In examining ways to stem the tide of political tribalism in the United States, Amy Chua notes that 
“citizens will . . . need to collectively fashion a national identity capable of resonating with and holding 
together Americans of all sorts—old and young, immigrant and native born, urban and rural, rich and 
poor, descendants of slaves as well as descendants of slave owners.” Amy Chua, Tribal World: Group 
Identity Is All, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 25, 33 (2018). 
35 See D. W. Winnicott, The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship, 41 INT’L J. 
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debate over whose politics is “right” into an emotionally revealing exchange 
about the roots of their political identities. 
Transcend. Ron and Leigh could have been more open to listening for 
sake of learning. Neither individual’s political views would have changed, 
but they could have expanded their understanding of the political terrain and 
important interests at stake for various constituencies. 
This is the civic mindset coming to life: We approach differences jointly, 
commit to the “relentless we,” and refuse to fall prey to political tribalism.36 
The more we listen, learn, and share, the more we fall into a positive 
vertigo—a free-flowing conversation that stirs enthusiasm, curiosity, and 
fulfillment of our civic duty. We maintain our beliefs while transcending 
difference. 
IN SUMMARY 
When political polarization threatens to undermine the ideals and 
functionality of democracy, there is a societal imperative to embrace a civic 
mindset. While the partisan mindset pits groups against one another and 
reduces political space for collaboration, the civic mindset motivates 
national cohesion and expands political space for mutually beneficial 
decision making. In this frame of mind, citizens across interest groups 
cooperate on issues of shared concern, embrace pluralism, and foster a 
community-minded spirit. Political parties still compete for power and 
influence—but within a broader identity that binds them together in the quest 
for a more perfect union. 
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Article 
The Role of Lawyers and Law Schools in Fostering 
Civil Public Debate 
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VIKRAM D. AMAR 
Partisanship can make policy discussion and civil debate difficult. Partisan 
differences in how facts and policies are understood contribute to the escalation of 
conflict and a lack of cooperation. Lawyers are not immune from these human 
tendencies. But good lawyers have, and good law schools teach, values, 
knowledge, and skills that can aid in fostering and modeling more productive 
debate and resolution of conflict. 
Lawyers are trained and socialized to internalize and safeguard the 
foundational tenets of our constitutional democracy, to uphold the law even when 
it does not reflect their own individual preferences. The professional rules of 
conduct encourage lawyers to separate the professional from the personal, and 
expect that vigorous debate, dissent, and zealous advocacy will be done in a 
professional manner. Lawyers are taught to think about issues, cases, or 
arguments from multiple sides and to value rational argument, the primacy of 
evidence and facts, and neutral processes in which cases are decided on their 
merits. The nuanced approaches to conflict that are required of lawyers—
distinguishing productive and unproductive conflict, both creating and claiming 
value, and acting as both advisors and advocates—equip lawyers with abilities 
that help them generate and manage more productive debate. 
Law schools, then, should strive to provide even better grounding in these 
values, knowledge, and skills. Lawyers should endeavor to highlight for 
themselves, their clients and colleagues, and their opponents nuanced approaches 
to conflict and debate. And law schools and lawyers should work to educate the 
broader citizenry about the values of our constitutional democracy and to model 
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We are in a time in which political polarization is frequently in the 
headlines,1 public opinion polls reveal a pervasive sense of division2 and a 
sense that political discussions have become less grounded in facts,3 and 
many are concerned about the civility (or lack thereof) with which we treat 
each other across political differences.4 Partisanship can, indeed, make 
policy discussion and civil debate difficult. And there are many aspects of 
human psychology that can contribute to the hurdles. Take a prominent 
example: people interpret policies and information differently depending 
                                                                                                                     
* Alice Curtis Campbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois College 
of Law. Our thanks go to Jean Sternlight for her very helpful comments and suggestions. 
** Dean, Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Jaclyn Gallucci, When It Comes to Politics, Americans Are Divided. Can Data Change 
That?, FORTUNE (July 17, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/07/17/political-polarization-in-
america-define/ (discussing “polarization unity” and how polarized voters and campaign donor 
influence furthers political division); Natalie Pattillo, As Shutdown Pauses, Coverage Focuses on 
Partisan Polarization, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/politics/
shutdown-partisan-coverage.php (describing focus of news coverage on polarization). See also Shanto 
Iyengar et al., The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States, 22 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 129, 130–31 (2019) (describing affective polarization and how to mitigate it); Samara 
Klar et al., Opinion, Is America Hopelessly Polarized, or Just Allergic to Politics?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/opinion/polarization-politics-democrats-
republicans.html (suggesting that we are less polarized than we think). See generally JOSHUA GREENE, 
MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 5, 14–16 (2014) 
(describing “us v. them” conflicts and the role they play in moral decision making); JONATHAN HAIDT, 
THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION, at xi–xii (2012) 
(describing how a “righteous” mind enables both cooperation and moralistic conflict). 
2 See, e.g., ROBERT P. JONES & MAXINE NAJLE, PRRI, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS: THE 
FATE OF PLURALISM IN A DIVIDED NATION 28 (2019), https://www.prri.org/research/american-
democracy-in-crisis-the-fate-of-pluralism-in-a-divided-nation/ (finding that “Americans are nearly 
unanimous in their belief that the country is divided over politics (91%), with 74% of Americans saying 
that the country is very divided”). 
3 Most Americans Say Political Debate in the U.S. Has Become Less Respectful, Fact-Based, 
Substantive, PEW RES. CTR. (July 18, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/ 
americans-say-the-nations-political-debate-has-grown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-to-
violence/ft_19-07-18_toxicpolitics_most-americans-say-political-debate-us-less-respectful-fact-based-
substantive/ (finding that 76% of American adults believe political debate has grown less fact-based in 
recent years).  
4 WEBER SHANDWICK, POWELL TATE & KRC RESEARCH, CIVILITY IN AMERICA 2019: 
SOLUTIONS FOR TOMORROW 2, 8–9, 10–15 (2019), https://www.webershandwick.com/news/civility-in-
america-2019-solutions-for-tomorrow/. 
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on their perspective and preferences,5 and assess evidence in accordance 
with preferences and prior beliefs.6 And recent research has found that 
people’s ideological beliefs can even make it difficult to evaluate the basic 
logical validity of arguments.7 
Despite these tendencies, we tend to believe that our own perceptions 
and experiences are objective and accurate, and often fail to realize the 
ways that our perceptions are influenced by our own perspective, 
knowledge, expectations, and desires—a phenomenon known as naïve 
realism.8 This naïve realism creates the “feeling that [our] own take on the 
world enjoys particular authenticity, and that other actors will, or at least 
should, share that take, if they are attentive, rational, and objective 
perceivers of reality and open-minded seekers of truth.”9 This feeling tends 
to make us confident that we should be able to persuade others of the 
rightness of our positions.10 But when others persist in having different 
views, it can lead us to conclude that they are unreasonable, biased, or 
                                                                                                                     
5 See, e.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 132–34 (1954) (finding partisan interpretations by the fans of 
opposing sports teams); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the 
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 854–55, 883–85 (2012) (finding that preferences 
and prior beliefs influenced interpretations of videotape of a political demonstration); David 
Tannenbaum et al., On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioural Policy Interventions, 1 NATURE HUM. 
BEHAV. 1, 5 (2017) (finding that people find behavioral interventions more ethical when the nature of 
the intervention matches their political beliefs and less ethical when it does not); Leaf Van Boven et al., 
Psychological Barriers to Bipartisan Public Support for Climate Policy, 13 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 
492, 493, 496–500 (2018) (describing how partisans devalue policy proposals from an opposing party). 
6 Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2108 
(1979); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 197 (1998). 
7 Anup Gampa et al., (Ideo)Logical Reasoning: Ideology Impairs Sound Reasoning, 10 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1075, 1082 (2019). See generally Peter H. Ditto et al., At Least Bias Is 
Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives, 14 PERSP. ON 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 273 (2019) (reporting a meta-analysis of the tendency “to evaluate otherwise identical 
information more favorably when it supports one’s political beliefs and allegiances”). 
8 Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 646 (Thomas Gilovich et 
al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
9 Id. Naïve realism also leads to the belief that we make more accurate assessments of other 
people than they make of us. This is the illusion of asymmetric insight. “We insist that our ‘outsider 
perspective’ affords us insights about our peers that they are denied by their defensiveness, 
egocentricity, or other sources of bias. By contrast, we rarely entertain the notion that others are seeing 
us more clearly and objectively than we see ourselves.” Emily Pronin et al., You Don’t Know Me, But I 
Know You: The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 639 (2001). 
This can mean that we are prone to “talk when we would do well to listen and to be less patient than we 
ought to be when others express the conviction that they are the ones who are being misunderstood or 
judged unfairly.” Id. at 652–53. 
10 Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict 
and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 116 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).  
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ill-motived.11 Research has found that people commonly conclude that 
those who disagree with them are biased, simply because they disagree.12 
Once a person attributes bias to another, they tend to see their conflict as 
more pervasive, to expect cooperation to be less worthwhile, and to act 
more competitively. Not surprisingly, this tends to cause the other person 
to respond in kind, creating a spiral of conflict.13 And incivility makes 
arguments seem less sound,14 likely contributing to the escalation of 
conflict. 
When differences in perspective are particularly focal—e.g., two 
people are on different sides of a contentious issue—we tend to 
overestimate those differences.15 Similarly, we tend to overestimate the 
degree to which things like ideology and self-interest influence other 
people’s views and behavior, believing that others are more motivated or 
influenced by these than we are ourselves.16 One study asked people with 
varying views on an issue to express their own judgments and also to 
predict how their understandings would differ from those with other 
political views.17 While there were, in fact, differences in how people with 
different political views perceived the case, these differences were 
relatively small compared to the large differences predicted by the 
participants.18 These sorts of mispredictions can mean that people are 
overly doubtful and cynical about the potential fruits of collaboration or 
finding common ground.19 
                                                                                                                     
11 Id. at 111; Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of 
Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 793 (2004); Leigh Thompson & George 
Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 193 (1992). 
12 Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of Bias and 
the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 845 (2008).   
13 Id. 
14 Jason R. Popan et al., Testing the Effects of Incivility During Internet Political Discussion on 
Perceptions of Rational Argument and Evaluations of a Political Outgroup, 96 COMPUTERS HUM. 
BEHAV. 123, 130 (2019). 
15 Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Perspective Taking: Misstepping into Others’ Shoes, in 
HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 297, 304 (Keith D. Markman et al. eds., 
2009). 
16 Chip Heath, On the Social Psychology of Agency Relationships: Lay Theories of Motivation 
Overemphasize Extrinsic Incentives, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 25, 
26 (1999); Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 1053, 1053 (1999); Rebecca K. 
Ratner & Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest and Its Effects on Social Action, 81 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14 (2001); see also Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, “Naive Cynicism” in 
Everyday Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 743, 751 (1999) (finding that “people have cynical intuitions about how others assess 
responsibility”). 
17 Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in 
Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414 (1995). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 416.  
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Lawyers, of course, are not immune from these human tendencies. The 
adversarial nature of our legal system and the representative nature of legal 
practice means that lawyers must necessarily operate much of the time 
with a partisan perspective.20 This partisan lens can contribute to the sorts 
of spirals just described.21 And incivility in the profession has been a topic 
of concern.22 
But good lawyers have, and good law schools teach, a range of values, 
knowledge, and skills that should be useful in fostering and modeling more 
productive debate and resolution of conflict.23 
Importantly, lawyers are trained and socialized to internalize and 
safeguard the foundational tenets of our constitutional democracy.24 The 
rule of law in the United States—and the prospect over time of formulating 
better policy that itself will be respected as legitimate—depends on notice 
and opportunity to be heard, the robust exercise of freedom of speech and a 
free press, substantive engagement of ideas, and confidence that dissenting 
viewpoints are engaged on their merits rather than merely overridden or 
                                                                                                                     
20 See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial 
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150–51 (1993) (finding that representation of a party on one side 
of a legal case influences perceptions of fairness). See also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838, 
887, 896–97 (2009) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize how different people might 
interpret a video of a police chase in Scott v. Harris). 
21 See, e.g., Stephen M. Garcia et al., Morally Questionable Tactics: Negotiations Between 
District Attorneys and Public Defenders, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 731, 737 (2001) 
(finding that attorneys viewed questionable negotiation tactics as more appropriate when used in 
response to the perceived use of questionable tactics by the other side).  
22 See NAT’L CTR. FOR PROF’L & RESEARCH ETHICS, SURVEY ON PROFESSIONALISM: A STUDY 
OF ILLINOIS LAWYERS 2014, at 5 (2014), https://www.2civility.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Study-
of-Illinois-Lawyers-2014.pdf (noting that more than eighty-five percent of lawyers surveyed reported 
experience with some kind of uncivil behavior in the past six months, such as sarcasm, condescension, 
misrepresentation, or negotiating in bad faith); LAUREN STILLER RIKLEEN, RIKLEEN INST. FOR 
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP, SURVEY OF WORKPLACE CONDUCT AND BEHAVIORS IN LAW FIRMS 33, 38 
(2018), https://wbawbf.org/sites/WBAR-PR1/files/WBA%20Survey%20of%20Workplace%20Conduct
%20and%20Behaviors%20in%20Law%20Firms%20FINAL.pdf (describing inappropriate behavior at 
law firms); Sam Skolnik, More Than Third of Female Lawyers Harassed at Work, Survey Shows, 
BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/more-than-third-of-female-
lawyers-harassed-at-work-survey-shows (reporting that more than a third of female lawyers have been 
sexually harassed at work). 
23 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 
347, 349–51 (2004) (suggesting that lawyers, as neutral advocates, are well-suited to assist in 
democratic discourse). 
24 Interestingly, the President of the American Bar Association and the President of the 
Association of American Law Schools both recently highlighted the importance of lawyers and legal 
education in upholding and educating the public about the rule of law and the “pillars” of constitutional 
democracy. Judy Perry Martinez, President’s Letter: Promise to a Nation, A.B.A. J., Sept.–Oct. 2019, 
at 6; Vicki Jackson, President, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., 2019 Presidential Address at the Second 
Meeting of the AALS House of Representatives: Pillars of Democracy: Law, Representation, and 
Knowledge (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/winter-2019/pillars-of-
democracy/. 
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ignored.25 Lawyers are the cultural custodians of this distinctive 
government by the people, for the people, and of the people.26 When we 
say—as we often do—that we are a nation of laws, not people,27 what we 
mean is that our highest obedience is to a set of principles of governance, 
not to the particular people who govern. This is why no person is above (or 
below) the law, and why lawyers are required and trained to uphold the 
law, even when it does not reflect their own individual preferences.28 That 
does not, of course, mean that lawyers passively accept laws that they 
believe to be unjust. Indeed, a big part of a lawyer’s role is to work for 
legal reform29 through the mechanisms of our constitutional democracy. 
That is why lawyers are permitted to take positions that are not supported 
by existing law, provided they are, in the words of one important ethics 
formulation, “warranted . . . by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
exten[sion], modif[ication], or revers[al of] existing law[,] or for [the] 
establish[ment] of new law.”30 
In serving as institutional and cultural custodians, lawyers are required 
to assume particular roles. It is for this reason that professional rules of 
conduct encourage—and successful law schools teach—lawyers to 
separate the professional from the personal.31 Vigorous debate, dissent, and 
zealous advocacy are all valued—and can all be done in a professional 
manner. As Shakespeare once said: “[D]o as adversaries do in law, strive 
                                                                                                                     
25 Overview – Rule of Law, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/
educational-activities/overview-rule-law (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). 
26 Former Solicitor General: Government Lawyers Critical to Rule of Law in Troubling Times, 
A.B.A. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/
2018/10/former-solicitor-general--government-lawyers-critical-to-rule-of/. 
27 David Davenport, A Nation of Laws, Not Men, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Sept. 2, 2013), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/nation-laws-not-men. 
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating the lawyer must 
abide by a client’s decision and that representation of a client does not mean the lawyer endorses the 
client’s political or moral views). 
29 The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, “[a]s a public citizen, a 
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service 
rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate 
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work 
to strengthen legal education.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
31 See, e.g., CODE OF PROF’L COURTESY no. 10 (KY. BAR ASS’N), https://www.kybar.org/ 
page/procourtesy (“A lawyer should recognize that the conflicts within a legal matter are professional 
and not personal and should endeavor to maintain a friendly and professional relationship with other 
attorneys in the matter. In other words, ‘leave the matter in the courtroom.’”); OBA STANDARDS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM r. 2.7 (OKLA. BAR ASS’N 2006), https://www.okbar.org/ec/standardsof 
professionalism/ (“We understand, and will impress upon our client, that reasonable people can 
disagree without being disagreeable; and that effective representation does not require, and in fact is 
impaired by, conduct which objectively can be characterized as uncivil, rude, abrasive, abusive, vulgar, 
antagonistic, obstructive or obnoxious.”). For a content analysis of state bar civility codes, see Donald 
E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility as an Obligation of 
Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 107–28 (2011). 
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mightily, but eat and drink as friends.”32 In addition to the rules and norms 
of professionalism, lawyers also have their own interests in treating those 
on the opposing side of a particular issue, case, or dispute with respect. 
Lawyers are repeat-players and are likely to encounter each other in future 
cases. Reputation—for ethicality, competence, problem-solving ability, or 
civility —is an important asset that should not be squandered.33 Moreover, 
someone who is on the opposing side in this case may be a partner or 
collaborator in the next.  
Lawyers are trained to think about issues, cases, or arguments from 
multiple sides.34 Lawyers cannot make good predictions if they have not 
thought about an issue in a complex, and multifaceted way. And lawyers 
would not be able to act as good advocates if they hadn’t at least 
anticipated the counterarguments. As a profession, moreover, we value 
principled analysis and rational argument, rather than foregone 
conclusions.35 Our system is grounded in the primacy of evidence and 
facts36 and the value of neutral processes in which cases are decided on 
their merits.37 
                                                                                                                     
32 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 1, sc. 2, ll. 281–82 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1921) (1594). 
33 See, e.g., Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive 
Reputation, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 621, 640 (2002) (finding that 
negotiator reputation influenced negotiator behavior). See also Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational 
Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28 
NEGOT. J. 117, 120 (2012) (“Perhaps paradoxically, the negotiators who are most likely to have a 
reputation for effectiveness are those who acknowledge that legal negotiation is just as much about the 
other people who are involved and abiding by relevant professional norms as it is about the task of 
competing for a favorable share of apparently scarce resources.”). See Catherine H. Tinsley et al., 
Reputation in Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 255, 256–58 (Chris Honeyman & 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017) (noting that a lawyer with an integrative reputation is perceived 
to be more effective by her negotiation counterpart). 
34 Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 
47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239–41 (1984) (exploring the effects of considering 
alternative outcomes); David McCraw, Think Like a Libel Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/opinion/sunday/think-like-a-libel-lawyer.html. See also Russell 
Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 281, 296 (2006) (suggesting the utility of taking the perspective of a disagreeable 
adjudicator). 
35 Vikram David Amar, The Helpful Role Lawyers Can Play in Rebuilding American Democracy, 
JUSTIA: VERDICT (Jan. 12, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/01/12/helpful-role-lawyers-can-play-
rebuilding-american-democracy (“Lawyers apply logic—and not preconceived notions or forgone 
conclusions—to the facts. Logic must be tempered by history and experience but at base relies on 
principled reasoning.”). 
36 Id. (“Lawyers deal in facts, grounded in evidence—they don’t trade in speculation, and 
certainly they do not create or promote fabricated falsehood.”). See also McCraw, supra note 34 
(discussing the importance of facts to libel lawyers). 
37 See, e.g., Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: 
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 748 (2003) 
(describing the importance of neutrality to procedural justice). 
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Conflict resolution skills—often taught in dispute resolution courses or 
clinics—are also an important part of the lawyer’s toolkit.38 Lawyers are 
routinely called upon to assist parties on opposite sides of a deal, case, or 
issue to come to mutual agreement. Listening actively, with curiosity, and 
for understanding—and listening with respect even in disagreement—helps 
lawyers understand the interests of the parties.39 Lawyers can help bring 
clients along to agreement by counseling them to assess both their own 
interests and those of the other side.40 Lawyers rely on empathy and 
creativity to craft or frame proposals that will satisfy the interests of both 
sides.41 Lawyers know that differences in interests or values make it 
possible to create value through exchange.42 
Of course, any serious and productive attempt to better align law 
school curricula and culture with modes of argumentation that might better 
serve individual law school graduates and society must reckon with the 
reality that conflict itself and lawyers’ roles are each varied. These 
variations, and the nuanced approaches to conflict that they require of 
lawyers, may themselves equip lawyers with abilities that can help them 
generate and manage more productive debate. 
Conflict is often thought of as necessarily bad. But conflict theorists 
distinguish between constructive and destructive conflict.43 And, indeed, 
                                                                                                                     
38 See RANDALL KISER, SOFT SKILLS FOR THE EFFECTIVE LAWYER 96 (2017) (“Higher levels of 
self-control are correlated with . . . superior conflict resolution skills.”); JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & 
JEAN STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN 
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 1 (2012) (describing the skills that will help 
lawyers to be better negotiators and counselors); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 359–60 
(describing conflict management and consensus building skills). See also Symposium, ADR’s Place in 
Navigating a Polarized Era, TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming) (considering the pros and cons of 
applying alternative dispute resolution techniques to contentious issues in a polarized climate). 
39 See, e.g., RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 76–90 (6th ed. 2019) (describing 
active listening); Jack Zenger & Joseph Folkman, What Great Listeners Actually Do, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(July 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/what-great-listeners-actually-do (“[P]eople perceive the best 
listeners to be those who periodically ask questions that promote discovery and insight. . . . Good 
listeners may challenge assumptions and disagree, but the person being listened to feels the listener is 
trying to help.”). See also Jonathan R. Cohen, “Open-Minded Listening”, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 139, 
144 (2014) (discussing the importance of open-minded listening and the factors that hinder and 
promote it). 
40 Perspective taking is complicated. See, e.g., Tal Eyal et al., Perspective Mistaking: Accurately 
Understanding the Mind of Another Requires Getting Perspective, Not Taking Perspective, 114 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 547, 547 (2018) (finding that perspective taking is difficult and that 
accuracy about another person is better aided by engaging in conversation with them). 
41 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 13, 27–37 (2012). 
42 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why We Can’t “Just All Get Along”: Dysfunction in the 
Polity and Conflict Resolution and What We Might Do About It, J. DISP. RESOL. 5, 9 (2018) (describing 
the importance of focusing on interests and values in conflict resolution). 
43 See LEWIS A. COSER, FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 16, 20–21, 47 (1956) (discussing both 
the dysfunctional and beneficial aspects of conflict); MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF 
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while conflict can sometimes be devastating, it can also be “the seedbed 
that nourishes social change”44 or the impetus to engage in creative 
thinking about how to accommodate or reconcile legitimate, though 
differing, interests. The goal, therefore, is not to eliminate disagreement or 
to invariably compromise quickly. Instead, it is important to distinguish 
between conflict that is necessary or useful and conflict that is unnecessary 
or unproductive. A lawyer might, for example, reasonably choose to 
litigate a case rather than agree to a settlement that does not meet her 
clients’ interests or might pursue a strategy of litigation in the service of 
legal reform. But she might also readily agree to a request for a delay in the 
proceedings from opposing counsel, when doing so would not compromise 
her client’s interests. 
Not only is conflict itself multifaceted, but lawyers are trained to 
operate in many different types of advocacy roles. In a transactional 
setting, getting to an agreement with other stakeholders (while preserving 
the things that are most important to one’s own client) is often the ultimate 
mark of success; lawyers who are unable to ultimately facilitate 
deal-making have a tough time earning a living in transactional practice 
areas. To the extent that naïve realism and other confirmation biases make 
it harder to appreciate—much less work to address or accommodate in 
relatively low-cost ways—the interests, perspectives, and proposals of 
other stakeholders in an agreement, classroom and skills training that helps 
students recognize and combat such subjective blind spots can only be to 
the good. 
In litigation (or litigation-like) arenas, things might get even more 
complicated. Even in litigation, most cases end up being settled out of 
court45 and, even in cases that go to trial, there are many procedural or 
substantive agreements to be made along the way.46 Litigators, therefore, 
need to be dealmakers. But not all cases can or should be settled,47 and our 
                                                                                                                     
CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 17 (1973) (differentiating constructive and 
destructive conflict). 
44 DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND 
SETTLEMENT 10 (3d ed. 2004). 
45 Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We 
Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases 
Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994). 
Litigation is really a process of “litigotiation.” Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to 
Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984). 
46 See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 62 (2016) (describing the range of agreements made by parties throughout the 
litigation process). 
47 The right balance is debated. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 
(1984) (discussing problems with settlement); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: 
A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2665–66 
(1995) (responding to Fiss); Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1117 (2009) (discussing various views and perspectives on settlements). 
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adversarial process is premised on the notion of vigorous advocacy. This 
means that litigators must be prepared to simultaneously cooperate and 
advocate. It also means that litigators must necessarily think about other 
audiences, including judges, juries, and arbitrators. To be sure, to the 
extent that these neutral finders of fact (or law) lament needless 
disagreement, bickering, and incivility by the participants in a 
dispute-resolution process, those lawyers who are best-trained in being 
reasonable—and appearing to be reasonable—will be rewarded. But there 
is nothing to guarantee that deciders of cases always react negatively to 
entrenched or combative presentation.48 A lawyer who has reason to know 
(or even think), for example, that a particular “old-school” judge (or a 
particular jury panel) will view empathy for and acknowledgement of the 
plausibility of the other side’s positions as weaknesses or implicit doubts 
about the validity of one’s own arguments, is duty bound by her oath to 
take such information into account when framing her presentation. 
Even within the roles of transactional dealmaker or litigator, the 
lawyer’s role has many facets. For example, to appropriately advise their 
clients as to the merits of a deal or lawsuit and the prospects for a better 
deal or settlement, lawyers must be able to objectively evaluate the deal or 
case. At the same time, to effectively promote clients’ interests, lawyers 
must act as advocates. It is not easy to wear these two hats—neutral 
observer and partisan advocate—at the same time,49 as these roles require 
different skills. Similarly, lawyers “cannot steward . . . effective deal[s] 
without both minimizing and facilitating risk taking.”50 As advisors, 
lawyers must often simultaneously seek creative solutions for clients while 
also ensuring their compliance with the law.51 
                                                                                                                     
48 The research literature is sparse and somewhat mixed. See Margaret S. Gibbs et al., 
Cross-Examination of the Expert Witness: Do Hostile Tactics Affect Impressions of a Simulated Jury?, 
7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 275, 280 (1989) (finding a negative effect of hostile and leading cross examination 
tactics); Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney 
Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 548 (1996) (finding that 
an aggressive presentation style was more effective than a passive style); William M. O’Barr & John 
M. Conley, When a Juror Watches a Lawyer, 3 BARRISTER 8, 11 (1976) (discussing the effects of 
language and presentation); Janet Sigal et al., The Effect of Presentation Style and Sex of Lawyer on 
Jury Decision-Making Behavior, 22 PSYCHOLOGY 13, 16 (1985) (finding that an aggressive 
presentation style was seen as more effective than a passive style). See generally Dominic A. Infante & 
Andrew S. Rancer, Argumentativeness and Verbal Aggressiveness: A Review of Recent Theory and 
Research, 19 ANN. INT’L COMM. ASS’N 319, 327–44 (1996) (reviewing research finding that 
argumentativeness is associated with higher credibility, but verbal aggression is associated with lower 
credibility). For recent research in a different context, see Popan et al., supra note 14, at 123. 
49 See Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of 
Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37, 43 (2010) (describing the difficulty of simultaneously 
enacting multiple roles). 
50 Susan P. Sturm, Lawyering Paradoxes: Making Meaning of the Contradictions 7 (Columbia 
Pub. L. Research, Working Paper No. 14-642, 2019). 
51 Id. 
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When engaging in negotiation—whether the negotiation of a contract, 
the settlement of a lawsuit, or any other negotiation—lawyers often find 
themselves with multiple, and conflicting, goals. In identifying the 
“Negotiator’s Dilemma,” scholars have recognized that negotiations 
involve “two separate but complementary negotiation tasks—claiming or 
distributing value, often described as ‘dividing the pie,’ and potentially 
creating new value from the opportunities that the negotiation presents, 
often described as ‘enlarging the pie.’”52 The best lawyers draw on skills—
some cooperative, some competitive—that allow them to be successful in 
both of these tasks.53 
All of this suggests a few possible directions for reform. First, law 
schools can strive to provide (1) an even better grounding in establishing 
and critically evaluating facts54 and a deeper understanding of empirical 
evidence;55 (2) an understanding of the habits of mind that influence policy 
debate;56 (3) more training in a wide range of approaches to dispute 
resolution and the relevant toolbox of skills;57 (4) facility in navigating the 
multiplicity of roles and making the nuanced distinctions required of 
                                                                                                                     
52 RISKIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 149–66. See also DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE 
MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29–45 (1986) (“There is a central, inescapable tension between cooperative 
moves to create value jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantage.”). See Keith G. 
Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework for Managing the Dilemma Between 
Claiming and Creating Value, 16 NEGOT. J. 387 (2000) (discussing best practices and strategies to 
manage this tension). 
53 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the 
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 147–49 (2002); Tinsley et al., supra 
note 33, at 621–22, 624, 637. 
54 See Beryl Blaustone & Lisa Radtke Bliss, The Role of the Lawyer and the Essential Skills to 
Teach Law Students in an Era of Fake News, “Alternative Facts,” and Governing by Disruption, 19 
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 139, 154–55 (2018) (discussing lawyers’ role in investigating, identifying, and 
establishing facts; challenging assumptions; looking behind alleged facts; and thinking about 
permissible inferences). Also important is the ability to distinguish the less than helpful concepts of 
“alternative facts” or “nonexistent truth” from the more useful notion of “constructive ambiguity” in 
dispute resolution. Noam Ebner, Begun, The Trust War Has: Teaching Negotiation When Truth Isn’t 
Truth, 35 NEGOT. J. 207, 208 (2019). 
55 See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 1–2 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining 
the importance for lawyers of understanding research design and statistics). 
56 See, e.g., JOHN COOK & STEPHAN LEWANDOWSKY, THE DEBUNKING HANDBOOK 1 (2011) 
(examining how attempts to debunk myths can reinforce those myths); ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, 
supra note 38, at 1 (describing psychological phenomena that influence conflict and its resolution); Jiin 
Jung et al., A Multidisciplinary Understanding of Polarization, 74 AM. PSYCHOL. 301, 307–10 (2019) 
(discussing a multidisciplinary approach to understanding polarization); Sami R. Yousif et al., The 
Illusion of Consensus: A Failure to Distinguish Between True and False Consensus, 30 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
1195, 1195 (2019) (discussing how false consensus can influence what information we trust); supra 
notes 5–18 and accompanying text (discussing how preferences and prior beliefs can lead to biases 
when evaluating arguments). 
57 See generally RISKIN ET AL., supra note 39 (surveying a range of skills and approaches relevant 
to dispute resolution). 
 
2021] ROLE OF LAWYERS AND LAW SCHOOLS 1105 
lawyers;58 and (5) a foundation of essential skills for making good 
decisions and working effectively with other people, including 
adversaries.59 
Second, at the very least, a lawyer who is trained in civil advocacy 
could present to her client the choice between a no-holds barred approach 
that might yield a somewhat better financial outcome and a more 
enlightened strategy that may leave the client with a bit less money in her 
pocket but serve other interests the client may have, leaving her feeling 
better about herself, the opposing party (with whom the client may have an 
ongoing business or personal relationship), and the legal system in 
general.60 Even more broadly, lawyers can work to distinguish the 
professional and the personal, to distinguish necessary and unnecessary 
conflict, to distinguish instances in which litigation is necessary from those 
in which a consensual solution is attainable, to distinguish their roles of 
advocate and advisor, and to distinguish the ways in which they present 
arguments to different audiences.61 Educating clients and opponents about 
these nuances can open the door to more problem-solving and less needless 
conflict. 
Third, law schools should—in the short and long term—look to 
educate would-be decision makers (current and future judges and the 
citizenry at large) about how the adversarial system can generate the most 
accurate and fair results in individual cases and for society at large.62 Just 
                                                                                                                     
58 See Sturm, supra note 50, at 5 (discussing the importance of “making sense of, and being able 
to forge constructive tension between [the] oppositional aspects of lawyering”). 
59 See KISER, supra note 38, at 4–5, 9–11 (describing the increasing importance of intrapersonal 
and personal competencies to the success of lawyers and other professionals); ROBBENNOLT & 
STERNLIGHT, supra note 38, at 5 (noting the most important skills for lawyers); John M. Lande & Jean 
R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law 
Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 247, 251 (2010) (highlighting the 
importance for lawyers of understanding emotion, communication skills, and creativity); Jean R. 
Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering: Insights for Legal 
Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 365–73 (2015) (discussing the connection between psychology and 
the core competencies of working with other people and making good decisions). 
60 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and 
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”). 
61 Sturm, supra note 50, at 7 (noting that these sorts of tensions “lie at the heart of what makes 
lawyers distinctive, necessary, and effective. The most successful and impactful lawyers live in these 
tensions. This capacity to hold paradox may be what equips lawyers to exercise truly effective 
leadership”); Symposium, ADR’s Place in Navigating a Polarized Era, supra note 38 (considering 
“whether and how we can teach our students to be discerning in making appropriate use of these 
approaches and skills, both in their future representation of clients and in their future roles as leaders 
within their local, professional, religious, and political communities”). 
62 The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct notes that “a lawyer should further 
the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal 
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their 
authority.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). See Justin Sevier, A 
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as with democracy, there is no guarantee that America’s distinctive 
contribution to formal dispute resolution (an adversarial system with robust 
lawyer ethical obligations and information protection, combined with 
mechanisms to help all kinds of clients secure competent and zealous 
representation) will be maintained in the next century as it has over the last 
two. We are at an historical moment in which sharp disagreements and 
seeming inability to appreciate the other side’s points is causing policy 
leaders in Washington and on the campaign trail to threaten major reform 
of the country’s highest legal institutions, so nothing can or should be 
taken for granted. 
At the same time, we are not suggesting a world in which lawyers are 
trained to facilitate consensual resolution of all controversies. Indeed, one 
increasingly prominent critique of the nation’s dispute-resolution system is 
that certain kinds of cases are settled too frequently, such that institutions 
that represent the public, like appellate courts and legislatures, are starved 
of fodder to reflect on and weigh in on major policy issues that should, 
because of their external and symbolic effects, not be left entirely to 
private ordering.63 But even here, disputes that are best resolved by our 
government leaders among the three branches can be clarified, streamlined, 
and facilitated—not hindered—when lawyers better understand how to 
present arguments in a less histrionic and more balanced and data-informed 
way. Our adversarial system is most worth preserving when we keep 
firmly in mind that adversarial is not the same thing as belligerent, and 
certainly not the same thing as bellicose. 
 
                                                                                                                     
[Relational] Theory of Procedure, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1987, 1996–98 (2020) (describing establishing 
truth and providing justice as key objectives of dispute resolution). For empirical work on how U.S. 
laypeople view adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Justin Sevier, The Trust-Justice Tradeoff: 
Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal 
Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212, 213 (2014). 
63 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 47, at 1075 (describing the potential costs of settlement); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 47, at 2663–67 (discussing “when, how, and under what circumstances” disputes 
should be settled); Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, supra note 47 
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Many theorists claim that social media contribute to political polarization, 
but it is not clear how these effects occur. We propose and explain a theoretical 
model of this process that focuses on moral outrage. This combination of anger 
and disgust can emerge from a mismatch between evolved human nature and 
certain features of political discussions on the internet. We identify three specific 
types of socially negative behavior that moral outrage facilitates: aggression 
(behavior intended to harm others), sophistry (poor argumentation), and 
withdrawal (avoiding discussions of politics). We describe psychological 
mechanisms through which moral outrage can lead to these outcomes, specifically 
focusing on dehumanization and group antagonism. We discuss research justifying 
our proposed model and suggest new ways to empirically test its links. Our model 
should be useful for researchers exploring the question of when and how political 
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Political Polarization and Moral Outrage on Social 
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JORDAN CARPENTER, WILLIAM BRADY, MOLLY CROCKETT, RENÉ WEBER 
& WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG * 
BACKGROUND 
Decades ago, experts hailed the internet as a grand, new opportunity 
for political enlightenment. It was thought that the web would provide a 
convenient and widely available way to remove limitations imposed by 
geography and resources, expanding access to information, increasing 
understanding and empathy among people, and making the world better. 
Today, this optimistic view is tempered by fears that certain aspects of 
internet use—most notably social media—have the potential to exacerbate 
threats to democracy, including political polarization.1  
Political polarization is sometimes understood merely as ideological 
distance between political parties or homogeneity within parties.2 
However, group coherence and disagreement by themselves are not the 
main problems here. The more threatening kind of polarization, which is 
often described as affective group polarization, involves intense, negative 
attitudes toward the political outgroup.3 According to Pew Research 
                                                                                                                     
* William Brady is an NSF postdoctoral fellow in the psychology department at Yale University. 
Jordan Carpenter is a postdoctoral fellow in the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. Molly 
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1 William J. Brady & M.J. Crockett, How Effective Is Online Outrage?, 23 TRENDS COGNITIVE 
SCI. 79, 79–80 (2019). See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA 5–6 (2017) (advocating for “an architecture of serendipity” as the ultimate way to 
salvage democracy, as “[t]o the extent that social media allow us to create our very own feeds, and 
essentially live in them, they create serious problems. . . . Self-insulation and personalization . . . spread 
falsehoods, and promote polarization and fragmentation”); ANAMITRA DEB ET AL., IS SOCIAL MEDIA A 
THREAT TO DEMOCRACY? 3–4 (2017), https://www.omidyargroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Social-Media-and-Democracy-October-5-2017.pdf (reporting the six key 
features of social media that challenge democratic principles). 
2 Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 46 
POLITY 411, 412 (2014). 
3 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on 
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surveys in 2014, deep antipathy toward one’s political outgroup grew by 
24% in the preceding decade among the American public, and nearly 32% 
of Americans saw the opposing party’s policies as threats to the nation or 
its well-being.4 These strong feelings have contributed to violent clashes, 
such as those between far-right political groups and liberals in New 
Orleans and Charlottesville.5 More generally, increasing affective group 
polarization has led to a decline in the kind of civil discourse that many 
hold to be a cornerstone of democracy.6 
While social media use is widely believed to contribute to growing 
polarization,7 data directly addressing this claim are scarce and in part lead 
to controversial interpretations and conclusions. As a result, the processes 
through which social media might exacerbate polarization are not well 
understood. We need to figure out the processes behind polarization in 
order to figure out what to do about it. Solutions require understanding. 
I. THESIS 
We propose here that moral outrage is central to understanding how 
social media use is related to affective group polarization. Moral outrage is 
an intense negative emotion combining anger and disgust triggered by a 
perception that someone violated a moral norm.8 Messages that describe or 
evoke moral outrage are increasingly prevalent in contemporary political 
contexts, especially those accusing political opponents of moral norm 
                                                                                                                     
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690 (2015); Matt Motyl, Liberals and Conservatives Are 
(Geographically) Dividing, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 7, 21 (Piercarlo 
Valdesolo & Jesse Graham eds., 2016). 
4 Political Polarization in the American Public: Section 2: Growing Partisan Antipathy, PEW 
RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-2-growing-partisan-
antipathy/.  
5 See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What Is Antifa? Explaining the Movement to Confront the Far 
Right, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/what-is-antifa.html 
(reporting on the movements of “antifa,” a contraction of the word “anti-fascist,” including protests in 
Charlottesville that turned violent); Alan Feuer & Jeremy W. Peters, Fringe Groups Revel as Protests 
Turn Violent, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/us/politics/white-
nationalists-alt-knights-protests-colleges.html (describing various groups’ attempts to mobilize, 
including that of the Proud Boys—a clan of conservative nationalists—in New Orleans over the 
removal of Confederate monuments). 
6 Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 7 (1994); 
WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN: HOW TO REASON AND ARGUE 2–4 (2018) [hereinafter, 
SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN]. 
7 Levi Boxell et al., Greater Internet Use Is Not Associated with Faster Growth in Political 
Polarization Among US Demographic Groups, 114 PNAS 10,612, 10,612–16 (2017); JOSHUA A. 
TUCKER ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA, POLITICAL POLARIZATION, AND POLITICAL DISINFORMATION: A 
REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 3–5 (2018), https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ 
Social-Media-Political-Polarization-and-Political-Disinformation-Literature-Review.pdf. 
8 Jessica M. Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, The Interactive Effect of Anger and Disgust on 
Moral Outrage and Judgments, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2069, 2074 (2013).  
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violations.9 The moral nature of such messages makes them more likely to 
capture audiences’ attention10 and intensifies receivers’ emotional 
involvement.11 The resulting moral outrage is associated with especially 
stubborn political views12 and can even facilitate political violence.13   
Recent theorizing suggests that the design of social media platforms 
amplifies moral outrage by lowering the social costs associated with 
outrage and increasing its personal benefits,14 especially when moral 
content interacts with moral sensitivities to shape exposure to social media 
and subsequent behavior.15 Thus, moral outrage sparked by messages on 
social media and the internet more broadly is likely a crucial factor in 
explaining recent alarming trends in societal discourse and their 
consequences for increasing polarization and the decay of democratic 
norms. 
II. MODEL 
To understand affective group polarization, we propose a model 
describing how a mismatch between our evolutionary past and current 
social media amplifies moral outrage in online contexts. This, among other 
factors, leads to affective group polarization, involving group antagonism 
and dehumanization, which subsequently motivates social behaviors that 




                                                                                                                     
9 Spassena P. Koleva et al., Tracing the Threads: How Five Moral Concerns (Especially Purity) 
Help Explain Culture War Attitudes, 46 J. RES. PERSONALITY 184, 191–93 (2012). 
10 William J. Brady et al., Attentional Capture Helps Explain Why Moral and Emotional Content 
Go Viral, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 1, 4 (2019); Ana P. Gantman & Jay J. Van Bavel, The 
Moral Pop-Out Effect: Enhanced Perceptual Awareness of Morally Relevant Stimuli, 132 COGNITION 
22, 28 (2014). 
11 William J. Brady et al., Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks, 
114 PNAS 7313, 7316 (2017). 
12 Linda J. Skitka et al., Moral Conviction: Another Contributor to Attitude Strength or Something 
More?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 895, 903 (2005) (testing “the degree that moral 
conviction was correlated” with political orientation). 
13 ALAN PAGE FISKE & TAGE SHAKTI RAI, VIRTUOUS VIOLENCE: HURTING AND KILLING TO 
CREATE, SUSTAIN, END, AND HONOR SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 1–2 (2015) (discussing virtuous violence 
theory); Marlon Mooijman et al., Moralization in Social Networks and the Emergence of Violence 
During Protests, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 389, 389 (2018). 
14 M. J. Crockett, Moral Outrage in the Digital Age, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 769, 769–71 
(2017). 
15 Richard Huskey et al., Things We Know About Media and Morality, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 
315, 315 (2018). 
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Figure 1: Proposed model of online moral outrage.
Our model begins with some fundamental sources of online moral 
outrage. Human psychology developed over evolutionary time in small 
communities, where observing egregious acts was a rare and noteworthy 
event. By contrast, the modern world, particularly with the development of 
social media, supplies a near-constant barrage of material that evokes 
moral outrage when political discussions occur. Other features of online 
contexts that exacerbate moral outrage include the psychological distance 
between conversation partners and the rarity of punitive consequences for 
bad behavior,16 as well as the predominantly written nature of online 
communication, which can intensify the emotional impact of messages.17 It 
was also much harder and more dangerous to leave one’s small community 
in evolutionary times than it is to drop out of online exchanges. This 
mismatch between the circumstances in which our ancestors evolved and 
the online worlds that many of us inhabit today plays a large role in 
instigating the problem of moral outrage online.
In the next stage of our model, online moral outrage leads to two 
psychological states that characterize affective group polarization: group
antagonism (antipathy toward groups of political opponents)18 and 
dehumanization (failure to recognize others’ human mental attributes).19
These psychological states then lead to three distinct social behaviors: 
aggression (behavior intended to harm another individual),20 sophistry 
                                                                                                                    
16 Crockett, supra note 14, at 769–71.
17 Huskey et al., supra note 15, at 315; Joseph B. Walther, Computer-Mediated Communication: 
Impersonal, Interpersonal, and Hyperpersonal Interaction, 23 COMM. RES. 3, 3–5, 7–8 (1996).
18 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on 
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 690, 704 (2015).
19 Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging 
Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 847–48, 850 (2006); Nick Haslam, 
Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 252, 252–53 (2006).
20 ROBERT A. BARON & DEBORAH R. RICHARDSON, HUMAN AGGRESSION (PERSPECTIVES IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY) 7 (2d ed. 1994). 
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(using empty, misleading, or irrelevant arguments),21 and withdrawal 
(deliberately avoiding political participation, including voting, 
contribution, discussion, or even learning about political issues). These 
behaviors can threaten democracy by restricting communication, 
cooperation, civic participation, and the ability to react appropriately to 
political events.   
III. LINKS 
In order to test each link in this model, we need to pose a variety of 
research questions. We cannot answer any of these questions yet, but 
asking them will illuminate the central claims in our model and will show 
why we think our model is at least plausible.   
A. Does moral content increase moral outrage? 
Because moral outrage is triggered when a perceiver of a message 
believes an important moral norm has been violated, messages (e.g., 
tweets) without moral information are less likely to elicit moral outrage 
than messages that contain information about moral wrongdoing or moral 
conflict. In addition, the model of intuitive morality and exemplars 
(MIME)22 has shown that effects of social media messages are intensified 
when their content addresses violations or upholdings of moral norms that 
the audience endorses and sees as important.23 Furthermore, evidence from 
communication diffusion models repeatedly suggests that media effects are 
a function of both stimulus prevalence and stimulus density over a given 
time interval (e.g., the number of communicators or the number of message 
repetitions).24 Hence, the high prevalence and density of moral information 
and moral conflict in social media could help to explain why social media 
trigger such strong emotions.   
                                                                                                                     
21 See SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN, supra note 6, at 183–84 (discussing the sophistical 
fallacy of misleading others by jumping topics and avoiding the question asked).   
22 Ron Tamborini, Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars, in MEDIA AND THE MORAL MIND 
43, 43 (Ron Tamborini ed., 2015); Ron Tamborini & René Weber, Advancing the Model of Intuitive 
Morality and Exemplars, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION SCIENCE AND BIOLOGY 456, 456 
(Kory Floyd & René Weber eds., 2020). 
23 Tamborini, Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars, supra note 22, at 50–51; see also 
Graham J. Haidt et al., Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism, in 47 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 55, 82, 83 (James Olson ed., 2013) (discussing a 
study that showed individuals “were more likely . . . to favor those who personified virtues related to” 
ideals that are stereotypically valued by the side of the political spectrum with which the individual 
identified). 
24 See Ronald E. Rice, Intermediality and the Diffusion of Innovations, 43 HUM. COMM. RES. 531, 
531 (2017) (discussing the communication diffusion perspective of innovation). 
 
1114 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:3 
B. Do social media amplify moral outrage? 
Moral outrage has been singled out as especially likely to occur in 
online political discourse.25 Although moral outrage can also occur in 
face-to-face interactions, several factors exacerbate its effects online. 
Offline, people rarely encounter egregious moral violations, but social 
media and other technologies allow people to become aware of others’ 
worst behaviors much more easily. People are highly motivated to express 
outrage about immoral actions, which makes such information especially 
likely to go viral.26 In addition, expressing outrage is easy online, because 
the target of the outrage need not be present, the potential for retaliation is 
minimal, and distant targets inspire less empathic concern.27 It is also easy 
to express outrage and leave the website without waiting for any response 
and, hence, without knowledge of how harmful one’s expression might 
have been. 
Data from previous studies using experience sampling28 suggest that 
people experience more intense outrage in response to immoral events that 
they encounter online compared to events that they encounter in person or 
via traditional media (e.g., TV, radio, newspaper).29 Spending time on 
social media would therefore seem to increase the likelihood of 
experiencing strong moral outrage. 
These effects might be moderated by other factors, including age and 
political ideology. Age is of particular interest in light of recent evidence 
that older Americans have shown the greatest increases in group 
antagonism in recent years, despite using the internet and social media the 
least;30 however, other evidence suggests that older adults who do use 
social media are the most polarized.31 Certain demographic groups, such as 
older people, may be more vulnerable to the exacerbation of online moral 
outrage than others, which may help to explain demographic asymmetries 
in polarization. Just as not everyone exposed to a virus will fall ill, not 
everyone exposed to partisan content online will be influenced in the same 
                                                                                                                     
25 See Crockett, supra note 14, at 769 (explaining how the internet facilitates the spread of moral 
outrage). 
26 Brady et al., supra note 11, at 7316.  
27 Crockett, supra note 14, at 770.  
28 MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 21 
(2014) (“The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is a research procedure for studying what people do, 
feel, and think during their daily lives.”). For examples of studies using experience sampling, see 
Crockett, supra note 14, at 770 and Wilhelm Hofmann et al., Morality in Everyday Life, 345 SCIENCE 
1340, 1340–41 (2014). 
29 Crockett, supra note 14, at 770. 
30 Boxell et al., supra note 7, at 10,612. 
31 Id.; see also National Politics on Twitter: Small Share of U.S. Adults Produce Majority of 
Tweets, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/10/23/national-politics-on-
twitter-small-share-of-u-s-adults-produce-majority-of-tweets/ (concluding that older Americans are 
tweeting the most about national politics). 
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way. Because older adults show changes in brain systems related to 
processing social feedback,32 older adults could be differentially 
susceptible to online amplification of moral outrage.  
The specific mechanisms by which internet usage combines with 
evolved characteristics can be further specified. For instance, it is well 
documented in the literature that repeated exposure to media, including 
social media, influences emotions and behaviors by altering the salience of 
moral and political content.33 In a 2010 study by Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, 
and Giner-Sorolla, content that emphasized in-group glorification reduced 
the demands for justice when a violent perpetrator was an in-group 
member.34 Moreover, this effect was mediated by moral disengagement 
(de-emphasizing suffering by victims’ families and dehumanizing victims), 
which in turn is linked to violence and terrorism.35  
The MIME mentioned above suggests that, over time, exposure to a 
consistent communication diet emphasizing the superiority of one moral 
intuition over another will either increase the salience of the emphasized 
intuitions or maintain their salience in the face of opposing influences. 
According to the MIME, polarization is expected in relatively closed 
systems, where outside influence is limited or blocked (such as in 
fundamentalist religious or political groups); whereas self-regulation is 
more likely in relatively open systems where external factors exert 
opposing forces (as in social media networks with fast and inexpensive 
information). The MIME holds that more isolated communicative 
networks with insulation from value-inconsistent messages should foster 
polarized values within such groups, intensify responses to moral conflicts 
between groups, and reduce openness to divergent views. Several studies 
have found these predicted effects in media content produced for and 
consumed by sub-groups that differ by age, political interest and 
orientation, moral intuition salience, culture, location, and dosage of 
exposure.36  
                                                                                                                     
32 See Lars Bäckman et al., The Correlative Triad Among Aging, Dopamine, and Cognition: 
Current Status and Future Prospects, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 791, 797 (2006); 
Jean-Claude Dreher et al., Age-Related Changes in Midbrain Dopaminergic Regulation of the Human 
Reward System, 105 PNAS 15,106, 15,109 (2008); Ben Eppinger et al., Reduced Striatal Responses to 
Reward Prediction Errors in Older Compared with Younger Adults, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9905, 9908 
(2013); Shu-Chen Li et al., Dopaminergic Modulation of Cognition Across the Life Span, 34 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 625, 628 (2010).  
33 William J. Brady, Killian McLoughlin & Molly J. Crockett, Theory-Driven Measurement of 
Emotion (Expressions) in Social Media Text, in THE ATLAS OF LANGUAGE ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
(Morteza Dehghani & Ryan Boyd eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17). 
34 Bernhard Leidner et al., Ingroup Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Justice in the 
Context of Collective Violence, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1115, 1116 (2010). 
35 E.g., Alfred L. McAlister et al., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of Military 
Force: The Impact of September 11, 25 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 141, 162–63 (2006). 
36 For an overview, see Tamborini & Weber, supra note 22, at 457–58. 
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C. Does digital outrage increase group antagonism? 
Antagonism is not mere partisan disagreement. It involves hatred of 
political opponents in contrast to civil, substantive disputes about values 
and policies.37 Our model concerns antagonism rather than civil 
disagreement. 
Antagonism is related to moral outrage in that they both involve 
intensely negative emotions. However, whereas moral outrage is usually a 
response to an individual person or behavior, political antagonism is often 
directed against groups. Such political group antagonism is characterized 
by feelings of hostility towards the other political party and by beliefs that 
the other party is dangerous or evil. What began as a negative feeling 
towards an individual person or act grows into antagonism to their entire 
group. 
D. Does digital outrage lead to dehumanization? 
Dehumanization is a process of denying a person abilities and 
tendencies that are typical of human mental life.38 It is distinct from 
antagonism in that it is possible to hate someone without dehumanizing 
them and vice versa.39 However, we hypothesize that antagonism and 
dehumanization can feed one another and co-occur in the context of 
contentious political discourse online.  
Dehumanization takes two distinct forms: a target can be denied 
agency (the ability to make reasonable decisions) or feeling (the ability to 
suffer).40 People see the other side as “less than human”41 either in their 
ability to reason or in their ability to feel pain. Both kinds of 
dehumanization can be a consequence of moral outrage, largely because of 
its emotional element of disgust, which is associated with 
                                                                                                                     
37 Shanto Iyengar et al., Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 
PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 405, 408, 421 (2012). 
38 Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 252, 252, 254 (2006); see also Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of 
the Low: Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 847 (2006) (“[W]e 
present new social neuroscience data indicating that extreme forms of prejudice may deny their targets 
even full humanity.”). 
39 Tage S. Rai et al., Dehumanization Increases Instrumental Violence, but Not Moral 
Violence, 114 PNAS 8511, 8514–15 (2017). 
40 See Mengyao Li, Bernhard Leidner & Emanuele Castano, Toward a Comprehensive Taxonomy 
of Dehumanization: Integrating Two Senses of Humanness, Mind Perception Theory, and Stereotype 
Content Model, 21 TPM 285, 287 (2014) (defining “agency” as “the capacity for planning and acting” 
and defining “experience” as “the capacity for desires and feelings”). For further discussion of 
experience and agency, see Heather M. Gray et al., Dimensions of Mind Perception, 315 SCIENCE 619, 
619 (2007). 
41 Madeleine Dalsklev & Jonas Rønningsdalen Kunst, The Effect of Disgust-Eliciting Media 
Portrayals on Outgroup Dehumanization and Support of Deportation in a Norwegian Sample, 47 INT’L 
J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 28, 29 (2015).  
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dehumanization.42 Studies have also found that communication by text as 
opposed to voice leads to greater dehumanization,43 so the fact that most 
online communication takes the form of writing might increase its 
contribution to dehumanization.  
On the other hand, recent evidence suggests that people do not 
dehumanize the victims of violence when those victims are perceived as 
immoral, which is likely to be the case in the context of political conflict.44 
Perceiving someone as immoral in fact usually requires perceiving them as 
having nefarious or malicious intentions, which are human mental states. 
Merely humanizing opponents by ascribing some mental states to them is 
then not enough to forestall antagonism and aggression towards them.45 
Beliefs that they have bad intentions can instead make their suffering seem 
less aversive and increase antagonism and aggression towards them.46 In 
this way, inaccurate perceptions of others’ mental states can sometimes be 
just as pernicious as dehumanization.  
The sources of group antagonism and dehumanization need to be 
determined in order to design remedies. Many proposed interventions on 
affective group polarization (such as those designed to increase empathy 
for political opponents) are predicated on the assumption that affective 
polarization leads people to spontaneously generate limited, simplistic 
theories about their opponents’ motivations or emotions. These 
interventions are unlikely to succeed if their assumptions are inaccurate.47 
E. How can we test these links? 
To verify or falsify these assumptions, we need to measure 
relationships among outrage, group antagonism, and dehumanization 
among social media users. This task can now be approached with tools that 
have become available only recently, such as natural language processing48 
                                                                                                                     
42 Id. at 29, 37–38; Katrina M. Fincher & Philip E. Tetlock, Perceptual Dehumanization of Faces 
Is Activated by Norm Violations and Facilitates Norm Enforcement, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
131, 132 (2016); Harris & Fiske, supra note 38, at 852. 
43 Juliana Schroeder et al., The Humanizing Voice: Speech Reveals, and Text Conceals, a More 
Thoughtful Mind in the Midst of Disagreement, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1745, 1746, 1760 (2017). 
44 Rai et al., supra note 39, at 8513–14. 
45 Id. at 8512.  
46 Id. at 8511–12.  
47 See Scott Barry Kaufman, Can Empathic Concern Actually Increase Political Polarization?, 
SCI. AM. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/beautiful-minds/can-empathic-concern-
actually-increase-political-polarization/ (discussing how biases are likely to increase hostility toward 
the “outgroup”). 
48 Frederic R. Hopp et al., The Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (eMFD): Development 
and Applications of a Crowd-Sourced Approach to Extracting Moral Intuitions from Text, BEHAV. RES. 
METHODS 2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-020-01433-0; CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING & 
HINRICH SCHÜTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 4 (1999); Eyal 
Sagi & Morteza Dehghani, Measuring Moral Rhetoric in Text, 32 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 132, 142 
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and supervised learning classification.49 We predict that these tools can be 
used to uncover a positive relationship between expressions of moral 
outrage online and language that expresses antagonism towards groups and 
that dehumanizes opponents, such as by referring to them as animals.50 We 
also predict that social reinforcement of expressions of moral outrage (in 
the form of “likes” and “retweets”) will increase subsequent use of 
antagonistic and dehumanizing language in online discourse so that 
participants who receive the greatest amount of positive social feedback 
when they express moral outrage in their social media posts will show the 
highest levels of antagonism and dehumanization. Evidence for these 
predictions would support the corresponding links in our model between 
online moral outrage and the two psychological mediators: group 
antagonism and dehumanization. 
F. Does online moral outrage lead to aggression? 
Our model’s next set of research questions asks whether moral outrage, 
through the mediators of both group antagonism and dehumanization, will 
lead to certain behaviors. Our model focuses on three actions: aggression, 
sophistry, and withdrawal.   
To understand online aggression, recall that moral outrage begins as a 
negative emotional reaction to a single individual’s act,51 whereas 
antagonism is directed towards a group.52 The transition from moral 
outrage to antagonism thus involves the spreading of negative feeling from 
one person to their entire group.  
Anger at outgroups is associated with prejudice53 and has been shown 
to be related specifically to disliking political outgroups more and 
tolerating them less.54 Therefore, higher levels of moral outrage tend to 
lead to higher levels of prejudice and intolerance towards groups 
                                                                                                                     
(2013); René Weber et al., Extracting Latent Moral Information from Text Narratives: Relevance, 
Challenges, and Solutions, 12 COMM. METHODS & MEASURES 119, 124, 137 (2018). 
49 Brady, McLoughlin & Crockett, supra note 33 (manuscript at 6–9). 
50 See, e.g., Florian Arendt & Narin Karadas, Content Analysis of Mediated Associations: An 
Automated Text-Analytic Approach, 11 COMM. METHODS & MEASURES 105, 112 (2017) (analyzing the 
use of animal-related terms over a four-month period to demonstrate the dehumanization of Muslims in 
German news coverage of Islam). 
51 See Salerno & Peter-Hagene, supra note 8, at 2069 (closely linking moral outrage with anger). 
52 See Giulia Evolvi, #Islamexit: Inter-Group Antagonism on Twitter, 22 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 
386, 397 (2019) (studying group antagonism through anti-Muslim tweets during the Brexit debate in 
the United Kingdom). 
53 Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence of Specific 
Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585, 589 (2009). 
54 Linda J. Skitka et al., Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the 
September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: An Integrative Approach, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 743, 754 (2004). 
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associated with the particular source of the moral outrage and then to 
representatives of those groups. 
As a result, it seems likely that increased group antagonism will make 
people more willing to act aggressively to individual members of opposing 
groups based on group membership. Similarly, previous research has found 
that dehumanization is strongly associated with aggression, such that when 
a person perceives opponents as lacking feeling, they become more willing 
to inflict harm against opponents through bullying or harassment.55 
Therefore, dehumanization, particularly a lack of concern for the feelings 
of the target, would also seem to lead to aggression, at least in some cases. 
G. Does online moral outrage increase sophistry? 
Moral outrage also seems to lead people to engage in sophistry, or bad 
arguments, partly because one component of outrage is anger, which 
impairs judgment and decision making.56 Ideally, the purpose of presenting 
arguments is to increase understanding of opposing points of view 
(including why others hold those positions) as well as to influence beliefs 
and attitudes on both sides of a controversy.57 However, for many people 
talking about politics in social media, the focus is instead on competition 
and provocation (beating opponents by embarrassing, exhausting, or 
bewildering them) or theater (appearing more intelligent to observers who 
are allies or potential allies).58 Even when people intend to create good 
arguments against opposing positions (or for their own), they often miss 
their targets because of a simplistic understanding of their opponents. This 
tendency seems to be exacerbated by higher levels of antagonism and 
dehumanization, which leads people to adopt a competitive or theatrical 
mindset during political discussions online, resulting in sophistry. 
H. Does online moral outrage motivate withdrawal? 
For the same reasons that moral outrage is galvanizing for some 
people, it leads others to withdraw from politics.59 Intense animus can be 
overwhelming and unpleasant and will motivate many people to withdraw 
                                                                                                                     
55 Albert Bandura et al., Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and 
Dehumanization of Victims, 9 J. RES. PERSONALITY 253, 266 (1975); Brock Bastian et al., The Roles of 
Dehumanization and Moral Outrage in Retributive Justice, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 9 (2013). 
56 Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z. Tiedens, Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal 
Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115, 132 (2006). 
57 SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THINK AGAIN, supra note 6, at 56. 
58 See, e.g., Ashley A. Anderson & Heidi E. Huntington, Social Media, Science, and Attack 
Discourse: How Twitter Discussions of Climate Change Use Sarcasm and Incivility, 39 SCI. COMM. 
598, 600 (2017) (analyzing the use of sarcastic or uncivilized rhetoric in online discourse surrounding 
climate change). 
59 Elizabeth A. Bennett et al., Disavowing Politics: Civic Engagement in an Era of Political 
Skepticism, 119 AM. J. SOC. 518, 518–19 (2013).  
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in order to avoid or reduce associated negative emotions.60 It is not clear 
what leads one person to become aggressive and another person to 
withdraw, but various individual differences might moderate these effects, 
such as the degree to which people experience moral outrage as unpleasant. 
In any case, antagonism and dehumanization by politically active people 
seem to lead some people into cynicism or apathy about politics. Just as 
many people effortfully avoid feeling sympathy for widespread suffering 
out of a desire to avoid emotional exhaustion,61 so many people are 
motivated to avoid engaging with politics in order to keep from 
experiencing the hostility that characterizes contemporary partisan politics. 
They see politics as unpleasant, difficult, and exhausting; they foresee few 
compensating benefits for engaging in political activity, especially because 
of the sophistry and vicious attacks that characterize so much of political 
discourse online. For such reasons, both antagonism and dehumanization 
seem to lead many people to withdraw from politics—and understandably 
so. 
IV. IMPACT 
Many claims in our model remain speculations in need of further 
empirical support, but it could prove important and useful. If even 
approximately correct, our proposed model and its further specifications 
could illuminate the sources of many unpleasant psychological states and 
politically harmful behaviors on social media and elsewhere. It could help 
us understand an important social problem by providing a greater sense of 
the emotional and cognitive factors that lead people to behave badly when 
engaging in politics online. Because we need to understand a problem 
before we can solve it, our model could also potentially guide interventions 
that reduce political polarization and ensuing social problems.  
All of this remains to be seen, because our model so far is only that: a 
hypothesized model—an educated guess. We would never claim to have 
established it as accurate. Much more research needs to be done to test it. 
All we can claim for now is that we find it plausible, promising, and 
potentially useful. We hope that others do, too. 
                                                                                                                     
60 Id. 
61 C. Daryl Cameron & B. Keith Payne, Escaping Affect: How Motivated Emotion Regulation 
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Former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, Martin Shkreli, gained a high 
profile in 2015 when he purchased the rights to a lifesaving HIV drug, 
Daraprim, and hiked up its price by more than 5000%.1 While such acts of 
price gouging can often be observed in business, Shkreli’s act created 
controversy because Daraprim is on the World Health Organization’s List 
of Essential Medicines.2 Though Shkreli was heavily criticized, he justified 
his actions with the response: “[E]verything we’ve done is legal.”3 Shkreli 
was right. His actions, potentially ruining the lives of a large number of 
people, were legal. And he was not alone. Legal actions that result in 
terrible consequences are, in fact, quite common, from pharmaceutical 
companies partnering with doctors to prescribe their more expensive 
drugs,4 to politicians who establish quid-pro-quo relationships with donors 
who anonymously give them unlimited amounts of money,5 to the 
                                                                                                                     
* Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Israel. 
** Brown University. 
*** University of Cologne; University of Limerick. 
**** Brown University. 
1 Robert Mclean, Turing Cuts Hospital Price for Drug It Hiked 5,000%, CNNMONEY (Nov. 25, 
2015, 8:17 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25/news/companies/turing-pharmaceuticals-
daraprim-price-drop/.   
2 Id. 
3 See ROBERT B. REICH, THE COMMON GOOD 10 (2018) (describing Shkreli’s response to 
criticism of the Daraprim price hike); Richard Mark Kirkner, Drug Pricing Regulation Pushed from 
Many Sides, MANAGED CARE, Jan. 2016, at 14, 15 (noting criticism of Shkreli and Turing by 2016 
presidential candidates and Merck CEO).   
4 See Lisa Cosgrove & Robert Whitaker, Finding Solutions to Institutional Corruption: Lessons 
from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 16–19 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 9, 
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261375 (explaining how relationships 
between doctors and pharmaceutical companies create conflicts of interest and worsen quality of care); 
BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS 316 
(2012) (describing how senior doctors were paid by pharmaceutical companies to promote their drugs, 
changing the prescribing behavior of other doctors). 
5 See Elinor Amit et al., Institutional Corruption Revisited: Exploring Open Questions Within the 
Institutional Corruption Literature, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 447, 453 (2017) (explaining how the 
current United States campaign finance system results in the “donor class” exerting a disproportionate 
political influence); Girish J. Gulati, Super PACs and Financing the 2012 Presidential Election, 49 
SOCIETY 409, 409 (2012) (explaining that the relationship between candidates and donors threatens 
democratic governance and creates opportunities for corruption); Jonathan Mendilow & Michael 
Brogan, Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in Government in the United States, in CORRUPTION AND 
GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 59, 62 (Jonathan Mendilow 
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President of the United States who does not shy away from conflicts of 
interest by maintaining control over his private business while in office.6 
All of these examples have one thing in common: the action is legal yet 
carries negative consequences for the greater good.   
Tension between the legal status of an action and its impact on the 
greater good poses a particular type of challenge when judging its moral 
acceptability. In a democratic society, laws are expected to represent the 
interests of its people, protect the greater good from individual 
misconducts, or at the very least not harm the society. While this is usually 
true, lawmakers cannot foresee each and every incident in which the law 
will be relevant. As a result, some legal behaviors may end up harming the 
greater good. Such legal yet harmful behaviors have been observed in 
research, design, manufacturing, and marketing processes of new products 
and policies released by various institutions.7 For instance, gaming 
companies use legal yet socially irresponsible marketing strategies and 
tactics to target vulnerable populations and encourage gambling.8  
In the farming industry, hog, poultry, and cattle farms often use legal 
antibiotics as a feed additive to stimulate artificial growth in their 
livestock.9 Through overuse, these antibiotics eventually become 
ineffective for bacterial infections, which people often contract through 
meat consumption and drinking infected water.10 As more and more 
antibiotics are becoming ineffective, new, usually more expensive, drugs 
have to be developed, leaving many individuals with no viable methods of 
treatment.11 This is one of many deadly but legal12 practices exercised by 
the farming industry. Big factory farming industries often lobby for 
                                                                                                                     
& Ilan Peleg eds., 2016) (noting that a quid pro quo between donors and politicians is the “most 
flagrant form of political corruption”). 
6 Steve Reilly et al., Did Trump Keep His 19 Promises to Insulate Himself from His Business? 
Only He Knows., USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-
depth/news/politics/2019/03/18/president-donald-trumps-promises-didnt-end-business-
entanglements/3030377002/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2019, 9:08 PM). 
7 See Nikos Passas, Lawful but Awful: ‘Legal corporate crimes’, 34 J. SOCIO-ECON. 771, 777 
(2005) (noting that the activities of several industries generate “hidden costs” that are mainly borne by 
the least privileged); John Warren Kindt, The Costs of Legalized Gambling: An Economic Approach, in 
IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 115, 124 
(Nikos Passas & Neva Goodwin eds., 2004) (explaining how the gambling industry targets lower 
income individuals and encourages excessive gambling by “consistent gamblers”). 
8 June Buchanan et al., The Marketing of Legal but Potentially Harmful Products and Corporate 
Social Responsibility: The Gaming Industry View, 4 INT’L J. INTERDISC. SOC. SCI. 81, 84 (2009). 
9 Mallory Russo, Food for Thought: Analyzing the Impacts of Livestock Factory Farming in the 
United States 40 (May 15, 2017) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Fordham University) (on file with Fordham 
University Libraries); Mark Ritchie, The High Price of Cheap Food, in IT’S LEGAL BUT IT AIN’T 
RIGHT: HARMFUL SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL INDUSTRIES 178, 180 (Nikos Passas & Neva 
Goodwin eds., 2010). 
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government regulations and laws that can profit their operations, allowing 
them to sustain inadequate facilities and exploit environmental resources.13 
These actions lead to irreversible consequences such as extinction of 
species, deadly working conditions for workers (e.g., farm workers are 
exposed to harmful chemicals and may die from asphyxiation), land and 
soil degradation, water contamination, and exacerbation or climate 
change.14 While such practices adhere to legal requirements, they bring 
harm of various degrees to society.  
How do people resolve this conflict and judge the moral acceptability 
of legal yet harmful actions? This question is important, because people’s 
moral judgments determine a wide variety of behaviors, from purchasing 
products,15 to protesting against companies,16 to voting for or against 
politicians in public elections.17 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in behaviors which 
are legal yet harm the greater good, collectively labeled as “institutional 
corruption.”18 According to the classic definition by Lessig (2013):   
Institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic 
and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently 
ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by 
diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to 
achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its 
purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution 
or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.19 
A surge of research on institutional corruption in the past decade has 
examined its manifestations in various domains, including: the 
pharmaceutical industry,20 psychiatry,21 food production and distribution 
                                                                                                                     
13 Russo, supra note 9, at 35. 
14 Id. at 16, 43. 
15 See Johannes Brinkmann, Looking at Consumer Behavior in a Moral Perspective, 51 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 129, 129 (2004) (claiming that “business ethics and consumer behavior could profit from 
further development of their overlap”); Oliver M. Freestone & Peter J. McGoldrick, Motivations of the 
Ethical Consumer, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 445, 445 (2008) (discussing the rise of consumer action “in the 
form of boycott activity, pressure groups and other forms of consumer activism”). 
16 Norman E. Bowie & Thomas W. Dunfee, Confronting Morality in Markets, 38 J. BUS. ETHICS 
381, 385, 389 (2002). 
17 See JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING 1–2 (2011) (arguing the moral significance and 
ethical implications of voting). 
18 See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 448 (describing the increased scholarly attention to institutional 
corruption). Lessig provides a definition for institutional corruption in Lawrence Lessig, Foreword: 
“Institutional Corruption” Defined, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 2, 2 (2013).  
19 Lessig, supra note 18, at 553 (emphasis added). 
20 See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over 
doctors); see also Garry C. Gray, The Ethics of Pharmaceutical Research Funding: A Social 
Organization Approach, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 629, 629 (2013) (illustrating the subtle ways 
pharmaceutical industry funding influences medical research); Donald W. Light, From Institutional 
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companies,22 and political campaigns.23 For example, research on the 
pharmaceutical industry has revealed that funding from drug companies 
influences medical researchers to produce favorable reviews of the 
company’s products, thus enabling a significant number of harmful drugs 
to reach the market.24 This undermines pharmaceutical companies’ mission 
of improving patient care and public health and promoting drug safety.25 
Similarly, in the field of psychiatry, financial conflicts of interest have 
compromised biomedical research, teaching, and practice.26 Organizations 
such as the American Psychiatric Association (APA) receive substantial 
funding from the drug industry, and many of the individuals who serve as 
diagnostic panel members have ties with the drug industry.27 “Industry 
financial relationships can . . . affect researchers’ and clinicians’ behavior 
in subtle ways” potentially influencing “decisions about the criteria for and 
measurement of diagnoses.”28 
Institutional corruption has also been observed in political 
campaigns.29 For instance, the creation of super political action committees 
(super PACs) in 2010 sparked significant controversy, as committees were 
allowed to receive and spend unlimited sums of money on independent 
                                                                                                                     
Corruption to Pharmageddon?, 1 LAB DISPATCHES 69, 69–70 (2013) (reviewing David Healy’s 
observation that the FDA and pharmaceutical companies have major influence over the medical 
industry); Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An Agenda for 
Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511 (2012) (“Physician relations with pharmaceutical firms are a 
source of conflicts of interest that can bias their prescriptions and advice.”).  
21 See ROBERT WHITAKER & LISA COSGROVE, PSYCHIATRY UNDER THE INFLUENCE: 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION, SOCIAL INJURY, AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR REFORM 4 (2015) (examining 
the societal impacts of the psychiatry field); Lisa Cosgrove & Emily E. Wheeler, Industry’s 
Colonization of Psychiatry: Ethical and Practical Implications of Financial Conflicts of Interest in the 
DSM-5, 23 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 93, 93 (2013) (arguing that modern psychiatry has been captured by 
the pharmaceutical industry); Marc-André Gagnon, Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets: 
Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 571, 
574 (2013) (highlighting how new anti-psychotic drugs dominate the market despite being more 
expensive and less effective than older drugs). 
22 See Amit et al., supra note 5, at 450 (discussing the case of Del Monte Foods); see also Sylvia 
Rowe et al., Funding Food Science and Nutrition Research: Financial Conflicts and Scientific 
Integrity, 67 NUTRITION REVIEWS 264, 264–65 (2009) (describing issues of conflict and scientific bias 
in the food industry); Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: 
Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 119, 142 (2004) (discussing the Food and Drug Administration’s conflict policy). 
23 See sources cited supra note 5; see also Malcolm S. Salter, Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and 
the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector 2, 24 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
11-060, 2010) (describing the scope and size of private money influencing Congress). 
24 See sources cited supra note 4 (illustrating the influence pharmaceutical companies have over 
doctors). 
25 See sources cited supra note 18 (discussing institutional corruption). 
26 Cosgrove & Wheeler, supra note 21, at 94. 
27 Id. at 102. 
28 Id. at 97. 
29 Gulati, supra note 5, at 409. 
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campaigning in support of or in opposition to political candidates.30 
Politicians receiving unlimited anonymous donations from super PACs 
suggested that there could be a disproportionate influence on policy and 
electoral outcomes.31 
Despite its importance, determining which behaviors fall under the 
category of institutional corruption is challenging. Even amongst experts 
there is disagreement over what counts as institutional corruption. In a 
survey we conducted, a set of ten scenarios that represent different facets 
of institutional corruption was presented to members of the Edmond J. 
Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University—all of whom were experts 
on the topic of institutional corruption research. These scenarios covered 
topics that are relevant for the concept of institutional corruption in various 
settings and were selected based on the research of the fellows of the 
center. In this survey, the experts were asked to judge whether the 
scenarios represent institutional corruption. For half of the scenarios we 
presented, 30% of the subjects or more thought that they do not represent 
instances of institutional corruption. The results illustrate the challenge in 
clearly identifying instances of institutional corruption, even by experts. 
The current paper is concerned with how the public morally judge 
instances of institutional corruption. We bring evidence that institutional 
corruption is perceived as more morally acceptable than criminal behavior, 
even when the portrayed action is identical except for its legal status. 
Moreover, although people’s moral judgments are sensitive to information 
about the legal status of the action—what we henceforth deem the 
distinguishing characteristic between institutional corruption and criminal 
action—people are not sensitive to information about the magnitude of the 
harm caused by the action. Thus, cases of institutional corruption with 
horrible consequences are judged as more morally acceptable than criminal 
actions with benign consequences. Together, our research suggests a 
surprising and ironic role for the law: that it diminishes independent, 
critical thinking. While criminal actions that have mildly negative 
consequences can be construed as immoral, institutional corruption will be 
seen as moral despite having terrible consequences. 
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The following experiments were designed to investigate how people 
judge institutional corruption versus criminal actions. Moral scenarios 
were presented, and people judged the moral acceptability of the action of 
a protagonist. We varied whether an action was institutional corruption or 
criminal by manipulating the legal status of the action: for the “institutional 
                                                                                                                     
30 Id. at 410. 
31 Id. at 409. 
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corruption” group the action was presented as legal, and for the “criminal 
behavior” group the action was presented as illegal. All the presented 
actions had a negative impact on the greater good. Additionally, we varied 
the severity of the direct consequences of the actions. Research shows that 
actions with bad consequences are judged as less morally acceptable than 
those with less bad consequences.32 We therefore wanted to rule out the 
possibility that people’s judgments are contingent on a particular outcome.  
A. Experiment 1A 
1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 131 MTurkers (75 females; Mage = 34.06, SD = 
11.15) who participated in exchange for payment. The participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs. 
Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Large) between-subjects design. In this and 
all subsequent studies: (A) we set a sample size based on previous research 
that had used similar methods and stimuli33; (B) our only a-priori selection 
criteria was recruiting subjects residing in the United States; and (C) we 
did not exclude any subject from the analysis. Any gap between the 
number of subjects recruited and reported in the “Participants” section and 
the final analysis are due to incompletion of the questionnaire by subjects 
(less than 0.5% of the recruited subjects in each experiment). 
2. Procedure 
Subjects were asked to read three scenarios that described actions of a 
protagonist. Half of the subjects were informed that this action is legal, and 
the other half that it is illegal. In each of these groups, half of the subjects 
were informed that the action is slightly harmful and the other half that it is 
significantly harmful. After reading each scenario, the subjects were asked 
whether the actions of the protagonist are morally permissible on a scale 
that ranged between 1 (completely impermissible) to 7 (completely 
permissible). The subjects were subsequently asked whether the action of 
the protagonist is legal on a scale that ranged from 1 (completely legal) to 
7 (completely illegal) and how would they rate the impact of the action on 
a scale that ranged from 1 (negligible impact) to 7 (strong impact). Finally, 
in this and all subsequent experiments, subjects were asked several 
demographic questions, including gender, age, whether they live in the 
                                                                                                                     
32 See, e.g., Elinor Amit & Joshua D. Greene, You See, the Ends Don’t Justify the Means: Visual 
Imagery and Moral Judgment, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 861, 861 (2012) (discussing how a consequentialist 
judgment that “favor[s] the greater good” is often deemed to be more morally salient); Jonathan Baron, 
Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 3 (1994). 
33 Elinor Amit, Jonathan Koralnik & Ann-Christin Posten, Mental Imagery of Institutional 
Corruption (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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United States, what is their native language, level of education, income 
(range), whether they support federal regulation, how liberal versus 
conservative they are with regards to economic and social issues, and who 
they voted for in the last election. 
The three scenarios are presented below. In the following scenarios, 
legal actions appear in the text; illegal in parentheses. Big impact appears 
in the text; small impact in parentheses.  
i. Scenario 1 (hospital) 
Suppose there is a head of a hospital network who receives money 
from a pharmaceutical company to give a talk. The head of the network 
then contemplates changing the hospital network’s electronic drug 
prescribing system from prescribing generic drugs as the default to 
prescribing brand name drugs as the default. Changing the default option 
from generic to brand name drugs has been shown to increase the 
percentage of brand name drugs prescribed. While the brand name drug is 
effectively identical to the generic, the brand name costs patients and 
insurance companies more, and earns the drug company more. The hospital 
director decides to change the electronic drug prescribing system to make 
brand name drugs the default. The increase in the percentage of brand 
name drugs prescribed causes patients and insurance companies to pay 
significantly (slightly) more for medications. According to the State 
Medical Board, it is legal for doctors to accept payments from 
pharmaceutical companies of up to $10,000 ($4000). The pharmaceutical 
company paid the doctor $7000.  
ii. Scenario 2 (coal) 
Under the U.S. Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) sets limits on certain pollutants. State governments can choose to 
make the state laws stricter than those of the EPA, though no state can 
have more lenient laws than those of the EPA. Suppose there is a CEO of a 
coal factory who is deciding whether to increase the energy produced by 
the plant. In order to produce energy, the factory burns fossil fuels, which 
emit air pollution into the surrounding towns. Notably, the percentage of 
residents in the closest town that have asthma is significantly (slightly) 
greater than the national average. According to the state law, it is legal for 
the coal factory to emit up to 40,000 (20,000) tons per year. The CEO 
decides to increase the factory’s air pollution emission to approximately 
30,000 tons per year to meet his energy goals. 
iii. Scenario 3 (army) 
Suppose there is a retired army general who serves as a director at a 
defense contractor and also advises the Department of Defense (DoD). As 
a director of a defense contractor, his job is to advocate for the weapons his 
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company produces. However, as an advisor, his job is to help find and 
purchase the most effective weaponry for the United States Army. The 
American military relies on the Department of Defense to choose top 
quality weapons. The general advises the DoD in favor of choosing his 
company’s products and the Department decides to follow his advice. 
Notably, some of the weapons sold by his company may not be the most 
cost-effective choices. Because of the cost of these weapons, the Army will 
have to significantly (slightly) decrease the budgets of other agencies. 
According to federal law, it is legal for DoD advisors to withhold 
information about conflicts of interest on purchases under $30 ($20) 
billion. The general advises the DoD to purchase his weapons from his 
defense contractor for $25 billion. 
3. Analyses and Results 
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with 
legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as factors, and moral 
judgment, legality judgment and impact judgment as dependent measures. 
The results show that the legal status of the action affected moral 
judgments such that actions that were legal were judged to be more 
morally permissible than actions that are illegal (Ms = 3.5 and 2.08, 
respectively); F (1, 127) = 35.38, p < .001, η² = .22. In contrast, the 
severity of the consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment 
(Ms = 2.8 and 2.8, respectively); F (1, 127) = 0.02, p = .877. There was no 
interaction between legality and consequences F (1, 127) = 0.19, p = .663. 
Legal actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.2 
and 6.02, respectively); F (1, 127) = 87.23, p < .001, η² = .4. Legality also 
affected perceived impact: legal actions were perceived to have smaller 
impact than illegal actions (Ms = 5.09 and 4.6, respectively); F (1, 127) = 
3.94, p < .049, η² = .03.  
In order to further explore the results, we investigated whether political 
orientation affects the relative weight people give to legality versus 
morality. Among our 131 subjects, 48 mentioned that in the 2016 
presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 33 for Donald 
Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other names). For the ease 
of interpretation of the effect of political orientation on moral judgments, 
we analyzed only subjects who endorsed Clinton or Trump. The results 
show that legal actions were judged as more morally acceptable than 
illegal actions (Ms = 3.43 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73) = 22.98, p < 
.0001, η² = .23. The rest of the effects were not significant. Thus, political 
orientation did not affect moral judgments nor interact with legality or 
impact. 
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B. Experiment 1B 
1. Overview 
In Experiment 1B, we replicated the procedure of Experiment 1A 
using a different set of scenarios. 
2. Participants and Design 
Participants were 130 MTurkers (79 females; Mage = 36.98, SD = 
11.90) who participated for a payment in the experiment. The participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: 
Legal vs. Illegal) x 2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design. 
3. Procedure 
The method of Experiment 1B was identical to that of 1A, with a 
different set of scenarios. The scenarios used in this experiment appear 
below. In the following scenarios legal actions appear in the text; illegal in 
parentheses. Big impact appears in the text; small impact in parentheses.  
i. Scenario 1 (CEO) 
Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide 
whether to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is 
often used in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is 
cost-effective; using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The 
CEO decides to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA 
consumption is significantly (slightly) correlated with an increased health 
risk of headaches and nausea. According to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), it is legal to sell foods containing up to 2 mg (1.5 
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg 
of ABA.  
ii. Scenario 2 (scientist) 
Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs 
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine. 
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and 
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also 
reveal a significant (slight) correlation between using this drug and 
experiencing various side effects, such as increased blood pressure. The 
scientist decides to re-run the studies that had the best results. These results 
confirm the positive findings from before. The scientist only publishes the 
positive results in the medical literature. The FDA approves the drug. 
According to the FDA, it is legal for scientists investigating the safety of 
prescription drugs to exclude up to 30% (20%) of their results. The 
scientist excluded 25% of their results.  
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iii. Scenario 3 (prison) 
Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to 
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when 
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it 
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison 
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison. 
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support 
system of family and friends leads to a significant (slight) increase in their 
rates of recidivism. According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons 
to transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to 
send some to prisons up to 150 miles away.  
4. Analyses and Results 
As in Experiment 1A, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as 
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as 
dependent measures. The results show that the legal status of the action 
affected moral judgments such that legal actions were perceived as more 
morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.48 and 1.76, respectively); 
F (1, 126) = 50.91, p < .001, η² = .29. In contrast, the severity of the 
consequences of the action did not affect moral judgment (Ms = 2.53 and 
2.71, respectively); F (1, 126) = 0.60, p = .44. There was no interaction 
between legality and consequences F (1, 126) = 0.38, p = .54. Legality 
affected perceived legality, such that legal actions were perceived as more 
legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.19 and 6.22, respectively); F (1, 126) = 
93.2, p < .0001, η² = .42. No other effect was significant.  
As in Experiment 1A, in order to further explore the results, we 
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people 
give to legality versus morality. Among our 130 subjects, 58 mentioned 
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 
29 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other 
names). As in Experiment 1A, we analyzed only subjects who endorsed 
Clinton or Trump. The results show that legal actions were judged as more 
morally acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 4.02 and 1.79, respectively); 
F (1, 79) = 57.14, p < .0001, η² = .42. Subjects who endorsed Clinton 
judged the behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed 
Trump (Ms = 2.54 and 3.28, respectively); F (1, 79) = 6.36, p < .014, η² 
=.075. We also found a significant interaction between voting and 
outcomes. For Clinton voters, when the outcome was small, the behavior 
was judged as more morally acceptable than when the outcome was large 
(Ms = 3.09 and 1.98, respectively, p < .001). For Trump voters, there was 
no significant difference between small and large outcomes (Ms = 1.18 and 
3.38, respectively, p < .68). The rest of the effects were not significant. 
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C. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we used the same basic design of Experiment 1, and 
manipulated legality (legal, illegal) and impact (big, small). The main 
difference was that in Experiment 2 we described impacts as distinct 
outcomes (e.g., diabetes versus skin rash).  
1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 132 MTurkers (85 females; Mage = 36.75, SD = 
12.10) who were paid for participation. The participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Legality: Legal vs. Illegal) x 
2 (Impact: Small vs. Big) between-subjects design.  
2. Procedure 
The method of Experiment 2 was identical to that of 1B, except that 
impact was described as distinct outcomes. In the following scenarios legal 
actions appear in the text; illegal actions appear in parentheses. Big impact 
appears in the text; small impact appears in parentheses.  
i. Scenario 1 (CEO) 
Suppose there is a CEO of a large food chain who must decide whether 
to offer products containing ABA, a chemical compound that is often used 
in plastic containers and canned food. This chemical is cost-effective; 
using it minimizes costs and maximizes profit margins. The CEO decides 
to offer the products that contain ABA. Notably, ABA consumption is 
correlated with an increased health risk of diabetes (skin rashes). 
According to the FDA, it is legal to sell food containing up to 2 mg (1.5 
mg) of ABA. The products the CEO decides to offer contain up to 1.75 mg 
of ABA.  
ii. Scenario 2 (scientist) 
Suppose a scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company runs 
several studies to investigate the safety and efficacy of a new medicine. 
The scientist obtains mixed results. Some show that the drug is safe and 
effective. Others show no effect of the drug. Some further studies also 
reveal a correlation between using this drug and experiencing side effects 
such as irregular heart rhythms (headaches). The scientist decides to re-run 
the studies that had the best results. These results confirm the positive 
findings from before. The scientist only publishes the positive results in the 
medical literature. The FDA approves the drug. According to the FDA, it is 
legal for scientists investigating the safety of prescription drugs to exclude 
up to 30% (20%) of their results. The scientist excluded 25% of their 
results.  
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iii. Scenario 3 (prison) 
Suppose there is a director of a private prison who is trying to 
maximize the prison’s earnings. The greatest profits can be achieved when 
the prison is fully booked. For the highest degree of capacity utilization, it 
is better to transfer prisoners from one prison to another. The prison 
director decides to transfer prisoners to maximize occupancy of the prison. 
Notably, research shows that moving prisoners away from their support 
system of family and friends leads to an increase in the rate of prisoners 
returning to committing felonies such as burglaries (misdemeanors such as 
shoplifting). According to federal law, it is legal for private prisons to 
transfer inmates up to 200 miles (100 miles). The director decides to send 
some to prisons up to 150 miles away.  
3. Analyses and Results 
As in Experiment 1, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), with legality (legal, illegal) and impact (small, large) as 
factors, and moral judgment, legality judgment, and impact judgment as 
dependent measures. The results show that subjects used only legality to 
determine the moral permissibility of the actions, such that they judged 
legal actions to be more morally permissible than illegal actions (Ms = 3.1 
and 1.69, respectively); F (1, 128) = 44.04, p < .001, η² = .26. There was 
no effect of consequences (Ms = 2.39 and 2.48), F (1, 128) = 0.13, p = 
.715, and impact did not interact with legality, F (1, 128) = 0.07, p = .932. 
Legality affected the perceived legality of the action, such that legal 
actions were perceived as more legal than illegal actions (Ms = 3.08 and 
6.23, respectively); F (1, 128) = 98.42, p < .001, η² = .43. Finally, when 
asked about the severity of consequences, subjects estimated illegal actions 
to be more severe than legal actions (Ms = 5.58 and 4.82, respectively); F 
(1, 128) = 8.76, p = .004, η² = .06. Unlike the pretest, here, where subjects 
were given information about legality, the consequences did not affect the 
judged severity of 10 consequences, F (1, 128) = 0.32, p = .58, nor was 
there an interaction, F (1, 128) = 0.44, p = .51. 
As in Experiment 1, in order to further explore the results, we 
investigated whether political orientation affects the relative weight people 
give to legality versus morality. Among our 132 subjects, 45 mentioned 
that in the 2016 presidential elections they voted for Hillary Clinton, and 
36 voted for Donald Trump (the rest either did not disclose or gave other 
names). The results show that legal actions were judged as more morally 
acceptable than illegal actions (Ms = 3.41 and 1.89, respectively); F (1, 73) 
= 26.16, p < .0001, η² = .26. Subjects who endorsed Clinton judged the 
behavior as less morally acceptable than subjects who endorsed Trump (Ms 
= 3.01 and 2.29, respectively); F (1, 73) = 5.91, p < .018, η² = .075. The 
remaining effects were not significant. 
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Figure 1. People rely on legality when judging moral permissibility of 
actions. Subjects judged the moral permissibility of actions that are either 
legal or illegal. In Experiment 1a (Fig 1A) and 1b (Fig 1B), the impact of 
the action was defined as having “slightly” or “significantly” negative 
consequences. In Experiment 2 (Fig 1C) the impact was manipulated as 
different outcomes that a pretest showed were considered severe or not 
(e.g., diabetes vs. skin rashes). In all experiments, subjects judged the legal 
actions as more morally permissible than the illegal actions, suggesting 
outsourcing of moral judgment to the Community of Knowledge.
II. GENERAL DISCUSSION: THE LAW AS A SHORTCUT FOR MORAL 
JUDGMENT
The current research shows that people judge institutional corruption 
as more morally acceptable than criminal actions, even when the portrayed 
events are identical. Moreover, our data suggest that the severity of 
outcomes of the portrayed action does not play a role in people’s 
judgments. Thus, institutionally corrupt actions were judged as more 
acceptable than criminal actions, regardless of whether the action had 
severe or benign consequences. Finally, we observed that political 
orientation (operationalized as voting for Trump or Clinton in the 2016 
presidential elections) did not affect the relative weight of legality and 
outcomes, nor did it diminish any of those effects. 
Why is institutional corruption judged as more morally acceptable than 
criminal actions? One explanation for our findings is that people use the 
law as a shortcut to judge whether an action is morally right or wrong. 
Evaluating the morality of actions is not easy. Moral judgments of real-life 
events involve numerous considerations, including the intentions and 
beliefs of actors, outcomes of actions,34 protected values,35 and one’s 
emotional reactions.36
                                                                                                                    
34 Amit & Greene, supra note 32, at 861; see Fiery Cushman, Victor Kumar & Peter Railton, 
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Research from cognitive science and psychology suggest that, when 
faced with complex assessment tasks, people use simplifying strategies to 
make decisions.37 It is therefore possible that when it comes to moral 
judgments, one simplifying strategy that people adopt is to not consider the 
moral dilemma at all. Instead, they outsource the question to the law.38 
According to this logic, the law does not simply reflect people’s sense of 
corruption, but actually determines it. This means that framing actions in 
terms of their legality is more than just a signal of the actions’ morality; the 
framing shapes their morality. 
An appeal to the law is an appeal to the moral reasoning of a 
community of thought leaders (such as legislators and policy makers) who 
have determined the legality of a class of actions that includes the one 
under consideration. Outsourcing cognitive tasks to the community is 
necessary when problems are too complex for individual reasoning alone. 
The many factors that are taken into account when judging moral 
dilemmas, including inferences about intentions, outcomes,39 the need to 
                                                                                                                     
Moral Learning: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives, 167 COGNITION 1, 3 (2017) 
(discussing the role empathy plays in moral responses to outcomes of actions); Liane Young & 
Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of Belief Encoding and Integration in Moral Judgment, 40 
NEUROIMAGE 1912, 1913 (2008) (discussing how children base their moral judgments primarily on an 
action’s consequence). 
35 See Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1 (1997) (defining protected values as those that resist trade-offs with other 
values, particularly economic values); Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and 
Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320–21 (2003) (discussing how moral outrage may 
be triggered by discovering that community members have compromised sacred values). 
36 See Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral 
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106 (2001) (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional processing 
to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect people’s 
judgments.”); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach 
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (discussing how, under a social intuitionist 
model, “moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”). 
37 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution 
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 81 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (“The substitution of one question for another, the representation of 
categories by prototypes, the view of erroneous intuitions are easy to override but almost impossible to 
eradicate . . . . We show here that the same ideas apply to a diverse class of difficult judgments . . . .”); 
JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 2 (1993) (“When faced with more complex 
choice problems involving many alternatives, people often adopt simplifying (heuristic) strategies that 
are much more selective in the use of information.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: 
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973) (“We 
propose that when faced with the difficult task of judging probability or frequency, people employ a 
limited number of heuristics which reduce these judgments to simpler ones.”). 
38 See MASS. INST. TECH., HANDBOOK OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE (Thomas W. Malone & 
Michael S. Bernstein eds., 2015). 
39 See Cushman et al., supra note 34, at 3 (discussing the ways in which learning the outcomes of 
their actions affects children’s future decisions); Young & Saxe, supra note 34, at 1913 (“Even though 
they can represent beliefs, these children continue to base their moral judgments primarily on the 
action’s consequences. . . .”). 
 
2021] INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 1137 
protect sacred values,40 and the need to integrate emotional reactions to 
events,41 make them complex enough to be strong candidates for 
outsourcing. For example, an assessment of big pharma’s culpability for 
aggressively selling opioids requires an analysis of the various companies’ 
prior knowledge and goals when selling opioids, the extent of their 
responsibility for the multiple traumatic consequences of the opioid crisis, 
as well as the amount of suffering that was reduced by the administration 
of opioids, and this must be weighed against each of one’s basic moral 
values while controlling one’s sense of outrage. 
There are alternative explanations for our results. One is that people 
hold the law in such high esteem that breaking the law is itself morally 
wrong and hence illegal actions are by definition immoral. To the extent 
the law is a set of rules that serves to protect people and their rights, it 
should play a substantial role in maintaining an ordered society, and an act 
that breaks the law should be viewed as inherently immoral. This may be, 
but it does not explain why consequences had no influence on judgment. 
Presumably consequences should be an additional contributor to our 
assessments of an act’s morality. Another alternative explanation is that 
legality is easier to evaluate than consequences42 because it is binary (legal 
versus illegal) whereas consequences are complex. This is possible 
although the consequences in our scenarios were not really complex and 
the differences between the bad and very bad consequences were actually 
quite stark. It is also possible that legality is more salient than 
consequences. This seems unlikely and does not explain why consequences 
had no effect whatsoever. If it is a matter of salience, one would expect a 
less salient dimension to have a smaller effect, but not no effect. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
Overall, these data show that people judge institutional corruption as 
more morally acceptable than criminal actions. Two otherwise identical 
actions were given different moral appraisals by virtue of their legal status. 
Actions that carry severely negative consequences may pass in the public 
                                                                                                                     
40 See Baron & Spranca, supra note 35, at 1 (defining protected values as those that resist 
trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values); Tetlock, supra note 35, at 320–21 
(discussing how moral outrage may be triggered by discovering that community members have 
compromised sacred values). 
41 See Greene et al., supra note 36, at 2106 (“Some moral dilemmas . . . engage emotional 
processing to a greater extent than others . . . and these differences in emotional engagement affect 
people’s judgments.”); Haidt, supra note 36, at 814 (discussing how, under a social intuitionist model, 
“moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments”). 
42 See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference 
Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 249 (1996) (discussing the way in which individuals will choose one 
decision-making process over another because it is easier). 
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as morally acceptable if they are legal, while criminal actions with 
relatively minor consequences may be perceived as morally unacceptable.  
Regardless of the explanation for the effect of legality and the neglect 
of consequences for judgments of morality, the results suggest that people 
rely on the law not only to prescribe and prohibit actions, but to actually 
determine their sense of what is moral. In other words, the law not only 
shapes how people act, but it also shapes what they believe. These findings 
have implications for both legislation and how we assess our society and 
institutions.  
With regard to legislation, lawmakers can take advantage of our 
findings by using them as justification to use the law to nudge people in 
socially beneficial ways, such as discouraging people from smoking in 
public spaces, protecting endangered species, and pushing people to avoid 
sugary drinks. As makers of the law—and consequently, shapers of 
morality—lawmakers have the power to redefine the relationship between 
institutions and people who are affected both directly and indirectly by 
those institutions. Through legislative measures, institutional behavior can 
be restructured, both internally (e.g., eliminating conflicts of interest, 
restructuring guidelines followed by the institution) and externally (e.g., 
evaluating the impact on the greater good).  
But the findings also suggest that we should be aware that our 
evaluations of existing institutional actions may be influenced in ways that 
we are not entirely aware of. Laws may carry information about whether 
actions are morally acceptable or not, but laws may reflect values that are 
out-of-date, they may have been inspired by technology or other facts that 
are no longer relevant, and they may be influenced by political and 
economic interests. In other words, there are a variety of reasons to be 
skeptical of the information carried by current law. Thus, it is important to 
have an independent means to judge the morality of action, not to rely only 
on the law as it is written. The foreseen consequences of an action seem a 
worthwhile basis for such judgment. Without considering such 
consequences, the legal status quo will sustain itself without adequate 
rationale. Pharmaceutical companies will continue to gouge innocent 
victims and politicians will continue to bend the law in favor of themselves 
and their supporters. 
Our findings thus provide additional reason to critically evaluate both 
the law and the morality of our institutions. We need to evaluate the 
consequences of the products we purchase and the policies and politicians 
we support. Society cannot rely only on existing law to make moral 
assessments; it needs to constantly refresh its justifications for the actions 
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Minimizing the Impact of Cognitive Bias in 
Transactional Legal Education 
ALINA BALL * 
The partisan divide that evolved over appropriate measures to prevent 
the spread of COVID-19 has provided yet another public display of 
political tribalism, populace polarization, and epistemic authority.1 During 
a presidential term pledged with brazen politics and mutual disdain for the 
other side,2 even the global crisis of the pandemic has not been sufficient to 
close the chasm.3 There seems to be no better moment than the present to 
take seriously the themes raised in this symposium volume and reflect on 
the role law schools can have in making law students sensitive to the 
complexity of human decision making. Society relies on lawyers to 
reconcile conflicting interests, ensure flow of reliable information, 
minimize opportunism that might otherwise exist between opposing 
parties, and marshal evidence that facilitates problem solving in the midst 
of ambiguity. But lawyers, judges, and politicians are all themselves 
susceptible to the same cognitive vulnerabilities that breed the current 
political polarization and, more generally, exacerbate conflict. This Article 
explores methods law professors can employ to align these inconsistencies 
between the role of the lawyer and the humanity of lawyers. Clearly, law 
professors can make an impact on the lawyers their students become. This 
                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law. 
1 See Cary Funk & Alec Tyson, Partisan Differences Over the Pandemic Response Are Growing, 
PEW RES. CTR. (June 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/03/partisan-differences-
over-the-pandemic-response-are-growing/; Marc J. Hetherington & Isaac D. Mehlhaff, American 
Attitudes Toward Covid-19 Are Divided by Party. The Pandemic Itself Might Undo That., WASH. POST 
(Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/18/american-attitudes-toward-
covid-19-are-divided-by-party-pandemic-itself-might-undo-that/.  
2 Emma Green, Americans Hate One Another. Impeachment Isn’t Helping, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/impeachment-democrats-republicans-
polarization/601264/; Ryan Warner, What Impeachment Says About Tribalism; Pushback on Polis, 
CPR NEWS (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.cpr.org/show-episode/jan-17-2020-what-impeachment-says-
about-tribalism-pushback-on-polis/ (recording at 24:10); Joel Rose, Americans Increasingly Polarized 
When It Comes To Racial Justice Protests, Poll Finds, NPR (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/03/908878610/americans-increasingly-polarized-when-it-comes-to-
racial-justice-protests-poll-f; and Grace Sparks, CNN Poll: Americans Are Divided Over Amy Coney 
Barrett, CNN (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/07/politics/cnn-poll-scotus-aca-
october/index.html. 
3 See Alex Fitzpatrick, Why the U.S. Is Losing the War on COVID-19, TIME (Aug. 13 2020), 
https://time.com/5879086/us-covid-19/ (describing a “disturbing partisan trend” regarding views on the 
pandemic). 
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Article provides some concrete thoughts on how transactional law clinics 
can utilize the social, political, and neuroscience research included in this 
symposium edition. 
In her article, Winning Isn’t Everything, Professor Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow argues that even though it is often rare that everyone in a 
legal matter will “win,” lawyers must recognize that they could do better 
for their clients by practicing problem-solving lawyering.4 She goes on to 
present problem-solving lawyering in opposition to conventional, 
adversarial lawyering.5 Problem solving, she argues, produces better 
solutions not by simply compromising6 or seeking to avoid conflict. 
Instead, problem solving requires collaboration and coordination between 
counterparties and adversaries.7 It also requires the lawyer to exercise 
creativity8 and engage in robust fact investigation to better understand 
context and consequences. 
The narrative example of problem-solving negotiation is a story 
Professor Menkel-Meadow shares about her and her brother regularly 
fighting over a piece of chocolate cake.9 Their mom would let their 
fighting go on for a while and then eventually intervene by cutting the 
piece of cake down the middle.10 While this would stop the argument, it 
didn’t resolve the issue between the siblings.11 Both the young Professor 
Menkel-Meadow and her brother would walk away aggrieved12 because 
she wanted the icing while her brother preferred the cake.13 If her mom had 
asked her and her brother what their underlying motives and goals were, 
her mom could have uncovered this difference in interests.14 Professor 
Menkel-Meadow uses this narrative as a tangible example of how, with 
problem-solving negotiation, even with finite resources, it is possible for 
opposing parties to get 100 percent of what they want if the lawyers 
understand each party’s underlying interests.15 It is the role of the 
problem-solving lawyer to conceive the multiple possibilities that even a 
single piece of cake presents. Even when “the pie” cannot be expanded, it 
                                                                                                                     
4 Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 906 (2000). 
5 Id. at 907. 
6 Id. at 906, 911. 
7 Id. at 910–11. 
8 Id. at 912, 915. 
9 Id. at 911. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 911–12.  
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can be possible for the lawyer to creatively divide it to optimize client 
objectives.16 
All lawyers have an ethical obligation to act in the best interest of their 
client.17 If problem-solving lawyering is in the best interest of the client, it 
is surprising that it is not the conventional form of lawyering. Far from the 
norm, Professor Menkel-Meadow explains that conventional lawyering is 
centered around a culture of adversarialism.18 As she explains, the 
hallmarks of the legal profession are argument, selective marshaling of 
facts, debate, competition, and performance of toughness, all of which 
often escalate conflict and lead to a stalemate.19 Conventional lawyering 
adopts the zero-sum mentality,20 described by Professor Daniel Shapiro in 
Overcoming Political Polarization,21 which animates the dominant legal 
culture and performance of lawyers. Ultimately, Professor 
Menkel-Meadow argues it is a lack of creativity leading many lawyers to 
view scarcity or limited resources as zero-sum. “[A]dversarialism . . . leads 
us to argue in oppositional modes, to see black or white, to resist nuance 
and complexity . . . .”22 In other words, adversarialism fosters cognitive 
biases that impede a lawyer’s ability to represent their client. Too often, 
lawyers are failing to reach their minimum goals for their represented 
cases.23 This phenomenon of dominant lawyering culture has serious 
consequences in the legal profession—consequences that attorneys have an 
ethical obligation to be mindful of—because this affects their clients. In 
light of this, law professors should attempt to mitigate dominant lawyering 
culture in their classrooms. 
Professor Menkel-Meadow provides steps to becoming 
problem-solving lawyers. First, she advises that there are several questions 
problem-solving lawyers must ask: (1) what are the client’s needs and 
goals; (2) what are the motivations of the counterparty; (3) what are the 
underlying interests of the counterparty; (4) what is at stake in this dispute; 
                                                                                                                     
16 Id. at 916. 
17 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer should 
act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”); id. r. 1.7 cmt. (stating that a lawyer’s duty is to prioritize the client’s interest above 
the lawyer’s own). 
18 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 907. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 906. 
21 See Daniel L. Shapiro, Overcoming Political Polarization: The Power of the Civic Mindset, 52 
CONN. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2020) (describing the tribal mindset and its emotional dynamics that 
foster political polarization). 
22 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 909. 
23 James H. Stark & Maxim Milyavsky, Towards a Better Understanding of Lawyers’ Judgmental 
Biases in Client Representation: The Role of Need for Cognitive Closure, 59 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
173, 176–78 (2019). 
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and (5) what are the outcomes produced by a given process.24 In the 
conventional model of lawyering, the lawyer is likely to stop their inquiry 
after contemplating the motivations of the counterparty. Professor 
Menkel-Meadow explains that moving beyond motivation to 
understanding the underlying interests of the counterparty, can provide 
meaningful information for the lawyer. The example of Ann Atwater and 
C.P. Ellis’s relationship demonstrates why this can be a powerful tactic in 
moving towards problem solving.25 Research demonstrates that lawyers 
should be skeptical of their ability to effectively ascertain the 
counterparty’s underlying interests in an adversarial context.26 Given that 
lawyers may not be readily adept at obtaining or understanding a 
counterparty’s underlying interests, there is even more justification for why 
law schools should prioritize teaching and allowing students to cultivate 
this skill. Law school should be an opportunity for budding attorneys to 
develop this metacognitive awareness and development. Practice utilizing 
the problem-solving questions Professor Menkel-Meadow proposes, would 
better prepare law students to achieve the goals of their future clients and 
make them more likely to resolve what might otherwise lead to a stalemate 
in a negotiation.  
Dominant lawyering culture is not the only hurdle that prevents 
lawyers from effective problem solving. Poor problem solving is also a 
result of cognitive biases, which impede one’s ability to effectively 
problem solve for their clients. Professor Menkel-Meadow addresses this 
in her analysis of problem-solving lawyering. Reactive devaluation, where 
one cannot hear something because it is coming from the other side, is 
a cognitive bias that occurs when a proposal is devalued if it appears to 
originate from an antagonist.27 
Lawyers must acknowledge and overcome cognitive biases to 
effectively represent clients and for the legitimacy of the legal profession. 
Well-developed psychological evidence demonstrates that implicit bias is a 
strong cognitive bias that impedes human ability to effectively problem 
solve in social situations.28 In the last decade, implicit bias has become the 
primary frame for contemporary discussion on social injustice, with 
                                                                                                                     
24 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 916. 
25 An Unlikely Friendship (PBS television broadcast Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/video/an-
unlikely-friendship-tbnri0/. 
26 See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 448–73 (2008) 
(describing research from social and cognitive psychology that explores how people perceive and 
interpret information and make judgments).  
27 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 914. 
28 See, e.g., CHERYL STAATS ET AL., KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY, 
STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 19–20 (2017) (noting the effects of implicit bias on 
police encounters).  
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implicit bias on one end of the spectrum and deliberate, explicit racism, 
sexism, homophobia on the other end.29 The idea of implicit bias has 
become ingrained in popular culture.30 As Secretary Clinton mentioned 
during the 2016 presidential election, “[i]mplicit bias is a problem for 
everyone.”31 When invoked in popular conversation, implicit bias is often 
used to describe the attitudes that are beyond conscious awareness or 
control. As the narrative goes, individuals manifest implicit bias without 
necessarily knowing it. In other words, implicit biases reflect the 
unconscious biases that individuals are unaware of32 and, thus, do not 
control.  
While the developing neuroscience does not support this popular 
concept of implicit or unconscious biases,33 it is helpful to recognize that 
individuals possess unacknowledged biases. These biases are pervasive, 
deep seeded, and contrary to purported notions of fairness and justice. But 
if everyone is responsible, the old saying goes, then no one is responsible. 
Implicit bias can become the way that individuals absolve themselves of 
the consequences of their actions. Individuals can easily find themselves 
feeling comfortable because these biases are so pervasive there is little they 
can do about them. How does a law professor access what occurs beyond 
the conscious reach of the decision maker, which their introspection is not 
likely to reveal? Can a law professor do anything to bridge the gap 
between the dissociation of what students believe about themselves and 
what their biases reflect? These are the questions I continue to wrestle with 
because there are no easy answers or universal remedies.  
I teach a corporate law clinic at UC Hastings College of the Law. My 
course prepares upper division law students to be corporate lawyers by 
having them represent social enterprise clients, businesses that use 
market-based strategies to achieve a social mission. For example, the clinic 
may represent a for-profit LLC marketing and design firm with the social 
                                                                                                                     
29 Jonathan Kahn, The 911 Covenant: Policing Black Bodies in White Spaces and the Limits of 
Implicit Bias as a Tool of Racial Justice, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 2 (2019). 
30 See Shankar Vedantam et al., Radio Replay: The Mind of the Village, NPR: HIDDEN BRAIN 
(Mar. 9, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/09/591895426/the-mind-of-the-village-
understanding-our-implicit-biases (discussing research about implicit bias and how it affects people’s 
perceptions). 
31 John A. Powell, Implicit Bias in the Presidential Debate, OTHER & BELONGING INST., 
https://belonging.berkeley.edu/implicit-bias-presidential-debate (last visited Jan. 26, 2020); Clinton on 
Implicit Bias in Policing, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016, 9:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
video/politics/clinton-on-implicit-bias-inpolicing/2016/09/26/46e1e88c-8441-11e6-b57d-dd49277af02f 
_video.html. 
32 See Implicit Bias Module Series, KIRWAN INST. FOR STUDY RACE & ETHNICITY, 
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/implicit-bias-training/ (defining implicit bias as “the attitudes or 
stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner”). 
33 LASANA T. HARRIS, INVISIBLE MIND: FLEXIBLE SOCIAL COGNITION AND DEHUMANIZATION 
159–60 (2017). 
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mission to hire and promote nontraditionally trained graphic designers who 
have criminal records. The company mission serves as a means for not 
only providing living wage employment to individuals often excluded in 
the formal economy but also elevating the voices and perspectives of their 
employees. The legal matters the clinic might take on for this client could 
range from drafting and analyzing business-to-business contracts, to 
renegotiating its commercial lease agreement, to amending and restating its 
operating agreement over the course of the representation. Law students in 
my course gain and refine their substantive corporate law knowledge in a 
context where they are applying their technical lawyering skills and critical 
thinking to pressing social and environmental issues central to their client’s 
corporate purpose. The course provides a rare opportunity to future 
corporate lawyers to meaningfully engage in issues of social and economic 
justice. 
Moreover, this is a class that affords me the bandwidth to help students 
recognize and confront their biases in the process of becoming better 
problem solvers.34 In early iterations of my course, I began by asking 
students early in the semester (as part of a due diligence memo) to identify 
any biases that they may have going into this representation. But what I 
found is that students—like most of us—often do not have the tools to 
self-assess and be meaningfully reflective regarding cognitive biases, 
especially those that are contrary to their ideas of fairness, justice, and 
equity. I maintained the question as a part of the assignment for years, but 
was rarely satisfied with the responses it elicited from students. Regularly a 
student would write that they had no biases going into the representation. 
Once that response was provided, it would effectively end the conversation 
on their biases and provide me no basis to help them dig deeper. It 
occurred to me the assignment may be more harmful than productive in 
regards to bias reduction. 
Recently, I adopted another method to the assignment with promising 
results. In my new iteration of the same due diligence memo, I have 
removed the explicit question about biases altogether. Instead, I now ask 
students to map out the client and its counterparty, or other key parties in 
the transaction, preferably in a sketch or diagram.35 The prompt asks them 
to draw the relational dimensions of the client and other parties involved. 
Lastly, the prompt asks the student to identify the role of the lawyer and 
opportunities for the lawyer to influence the outcome of the transaction 
                                                                                                                     
34 See generally Mark Neal Aaronson & Stefan H. Krieger, Teaching Problem-Solving 
Lawyering: An Exchange of Ideas, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 485 (2004) (discussing the interaction between 
substantive legal knowledge and critical thinking skills in legal education). 
35 See JAY A. MITCHELL, SKETCH PAD AS LEGAL PAD: PICTURING CORPORATE PRACTICE 3 
(2015) (discussing the benefit and practice of transactional lawyers sketching clients and deals). 
 
2021] MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE BIAS 1147 
consistent with the client’s goals.36 Transactional lawyers commonly 
sketch transactions and client matters. In the context of the due diligence 
memo assignment, the benefit of this diagramming and sketching is that it 
invites law students to memorialize their assumptions about distributions 
of power within the transaction or legal matter. Completing this 
assignment often requires the law students to make assumptions and draw 
conclusions outside of the facts of the client file.  
When I debrief with the student teams, I then ask them to identify 
where their assumptions and cognitive biases are at play in the depiction. 
This is an attempt to not only identify, but begin to disrupt their cognitive 
biases.37 During our conversation, I also invite the law students to think 
about the biases of the other actors in the representation. Some of the 
questions I ask them are, “What assumptions are other parties likely to 
have about your client? About you?” In this way, I am helping students 
become more aware and self-reflective of their cognitive biases and how 
biases impact their ability to represent their clients. This exercise is one 
concrete example of an attempt to debias my law students during their time 
in my course. 
Professor Menkel-Meadow’s model of problem-solving lawyering asks 
lawyers to answer a series of questions before attempting to problem 
solve.38 This slowing down of the problem-solving process is intended to 
help the lawyers better identify the underlying interests of the counterparty, 
what is at stake in this dispute, and the outcomes produced by a given 
process.39 These questions are also a useful debiasing technique. Her 
model of problem-solving lawyering allows law students to reflect on their 
own biases towards their clients, and how those might be contributing to 
the marginalization of their client in the representation. Lawyers have an 
opportunity to be architects and engineers of justice.40 Lawyers have the 
capability to leave the world a better place. I believe that wholeheartedly 
and try to instill this notion in my students each semester.  
As future transactional lawyers, I want my law students to understand 
they have the ability and the ethical responsibility to think outside the box, 
be creative, and engineer solutions that are structured around justice. By 
helping them acknowledge their cognitive biases early in the client 
representation, I believe I am facilitating them in becoming the better 
                                                                                                                     
36 See Alicia Plerhoples, Risks, Goals, and Pictographs: Lawyering to the Social Entrepreneur, 19 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 301, 313 (2015) (explaining the utility of pictographs to memorialize client 
goals). 
37 See Joan C. Williams & Sky Mihaylo, How the Best Bosses Interrupt Bias on Their Teams, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.-Dec. 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/how-the-best-bosses-interrupt-bias-on-
their-teams. 
38 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 909–10. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 910. 
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problem-solving lawyers that society desperately needs. More importantly, 
I am heartened by the experiences in my clinical course that there is even 
more transactional courses can do to make law students sensitive to the 
complexity of decision making and better prepared to defuse conflicts. If 
law professors are willing to engage with their students in the struggle of 
their ideological becoming, I believe the next generation of lawyers will be 








VOLUME 52 FEBRUARY 2021 NUMBER 3 
 
Article 
Semantic Descent: More Trouble for Civility 
ROBERT B. TALISSE 
Civility is widely regarded as a duty of democratic citizenship. This Article 
identifies a difficulty inherent within the enterprise of developing an adequate 
conception of civility. Challenging the idea civility is the requirement to remain 
calm, peaceable, or dispassionate in political debate, it is argued that that civility 
is instead the requirement to address one’s political arguments to one’s 
interlocutors. In this way, civility is a second-order requirement, a norm 
governing our conduct in political disagreement. From there, a conceptual 
problem for civility so understood is raised, the problem of semantic descent. It is 
argued that any plausible conception of civility is prone to being “weaponized,” 
transformed into a partisan device for incivility. The general upshot is that as 
important as civility is for a well-functioning democracy, its usefulness as a 
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Semantic Descent: More Trouble for Civility 
ROBERT B. TALISSE * 
INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly observed by commentators from across the political 
spectrum in the United States that the past decade has seen a marked 
intensification of political antagonism.1 Office holders and party officials 
seem to have lost the capacity to cooperate with those who do not share 
their political affiliation, resulting in political deadlock and stagnation.2 In 
fact, the trouble runs deeper than that. Whereas partisan animosity has long 
prevailed among politicians, it only recently has trickled down to, and 
intensified among, the U.S. citizenry.3 Citizens struggle these days to 
communicate productively across partisan divides. Thus, in addition to the 
intransigence within government, popular political discourse is beset by a 
range of dysfunctions that are commonly referred to collectively as 
incivility.4 A common thought is that we can begin to repair our democracy 
only by first restoring a commitment to civility. 
That incivility poses trouble for democracy is acknowledged by the 
American citizenry. A 2019 Pew study finds that most Americans believe 
that political debate has become dangerously toxic and disrespectful in 
recent years.5 A prior study finds that Americans disapprove of the 
incivility that has taken hold of democracy and want greater comity and 
cooperation among politicians.6 These findings offer some hope that the 
remedy for current political dysfunctions is not beyond reach. If citizens 
                                                                                                                     
* W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt 
University.  Thanks to Scott Aikin, Jody Azzouni, and Lisa Madura for comments on an earlier version 
of this Article. 
1 Shanto Iyengar & Sean J Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on 
Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 692 (2014).  
2 The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider: Sharp Shifts Among Democrats on 
Aid to Needy, Race, Immigration, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.people-
press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/.  
3 Id. 
4 Kathleen Hall Jamieson et al., The Political Uses and Abuses of Civility and Incivility, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 205, 205–19 (Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson eds., 2017). 
5 Bruce Drake & Jocelyn Kiley, Americans Say the Nation’s Political Debate Has Grown More 
Toxic and ‘Heated’ Rhetoric Could Lead to Violence, PEW RES. CTR. (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/americans-say-the-nations-political-debate-has-
grown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-to-violence/.   
6 See supra note 2.  
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dislike over-the-top political rancor and want a more civil mode of politics, 
then the challenge is simply that of incentivizing politicians and citizens to 
turn down the heat. 
Alas, this optimism fades in light of a further finding of the same 
study.7 Many who disapprove of the uncivil streak in contemporary U.S. 
politics also believe that the blame for incivility lies squarely with their 
political opponents; moreover, they think the solution is to force 
capitulation from the other side.8 In calling for more civility, many citizens 
seek submission or acquiescence from their political rivals. Surely civility 
cannot require capitulation from one’s political opposition. Something is 
amiss. 
The problem rests with the concept of civility itself. We all identify it 
as a political good, and incivility a political bad, yet we do not share a 
sufficiently nuanced understanding of what civility is. Similarly, we agree 
that democratic citizens and office holders have a duty to be civil and are 
therefore blameworthy when they behave uncivilly; nonetheless, in the 
absence of a clearer account of what civility requires, the duty of civility 
lacks definite content. Finally, as it is popularly understood, civility is 
closely related to politeness, courtesy, and generosity; while satisfying 
these norms may be admirable, the duty of civility arguably involves 
something else, as it is not clear that citizens have a duty to be polite, 
courteous, or generous. In short, there is the conceptual work to be done. If 
incivility is to play a central diagnostic and prescriptive role in our analysis 
of current political dysfunctions, and if, as is commonly held, civility is to 
be understood as a duty of democratic citizenship, then we need to work 
from a suitably detailed conception of what civility is and why it is 
valuable. 
To anticipate a point that will feature in a later part of this Article, in 
pursuing this conceptual task, it is crucial that we develop a conception of 
civility that is itself nonpartisan. That is, in order to perform its prescriptive 
and diagnostic job, our understanding of civility must not be rigged in 
favor of our own favored political stances. Whatever civility is, it must be 
satisfiable by citizens from across the full spectrum of democratically valid 
political opinion.9 In other words, a conception of civility that renders out 
of bounds all advocacy for political positions that we oppose is no 
                                                                                                                     
7 Id. 
8 Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and 
Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), 
https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.  
9 This formulation leaves open the possibility that some political viewpoints are intrinsically 
uncivil, such that their expression is necessarily a violation of the duty of civility. Certain overtly racist, 
sexist, and nationalistic views can be plausibly regarded as uncivil. The point, which will be discussed 
further below, is that our conception of civility must allow for civil expressions of political viewpoints 
that we find erroneous, perhaps severely so. 
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conception of civility at all. We might say, then, that a proper conception 
of civility must itself be endorsable across the spectrum of democratically 
acceptable political perspectives. It must be in this sense public. 
This Article identifies a difficulty inherent within the enterprise of 
developing a public conception of civility. I begin by raising a puzzle 
about civility as popularly understood, which in turn reveals that the duty 
of civility cannot be the requirement to remain calm, peaceable, or 
dispassionate in political debate. In fact, the initial puzzle suggests that 
civility cannot be a norm governing one’s tone or demeanor in political 
disputation at all. It will be proposed in Section Two that civility rather is a 
norm of discursive engagement that requires one to address one’s 
contributions to political argument to one’s interlocutors; civility is a norm 
of engagement, pertaining to how well one’s contributions to debate track 
the contributions of one’s interlocutors. It will then be argued, in Section 
Three, that whatever the more precise details of civility might be, the duty 
to be civil is a reciprocal requirement; that is, we are bound by the norm of 
civility only when there is sufficient reason to expect that one’s 
interlocutors will abide by it as well. In Section Four, I further specify 
conditions that a viable conception of civility must meet. In particular, I 
draw upon some terminology introduced by Willard Van Orman Quine to 
show that civility must be understood as a second-order norm, a norm 
governing our conduct in contexts of disagreement. In Section Five, I spell 
out a conceptual problem for civility so understood, what will be called the 
problem of semantic descent. It will be argued that any plausible 
conception of civility is prone to being “weaponized,” transformed into a 
partisan device for incivility. The general upshot is that as important as 
civility is for a well-functioning democracy, its usefulness as a diagnostic 
tool for repairing political dysfunctions is limited. 
I. THE PUZZLE OF CIVILITY 
Begin by assuming a popular conception of civility. According to it, 
civility involves remaining calm, reserved, cooperative, courteous, and 
dispassionate in political debate. This conception of civility has many 
merits, and perhaps chief among them is that it comports well with 
common usage of the term, including use in contexts outside of politics. 
Thus, in assuming the popular conception of civility, one is claiming that 
in politics one ought to abide by norms that govern other familiar 
discursive contexts where disputation might arise, from the family dinner 
table to the workplace, classroom, and queue at the supermarket. In short, 
the popular conception of civility in politics has the virtue of making 
civility a unitary concept, a set of norms applicable to interpersonal affairs 
across the board, as it were. 
Of course, the nastiness of politics may be regrettable without thereby 
being democratically pathological. Therefore, laments over the incivility of 
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contemporary politics are often accompanied by an additional (though 
often tacit) claim, namely that democratic citizens have a duty to be civil. 
This additional contention is needed if incivility is to be regarded as a 
democratic failure or political pathology. That is, in order for incivility to 
register as a democratic dysfunction, we need to make a case for thinking 
that democratic citizens and office holders have a duty to be civil. 
The case for the duty of civility runs roughly as follows: If it is to 
flourish, a democracy needs to get things done; this means that political 
rivals—especially office holders, but citizens too—must cooperate and 
sometimes even compromise. When discourse is overly antagonistic, 
participants are incentivized to dig in their heels and adopt a stance of 
intransigence. This not only leads to deadlock, it also encourages a mode 
of politics that abandons the democratic ideal of self-government among 
equals, replacing it with a strictly strategic conception that values only 
winning and so regards political opponents as merely obstacles to be 
neutralized. Yet democracy is a partnership among political equals; thus, 
democratic citizens, including office holders, have a duty of civility.10 
Consequently, when they fail to be civil, citizens have fallen short of 
proper citizenship; and when incivility is rampant within a polity, 
democracy is failing. 
This reasoning is solid, but it occasions a puzzle. Understood as 
self-government among political equals, democracy calls upon citizens to 
take responsibility for their collective political life; they must in some 
sense take ownership of their political order. This means that citizens must 
be participants in the tasks of democracy. Accordingly, they have duties to 
be informed, competent, and reflective as citizens.11 In addition, they have 
a duty to exercise their judgment about public affairs. They are expected to 
think through the political issues of the day and to form their own political 
opinions. What is more, as citizens are one another’s equals, the style of 
judgment required by citizenship involves a kind of perspective-taking; 
democratic citizens are expected to reason from a collective point of view, 
                                                                                                                     
10 See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL 
DEBATE 131–34 (2006) (detailing the “partnership” view of democracy). 
11 There is a massive literature focusing on whether citizens are up to the tasks of democratic 
citizenship. Though this question is important, it is not my focus here. For a range of views, see 
generally CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY 
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT (2017) (detailing how the idea of thoughtful 
citizens guiding a democratic state from the voting booth is fundamentally misguided); ROBERT 
GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY (2003) (offering a solution when political disputes in a democracy 
invariably mix facts with values); HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, 
COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY (2013) (arguing that democracy is 
legitimate, just, and smart because the decision by the many will be more accurate than decision by the 
few); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS 
SMARTER (2016) (revealing how the depths of political ignorance in America cause a major challenge 
for democracy). 
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rather than from a narrowly first-personal perspective. That is, in thinking 
through political issues, each citizen must look beyond their individual 
interests and attempt to discern the collective or public good.12 Many 
democratic theorists claim that participating in public political discussion 
is an indispensable step in adopting the collective point of view; hence 
these theorists hold that democratic citizens are also obligated to engage in 
forms of public deliberation and discussion.13 
The puzzle emerges from the fact that under conditions of intellectual 
freedom and equality, citizens’ judgments over normative matters are 
unlikely to converge. As John Rawls observed, the freedoms secured in a 
constitutional democracy give rise to a “reasonable pluralism” of political 
ideas, doctrines, perspectives, and opinions.14 Accordingly, the aim of 
public participation and deliberation is not consensus but, as indicated 
above, the achievement of a properly public perspective from which to 
form one’s political judgements and conduct political debate. Rawls’s 
insight, well-confirmed in democratic practice, is that properly public 
judgments about complex political issues nonetheless diverge.15 Hence, 
political disagreement and disputation are inexorable from democracy. 
The task of much of democratic theory is to envision and design 
processes and institutions that can manage our political divides. One might 
go as far as to say that constitutions simply are rulebooks for containing 
our divisions within the navigable boundaries of fair rules and procedures. 
But when it comes to interactions among the disputants, this managerial 
function is fraught. Although some political disagreements concern 
relatively nominal matters, many invoke citizens’ sense of justice. Though 
the familiar debates over healthcare, poverty, taxation, immigration, and 
the environment are sometimes articulated as the strictly managerial 
disputes of what the country can afford, they are ultimately disputes over 
justice, and disagreements about what a morally acceptable society is 
required to do. Hence, heat frequently accompanies these disputes. When 
arguing about matters invoking our sense of justice, we tend to see our 
interlocutors as being not merely on the incorrect side of the question, but 
on the unjust side. And when their side prevails politically, we are bound 
                                                                                                                     
12 See Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95, 95–96 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) 
(explaining the importance of decisions being made collectively within a democracy, even when there 
are no shared comprehensive moral or religious views); Seyla Benhabib, Deliberative Rationality and 
Models of Democratic Legitimacy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 26, 28–29 (1994) (distinguishing between 
collective good and individual interests in the democratic process). 
13 The deliberative democrats are perhaps the most obvious proponents for this kind of view. But 
the idea that citizens have a duty to discuss politics is not limited to deliberativists.  
14 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (2005).  
15 GERALD GAUS, THE TYRANNY OF THE IDEAL: JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY ch. 1 (2016).  
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to regard that outcome as not merely suboptimal or regrettable, but morally 
unacceptable. 
Here, then, is the puzzle occasioned by the popular conception of 
civility and its corresponding duty. Heated tones and antagonistic 
demeanors are precisely what one should expect in disputes where the 
interlocutors take themselves to be defending against injustice. Moreover, 
as was noted above, democratic citizens have a duty to take responsibility 
for their collective political life. Accordingly, when matters of justice are 
at stake, they are thus likely to bring to political disagreements the 
emotional and normative investments that tend to manifest in heat and 
hostility. In short, antagonism, animosity, resentment, and indignation are 
what we should expect from democratically engaged citizens when arguing 
sincerely over important public matters. The features of political discourse 
that are commonly cited as constitutive of incivility appear to be the 
natural byproducts of responsible citizenship. The duty of civility, taken in 
its popular conception, looks inconsistent with proper democratic 
citizenship. 
A defender of the popular view might retort that the reasoning above 
shows not that civility is incompatible with proper citizenship, but only 
that it is difficult. She may contend that the duty of civility is the 
requirement to contain or suppress the tendency, natural though it may be, 
to be exercised in political discussions when matters of justice are at stake. 
The duty of civility, it may be claimed, is the requirement to not allow our 
passions to get the better of us in political disputation. 
This line of defense prompts a formidable critique of the idea that the 
duty of civility involves the requirement to be soft-spoken, collected, and 
reserved in political debate. Theorists working in various feminist idioms 
have argued––correctly, in my view––that, when civility is understood 
broadly as politeness, the duty of civility gives unwarranted advantage to 
the status quo and the existing balance of political power.16 One of the 
ways in which the duty of civility so understood accomplishes this is by 
creating opportunities for the politically powerful to defuse criticisms and 
objections by fixing on the manner in which they are expressed. Those for 
whom the status quo is most objectionable tend also to be those who are 
most passionate and indignant. Consequently, the duty of civility, again 
                                                                                                                     
16 See, e.g., Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View, 13 CAN. J. PHIL. 
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 111–37 (1987), reprinted in SCIENCE, MORALITY & FEMINIST THEORY 209, 
213–14 (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielsen eds., 1987) (noting that women were not “expected to demand 
equal rights”); Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 120, 122–24 (Seyla 
Benhabib ed., 1996) (arguing that “differences of speech privilege correlate with other differences of 
social privilege”); Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 348–49 (1997) 
(arguing that “appeals to deliberation do nothing to challenge an undesirable status quo” and ultimately 
disadvantage individuals “who are already underrepresented in formal political institutions”). 
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assuming the popular understanding of civility that we have been 
exploring, is in effect an instrument by which democratic responsibility is 
deflected and democratic judgment disabled. Once again, given the popular 
understanding of civility, the duty of civility seems incompatible with 
responsible democratic citizenship.  
This provides a clue as to what civility and its corresponding duty 
cannot be. Whatever value there might be in remaining calm and collected 
in the midst of political disagreement, it cannot be a requirement of 
democratic citizenship to do so. It may be an effective strategy to manifest 
a reserved and dispassionate demeanor in political discussion, but it is not 
a democratic duty to do so. The heat, tone, and animosity of contemporary 
political discourse might be regrettable for a variety of reasons, but it does 
not itself constitute a failure of citizenship. Consequently, the duty of 
civility requires something else of us. 
To be clear, civility in the popular sense that we have thus far adopted 
nonetheless captures a common collection of pro tanto norms which I do 
not take the arguments above to impugn. Moreover, I take it that there is a 
pro tanto duty that applies to persons to be civil in their interactions, and 
perhaps especially their disputes. The argument thus far has fixed only on 
the idea that civility, as it is popularly construed, is the core of a duty of 
citizenship. Accordingly, the upshot thus far may be formulated as follows: 
Civility is not a unitary concept. Rather, there is a distinct sense of civility 
that applies strictly to contexts of democratic politics, and consequently, a 
duty of civility that applies to persons specifically in their role as 
democratic citizens. 
II. CIVILITY AS CIVIC ADDRESS 
What, then, does this distinctively democratic concept of civility and 
its corresponding duty amount to? In pursuing this, we can draw further a 
lesson from the feminist line of criticism introduced above. Recall that the 
target of that critique was a conception of the duty of civility that too easily 
enabled powerholders and advocates of the status quo to deflect objections 
from those who find the status quo unacceptable. Widening the focus 
slightly, we can see the feminist critique as emphasizing a crucial feature 
of democratic responsibility: in order to realize the ideal of 
self-government among equals who take ownership of their collective 
political order, citizens must be accountable to one another. When it comes 
to citizens who are also holders of public office, this means that they must 
render themselves vulnerable to the criticisms of their fellow citizens. 
Broadly, democratic citizens owe to one another actual engagement; in 
conducting their political disputes, they must address one another in a way 
that is consistent with their standing as democratic citizens, that is, as 
political equals. 
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Addressing another person in a way that is consistent with their 
standing as an equal citizen is not easy, especially when matters of justice 
are at stake. Just as it is easy to manifest hostility towards those who one 
perceives to be advocating injustice, it is easy to dismiss one’s political 
opponents as political inferiors. However, unlike expressions of political 
hostility, attitudes of political superiority are obviously at odds with the 
core democratic ideal of self-government among equals. In other words, 
the political disputation that is inexorable from––because it is constitutive 
of–– democracy is always disputation among equals. I want to propose, 
then, that the core of civility (now taken in its distinctive democratic sense) 
is the norm of addressing political interlocutors as one’s fellow citizens, 
and thus as equal partners in self-government. In short, I propose that we 
think of civility as a norm of civic address, and the corresponding duty as 
requiring that we address our fellow citizens in a way that is consistent 
with their standing as our equals. 
Central to civility as civic address are three broad requirements. First, 
there is responsiveness. In political discourse, including of course 
argumentation, citizens must strive to be responsive to their interlocutors’ 
actually stated views and reasons, rather than with strawmen or other 
opportunistically constructed fabrications. Second, is the requirement of 
connection. That is, in political discourse, citizens must strive to address 
their contributions to one another, rather than to onlooking audiences or a 
choir of sympathetic partisans; in argumentative contexts, interlocutors 
must not use one another as mere props, foils against which to mug to their 
allies in the audience. Third, citizens must endeavor to conduct their 
political discourse by means of reasons and considerations that they 
sincerely believe that their interlocutors will appreciate the force of. Call 
this the mutuality requirement for civic address. In short, in communicative 
and argumentative exchanges, we manifest a due recognition for our 
interlocutor’s status as an equal when we strive to address them in a way 
that responds to their actual views, connects with them directly, and 
attempts sincerely to offer reasons and considerations that they will accept 
as such. Insofar as democratic citizenship involves a standing requirement 
to acknowledge our fellow citizens as our political equals, there is a duty of 
civility. 
Readers will have noticed that the requirements of civic address have 
been formulated as requirements to strive and endeavor to engage with 
one’s fellow citizens in a particular way. The formulation as requirements 
to try is necessary if we are to take due account of the fact that 
argumentative discourse is one of the ways in which citizens come to learn 
about their oppositions’ perspectives and arguments. Consequently, civility 
must be consistent with a certain degree of sincere misunderstanding of 
others’ views. Consider that it should not count as uncivil when a citizen 
fails to offer her interlocutors reasons that they could accept due to her 
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being honestly mistaken about the substance of their position. Borrowing a 
term proposed in a different context by Christopher Eberle, we can say that 
the resulting duty of civility is a duty of “conscientious engagement.”17 
It is not difficult to discern some of the leading merits of this approach 
to conceptualizing civility and its corresponding duty. For example, on the 
civic address account, the mark of incivility does not lie in tone, heat, or 
demeanor, but rather in opportunistic refusals to take one’s critics or 
opponents as nonetheless one’s equal citizens. And this view enables us to 
identify popular modes of political discourse as especially uncivil. Note 
how often political argumentation involves strategic mischaracterization of 
the oppositions’ actual views, the mere pantomime of answering objections 
while simply restating one’s views for the sake of rallying one’s allies, and 
the tactic of offering as decisive reasons in favor of one’s views claims that 
are the very ones being called into question by one’s critics.18 That these 
tactics are compatible with maintaining a soft, concessive tone and polite 
demeanor indicates the limitations of the popular conception of political 
civility. 
The conception of civility as civic address is also able to accommodate 
the thought that hostility and animosity are generally regrettable features 
of our politics. After all, heat and attitude are tactics for escalating conflict, 
and when they are employed by those who are already unduly advantaged, 
they serve to diminish critics and smother criticisms. One could go so far 
as to say that the marks of incivility as popularly understood (aggression, 
name-calling, shouting, impoliteness, and the like) are reliable signals that 
civility in the sense of civic address is being breached. What matters in 
assessing a mode of discourse with respect to civility, then, is how well the 
interlocutors succeed in actually addressing one another in the relevant 
ways. Heat, animosity, and tone are consistent with civic address, even 
though they are frequently manifestations of its violation. Consequently, 
democratic citizens have a pro tanto duty to be civil in the popular sense, 
but this is parasitic on the duty to civically address their fellow citizens. 
This means that a failure to be civil in the popular sense does not itself 
constitute a failure of citizenship. 
I realize that I have barely sketched my conception of civility as civic 
address. A complete view of civility would need to include far more detail 
than can be provided here. But recall that my objective in this Article is not 
to develop a conception of civility, but rather to identify a problem that any 
viable conception of civility will confront. My contention at this juncture is 
simply that the conception of civility as civil address, along with its 
                                                                                                                     
17 CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS 104 (2002). 
18 See SCOTT F. AIKIN & ROBERT B. TALISSE, WHY WE ARGUE (AND HOW WE SHOULD): A 
GUIDE TO POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNREASON 10–12 (2d ed. 2019) (offering detailed 
analyses of these pathologies). 
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corresponding duty, is both commonsensical and noncontroversial enough 
to serve as a template from which more detailed articulations of civility 
would proceed. Spelling out the details of civility as civic address is 
undertaken in other work.19 
III. CIVILITY AS A RECIPROCAL DUTY 
Any conception of civility that takes something like civic address as its 
foundation will conceive of civility as a norm of engagement with one’s 
fellow citizens, and this will naturally entail that the duty of civility is what 
may be called a reciprocal duty.20 
To explain, some duties are first-personal while others are 
reciprocal.21 An analogy with garden-variety moral virtue will be helpful. 
Consider a virtue like moderation. This virtue establishes a standard of 
conduct that requires an individual’s temperance in the pursuit of 
enjoyment. This standard is first-personal.22 What it requires is not 
contingent on the presence of other temperate people; the virtue of 
temperance applies to individuals as individuals, and demands of them 
individual moderation, even in the presence of immoderate company. 
Another example of a first-personal virtue is courage. The courageous 
person must stand firm in fearful situations, even when surrounded by 
cowards. To be sure, precisely what course of action courage requires 
might depend on one’s company and what they are currently doing; 
nonetheless, that others are cowards does not license anything less than 
courage from the courageous person. Again, courage, as a first-personal 
virtue, applies to the individual. 
Now contrast these first-personal virtues with requirements of a 
different kind. These do not primarily attach to individuals, but instead 
govern groups of individuals or are exhibited in relations between them. 
That is, they establish a standard of conduct for us rather than simply for 
me and you. For example, we teach our children the policy “keep your 
hands to yourself.” But notice that the policy of keeping one’s hands to 
oneself establishes a standard of conduct for those on the playground; 
more importantly, it is in virtue of its collective application that individuals 
are bound to comply with its requirements. Consequently, when Billy 
violates the norm by grabbing Danny, and Danny retaliates, it would be 
absurd to criticize Danny for failing to keep his hands to himself. With 
Billy’s violation, the collective norm is suspended, and in extricating 
himself by pushing Billy away, Danny does not himself break the rule. To 
                                                                                                                     
19 SCOTT F. AIKIN & ROBERT B. TALISSE, POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN A POLARIZED AGE 53–56 
(forthcoming 2020). 
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better capture this, notice that the norm “keep your hands to yourself” is an 
abbreviated version of the more complex norm “keep your hands to 
yourself on the condition that others are keeping their hands to 
themselves.” We see, then, that the norm and its corresponding duty are 
reciprocal; they establish a standard of conduct that applies to groups, and 
individuals are required to abide by the norm, as long as others generally 
do so as well.23 
Notice that in this playground case, the norm does not indicate what 
one is permitted to do in response to its violation. Surely there are certain 
retaliatory acts that Danny could perform against Billy that would be 
inappropriate or even impermissible. That Billy’s violation suspends the 
collective norm does not afford to Danny moral carte blanche to respond 
however he wishes. Though his retaliatory response does not itself 
constitute a violation of the “keep your hands to yourself” norm, Danny 
may still retaliate in ways that render him worthy of criticism, perhaps 
even punishment. 
Return now to politics. It is clear that some political duties are 
first-personal. As a citizen, one’s engagements with others must manifest 
the requirements of honesty and evenhandedness. That one’s fellow 
citizens are inveterate dissemblers does not license one to be dishonest or 
biased. In fact, when dishonesty is widespread, honesty and 
evenhandedness are all the more important. However, other political duties 
are reciprocal. They prescribe modes of conduct to us—collectively, so to 
speak. Accordingly, individuals are required to abide by these 
requirements only when they are embraced and generally practiced by the 
group. Where the norm corresponding to a reciprocal duty is commonly 
disregarded within a group, the duty itself is rendered inactive, as it 
establishes a standard of behavior only under the conditions where the 
norm is collectively embraced. 
Given that the duty of civility follows from the democratic aspiration 
of maintaining responsibility for the citizens’ shared political order, it 
looks clearly reciprocal. We are required to hold ourselves politically 
accountable to our fellow citizens, and hence to render ourselves 
vulnerable to their criticisms, as a way of manifesting our recognition of 
their status as equal partners in democratic self-government. When others 
are disposed to incivility, they decline to hold themselves politically 
accountable to us; under such conditions, it would be perverse to take 
ourselves to nonetheless be bound by the duty of civility. Indeed, abiding 
by the duty of civility when it is generally flouted is tantamount to abetting 
our own political subordination, as it places constraints on our political 
activity and puts our views and objectives at a relative disadvantage. One 
                                                                                                                     
23 Id. 
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might say, then, that abiding by the duty of civility under conditions where 
it is not reciprocally practiced helps to empower and entrench incivility, 
which in turn serves to further deteriorate democratic conditions. In 
abiding by the duty of civility when dealing with the uncivil, we contribute 
to the strategic effectiveness of incivility. Under certain extreme 
circumstances, there may be a duty of incivility.24 
IV. CIVILITY AS A SECOND-ORDER NORM 
The next stage of the argument begins from a brief digression into 
what might seem to be exceedingly distant territory—the views of the 
twentieth century American empiricist philosopher Willard Van Orman 
Quine, who wrote nothing in political philosophy and only one curious 
essay in moral philosophy.25 Our present interest in Quine is limited to a 
particular bit of nomenclature—specifically, the term semantic ascent26—
that he introduced as he was theorizing the structure of philosophical 
disagreements over what might be called ontology, or disagreements over 
what exists.27 I suspect readers are familiar with certain longstanding 
philosophical disputes that belong to the subfield of metaphysics. In 
particular, there is a debate going back to at least the Presocratics about 
whether everything that exists is physical.28 This is closely related to a 
debate over whether everything that exists has causal properties. Typically, 
these debates focus on the seemingly indispensable nature of certain 
abstracta (that is, nonphysical items), such as numbers, sets, classes, and 
kinds, whose role in the causal order is on anyone’s view mysterious.29 
Quine was concerned with whether disputes over the existence of such 
(purported) items could be well-ordered. It would seem that between the 
physicalist (who denies that there are abstracta) and the nonphysicalist 
(who affirms that some abstracta exist), there could be no proper 
                                                                                                                     
24 See generally CANDICE DELMAS, A DUTY TO RESIST: WHEN DISOBEDIENCE SHOULD BE 
UNCIVIL (2018) for a similar discussion in the context of the duty to obey the law. Delmas argues that 
in cases where the political order is significantly unjust, there is not only no duty to obey the law, but 
possibly a duty to disobey, perhaps even in ways that overtly violate norms of civil disobedience. Id. at 
224–25.  
25 For a reliable overview of Quine’s philosophy, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, 
QUINE: LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE AND REALITY 50–53 (1988) (describing Quine’s views on 
pragmatism, relativism, and realism). 
26 WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 270–74 (1960) [hereinafter QUINE, WORD 
AND OBJECT]. 
27 See HOOKWAY, supra note 25, at 20 (“Quine speaks of the set of objects which a speaker takes 
to exist as his ‘ontology’: an assertion ‘ontologically commits’ its author to objects of a certain kind if 
the assertion would only be true if objects of that kind existed.”).  
28 See JONATHAN BARNES, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS (1979) (describing various ideas of 
the Presocratics). 
29 For an example, see generally, Kathrin Koslicki, On the Substantive Nature of Disagreements 
in Ontology, 71 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 85 (2007). 
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engagement, as the argumentative maneuvers from the one side seem 
destined to appear question-begging to the other.30 Indeed, it seems that 
among these interlocutors, their disagreement is likely to extend to the 
question over what should count even as a relevant consideration with 
respect to the dispute. 
Quine gave the name semantic ascent to the strategy of dealing with 
disputes of this kind by shifting the site of the dispute, at least 
momentarily, towards the terms each side employs in formulating their 
position; interlocutors should try ascending from talking about the matter 
in dispute to talking about the way they talk about the matter in dispute. 
Quine writes that semantic ascent “is the shift from talking in certain terms 
to talking about them.”31 He reasons that “[w]ords . . . unlike [e.g.] classes . 
. . are tangible objects of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men 
of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best.”32 
The strategy of semantic ascent, then, is that of looking for relatively 
uncontested common ground, in the hope that disputants might find some 
foothold from which to more productively conduct their more fundamental 
disagreements. Importantly, the strategy involves not simply a change in 
the topic of the disputants’ conversation, but a shift in the level of the topic 
of the conversation. They are to shift from arguing about, e.g., whether 
classes exist to talking about how they talk about whether classes exist. 
This second-order conversation will focus on hopefully more tractable 
questions such as what each takes to be adequate definitions or 
conceptualizations of the disputed items, what renders those definitions 
and conceptualizations adequate, and so on. 
Again, the hope is that by ascending to semantic level, interlocutors 
might discover that there is enough difference in their nomenclature as to 
render their dispute over classes merely verbal. (In that case, they may 
nonetheless have to confront a prolonged debate at the semantic level.) Or 
they could discover that they are largely in agreement over the semantics, 
which itself might constitute a kind of progress in their first-order dispute 
about classes. Semantic ascent, then, is not a way to resolve disputes, but 
rather a means for making disputes more orderly. 
Semantic ascent is of course a commonsense strategy that we 
intuitively employ in disputes of all kinds. What is of particular interest at 
present is that the strategy calls attention to a general fact of 
disagreements, namely that they run simultaneously along two evaluative 
tracks that may be distinguished by referring to first-order and 
second-order levels of evaluation. In this way, argumentation functions a 
                                                                                                                     
30 See generally Jody Azzouni, On “On What There Is”, 79 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 1 (1998) (discussing 
“debates over the Quine-Putnam Indispensability thesis”). 
31 QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT, supra note 26, at 271. 
32 Id. at 272. 
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lot like communication more generally. More specifically, in order to carry 
on a conversation, communicators must simultaneously track two distinct 
levels of language use, namely the meanings of the words being used (the 
semantics, the first order) and the grammatical structure in which they are 
used (the syntax, the second order). Missteps in tracking either distinct 
level typically result in communicative failure.33 What is more, 
communicators need a common second-order idiom in order to diagnose 
and correct certain kinds of communicative failure. 
Similarly, in order to successfully engage in argumentation, disputants 
must track and evaluate each other’s claims (the first order) as well as what 
might be called their argumentative performance (the second order). For 
example, when engaged in argumentation about, say, gun ownership laws, 
disputants must be able to track one another’s first-order claims about 
guns, ownership, and the law, while also attending to the ways in which 
those claims figure into the evolving dialectic among them. Minimally, in 
order to engage in argumentation, each interlocutor’s contribution must: 
take account of the relevant prior statements introduced into the discussion; 
avoid contradicting their own prior statements; refrain from needlessly 
repeating claims that are already manifestly agreed upon; decline to 
repeatedly assert as a premise that which is disputed among them; and so 
on. In other words, interlocutors must perpetually be “keeping score” of 
the state of play in their disagreement.34 This is a second-order evaluative 
site that is accordingly distinct from the first-order assessment of the 
reasons offered about gun ownership laws. Accordingly, just as an unsound 
argument can have a true conclusion, an impeccable first-order case for 
stricter gun laws can be a dialectical failure. 
We are now able to tie the hanging threads together. As a collection of 
norms governing our engagement with fellow citizens in political 
disagreements, civility as civic address has largely to do with what has just 
been called our argumentative performance. We fail to be civil not simply 
                                                                                                                     
33 This is not intended as a complete analysis of communication, but only as identifying two 
necessary conditions for communicative success. Command of the relevant semantics and syntax does 
not suffice for successful communication; according to many views, one must also develop an adequate 
conception of the interlocutor’s communicative intention in talking as she does. See PAUL GRICE, 
STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26 (1989) (formulating “the Cooperative Principle” for participants in 
conversation: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”).  
34 David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 8 J. PHIL. LOGIC 339, 344–46 (1979). See 
also ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE 
COMMITMENT 6 (1994) (explaining an aim of the work is “to address the question, How should the 
relation between representation . . . and the discursive concepts of reason and truth be understood?”); 
MARY KATE MCGOWAN, JUST WORDS: ON SPEECH AND HIDDEN HARM 2 (2019) (identifying “a 
previously overlooked mechanism by which ordinary speech by ordinary speakers under ordinary 
circumstances enacts harmful norms and thus constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm. Harm is 
constituted when the harm is brought about via adherence to norms enacted”). 
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in virtue of the position we hold, nor simply in virtue of the heat or tone 
with which we express our position, but centrally in virtue of the ways in 
which our presentation of our position fails to properly address our 
interlocutor. In this sense, civility is a second-order norm, and the 
corresponding duty is similarly second order—it is a duty to engage 
political disagreement in a particular way. In short, the duty of civility has 
to do with our dialectal conduct. 
The second-order nature of civility may seem so obvious as to not 
require extended comment. However, it is worth emphasizing this feature 
of the duty in order to properly understand its role in democratic life. The 
concept of civility is needed to articulate a feasible understanding of what 
citizens owe to one another, given that political disagreement is an 
inevitable product of democracy itself. That is, democratic citizens need to 
be able to evaluate one another’s dialectical conduct as a way of managing 
their first-order disputes. As with the ontological debates that concerned 
Quine, citizens need to be able to talk about the way they talk about the 
issues that divide them, as this second-order talk can help them to arrive at 
mutually agreeable understandings of where their disagreements lie and the 
precise shape they take. Perhaps the ability to ascend to talk in the second 
order about how well one’s arguments address one’s interlocutors can 
sometimes assist in making progress with first-order disputes over policy. 
At the very least, the ability to avail ourselves of a second-order idiom for 
evaluating discursive conduct may be able to help prevent undue escalation 
in contexts of disagreement. 
And here is where a point made at the beginning of this Article comes 
into its own. Note that the idiom of civility can perform these democratic 
tasks only if it is second order. That is, a conception of civility can play its 
proper role in democracy only if it specifies requirements that can be met 
by those who hold erroneous political views, and also violated by those 
who hold correct political views. We might say that the requirements 
specified by the duty of civility must be nonpartisan, that is, impartial with 
respect to political error and correctness. Or, put another way, a viable 
conception of civility and its corresponding duty must enable us to 
countenance cases where those with whom we agree at the first order are 
nonetheless failing at civility, and those with whom we disagree at the first 
order are nonetheless civil.  
V. THE PROBLEM OF SEMANTIC DESCENT 
My hope is that nearly everything that has been said thus far strikes the 
reader as unobjectionable, perhaps even commonsensical. Still, the 
elements are in place for formulating what I see as a serious difficulty 
confronting any plausible conception of civility. When it comes to political 
disagreement, there are no analogues to Quine’s “tangible objects” that 
allow people “of unlike conceptual schemes” to “communicate at their 
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best.”35 To put the point bluntly, what goes up can come down, too. And 
our second-order idiom for evaluating each other’s discursive conduct is 
subject to what can be called semantic descent—the shift by which our 
second-order evaluative terms are conscripted into playing a combat role in 
first-order skirmishes. 
To get the flavor of what I have in mind, consider a term used in 
talking about online discourse: “troll.” This term entered into our 
vernacular as a way to identify a mode of online conduct that is 
objectionable in virtue of being provocative and haranguing simply for the 
sake of disrupting discussion threads.36 In this original usage, being a 
“troll” has little to do with one’s substantive commitments; “trolling” is the 
second-order phenomenon of engaging in a way designed to derail 
conversation. Once the term gained currency, however, it quickly became 
vulnerable to semantic descent: the term is now widely deployed as a term 
of abuse to characterize those with whom one disagrees over issues at the 
first order. “Trolls” are simply one’s political opponents, and “trolling” is 
what trolls (so understood) do in articulating their views. 
Another example of the phenomenon of semantic descent is the term 
“fake news.” The term was introduced to describe a source that poses as 
journalistic, but in fact is not.37 The term thus initially denoted a 
second-order feature of various web sites, television programs, and print 
media. However, “fake news” is now widely used as a term to deride the 
content that is reported by a journalist.38 At its worst, “fake news” is 
simply what one calls reportage that is favorable to one’s political rivals.39 
In this way, the term has descended from its second-order function to our 
first-order debates. In other words, it initially served an umpiring function, 
but is now just another player in the political game. 
Finally, consider the verb to “politicize.” This term entered the 
vernacular as a way of identifying cases where political actors attempt to 
gain politically from a high-profile event (typically a tragedy) that arguably 
ought to stand above the fray of politics. But now the term is itself 
                                                                                                                     
35 QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT, supra note 26, at 272. 
36 ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST., MEDIA MANIPULATION AND 
DISINFORMATION ONLINE 4–5 (2017), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ 
DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline-1.pdf. 
37 JULIE POSETTI ET AL., JOURNALISM, ‘FAKE NEWS’ & DISINFORMATION: HANDBOOK FOR 
JOURNALISM EDUCATION AND TRAINING 14 (2018). This book references the “growing international 
concern about a ‘disinformation war’ in which journalism and journalists are prime targets,” and offers 
as evidence the joint statement issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Representative on 
Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States’ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression, and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. Id.  
38 Id. at 66. 
39 Id. at 14–15. 
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deployed as a means for gaining politically under circumstances of that 
kind. More specifically, the term functions as an accusation that one wields 
against one’s opposition as a way to claim for oneself the political high 
ground by disparaging one’s rivals. But, of course, vying for the political 
high ground is itself an attempt to gain politically. 
The trouble is that any conceptualization of civility, and indeed the 
very concept of civility itself, is subject to semantic descent. That is, 
although civility is useful to us as a way of thinking about how we conduct 
ourselves in political argumentation, it can always be opportunistically 
wielded as just another way of carrying out our first-order debates. When 
civility has descended, it functions as a term of approval for those who 
express positions that we find favorable, and incivility serves as a term for 
expressing disapprobation at the first-order positions that we find 
objectionable. 
The matter grows bleaker still once we recall that civility norms are 
best understood as requirements to try to engage in ways that successfully 
address one’s fellow citizens. This means that the question of whether a 
citizen is being civil in a particular dispute is largely a matter of judgment: 
we must assess whether our interlocutor is endeavoring adequately to 
address us as an equal and communicating in good faith. A significant 
body of empirical literature demonstrates that evaluations of this kind are 
highly responsive to exogeneous factors. In short, we are very likely to 
regard those with whom we disagree politically as ill-motivated, 
untrustworthy, and unreliable. Accordingly, our assessments of their 
dialectical conduct will be responsive to our evaluations of their first-order 
views in ways that will lead us to assess our opponents as uncivil. 
Recall the argument from Section Three that the duty of civility is a 
reciprocal requirement. This means that individual citizens are bound by 
the requirement only provided that their interlocutors seem prepared to 
reciprocate. Once civility has descended from its second-order function, 
we grow increasingly unable to regard our political rivals as capable of 
reciprocating. We therefore take ourselves to not be bound by civility’s 
norms. Crucially, our opposition reasons similarly. The result is 
democratically degenerative—a condition where citizens are able to 
interact civilly only with those who are politically just like themselves, 
and, with some justification, see those who are politically different as 
undeserving of civility (because unwilling or unable to reciprocate). 
CONCLUSION 
Return to the Pew results mentioned at the beginning of this Article. 
Citizens say they want a more civil mode of politics, but they also see their 
political opposition as the source of incivility, and accordingly want their 
rivals simply to stand down and acquiesce. This collection of attitudes is 
precisely what we should expect when civility has semantically descended, 
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when its second-order content has been degraded to the point where it can 
no longer serve as a basis for impartial evaluation of discursive conduct. 
The upshot, I think, is that the concept of civility is at this point probably 
unable to play a useful role in diagnosing and repairing our democracy. To 
put the point in a different way, no suitably detailed conception of civility 
will be sufficiently public and impartial to serve as a tool for addressing 
our political dysfunctions. 
Where does that leave us? Although I cannot develop the thought here, 
my sense is that the partisanship, animosity, polarization, and distrust that 
have taken hold of our democracy cannot be remedied with prescriptions 
for better politics. Any such prescription is likely to be received by a large 
portion of those to whom it is addressed as yet another partisan maneuver. 
What is needed instead is the recognition that these dysfunctions are 
possibly the natural result of allowing politics to play too great a role in our 
collective life. As other scholars have noted, the intensification of partisan 
animosity and polarization has occurred alongside sociological shifts in the 
country that have served to place individuals’ partisan affiliations at the 
center of their social identity. In short, we now tend to see ourselves as 
fundamentally defined by our political loyalties.40 Along with this shift in 
our self-understanding has come a transformation of the social spaces we 
inhabit in our day-to-day lives: they have become increasingly segregated 
along partisan divides.41 Perhaps the right response, then, is to devise 
channels by which citizens can come to see in one another something 
beyond partisan identities. As paradoxical as it might sound, the way to 
repair our democracy is to keep ourselves mindful of the fact that, as 
important as democracy is, we cannot live well together as equals solely by 
means of politics.42 
                                                                                                                     
40 See LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 5–6 
(2018) (“Parties simplify the voting decision. . . . [M]ost voters have a sense of party loyalty. They 
know, either through a lifetime of learning, from parental socialization, from news media, or through 
some combination thereof, that one party is better suited to them.”).  
41 See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS 
TEARING US APART 5 (2009) (“As Americans have moved over the past three decades, they have 
clustered in communities of sameness, among people with similar ways of life, beliefs, and, in the end, 
politics. . . . When people move, they also make choices about who their neighbors will be and who 
will share their new lives. Those are now political decisions, and they are having a profound effect on 
the nation’s public life.”). 
42 See ROBERT B. TALISSE, OVERDOING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE MUST PUT POLITICS IN ITS 
PLACE 4–5 (2019) (discussing “the ubiquity of democratic politics, the saturation of social life with 
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LYNN MIE ITAGAKI 
Civility has been much on the minds of pundits in local and national political 
discussions since the 1990s. Periods of civil unrest or irreconcilable divisions in 
governance intensify concerns about civility. While its more archaic definitions 
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goal of deliberative democracies. However, less acknowledged is its disciplinary, 
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and ableist hierarchies that distinguish some populations for full citizenship and 
others for partial rights and protections. 
In Part I, I examine a recent series of civility polls, their contradictory results, 
and how these contradictions can importantly expose the fissures of our 
contemporary moment and our body politic. In Part II, I describe the historical 
background of civility around race, gender, and sexuality and the unacknowledged 
difficulty in defining civility and incivility. In Part III, I extend this discussion to 
address the recent cases before the Supreme Court concerning LGBTQ+ 
employment discrimination and lack of accessibility. In conclusion, I identify what 
it would mean to analyze civility in terms of dignity on the basis of these cases 
about the equal rights and protections of their LGBTQ+ and disabled plaintiffs. 
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The Long Con of Civility 
LYNN MIE ITAGAKI * 
INTRODUCTION 
Civility, now more than ever, is a concern of our everyday 
conversations and political debates. Civility is a flexible concept which has 
referred to everything from polite conversation to an entire civilization, 
and its very expansiveness undermines its effectivity. Most often, civility 
denotes orderly turn-taking or polite manners exhibited by a “civilized” 
citizenry. It also includes internal contradictions, depending on the 
situation and its practitioners. Civility is the way in which we should talk 
about important things; civility is also the way in which we do not talk 
about important things. One person’s civility is another’s incivility. From 
the smallest rude remark to the institutionalized exclusion of groups, the 
flexibility of the term “civility” encompasses a tremendous range of 
customs, behaviors, practices, and traditions. Moreover, when people 
advocate for civility, they often neglect to disclose their implicit 
assumptions about to whom they owe civility, which may not include those 
with whom they disagree or disparage. Civility is often understood as the 
foundation or goal of deliberative democracies; however, it also has 
disciplinary, repressive effects in maintaining or exacerbating racial, 
gendered, heteronormative, and ableist hierarchies that distinguish some 
populations for full citizenship and others for partial rights and protections. 
In Part I, I examine a recent series of civility polls, their contradictory 
results, and how these contradictions can importantly expose the fissures of 
our contemporary moment and our body politic. In Part II, I describe the 
historical background of civility around race, gender, and sexuality and the 
unacknowledged difficulty in defining civility and incivility. In Part III, I 
extend this discussion to address the recent cases before the Supreme Court 
concerning LGBTQ+ employment discrimination and lack of accessibility. 
In conclusion, I identify what it would mean to analyze civility in terms of 
dignity on the basis of these cases about the equal rights and protections of 
their LGBTQ+ and disabled plaintiffs. We should be deeply suspicious 
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with demands for civility that are often deployed to quell dissent from 
marginalized populations and to dampen democratic practices. 
I. THE PARADOX OF THE POLLS 
The consensus among Americans is that incivility seems to have gotten 
worse. Poll after poll appears to represent respondents’ increasing 
frustration with incivility in our media and political debates. A late October 
2019 poll1 about civility in politics seemed to affirm with numbers the 
political polarization and profound partisanship that most people felt. In 
response to the statement “[t]he political, racial, and class divisions in this 
country are getting worse and our national dialogue is breaking down,” 
seventy-seven percent agreed, a six point swing from April 2019’s 
eighty-three percent (albeit within the ±3.1 margin of error).2 Other similar 
overwhelming majorities agreed with variations of these statements such as 
“I am frustrated by the uncivil and rude behavior of many politicians” 
(eighty-seven percent) and “[b]ehavior that used to be seen as unacceptable 
is now accepted as normal behavior” (eighty-four percent).3  
However, polling data for this Civility Poll revealed an apparent 
contradiction expressed by a majority of respondents: while eighty-seven 
percent (with sixty-four percent strongly agreeing) agreed that 
“compromise and common ground should be the goal for political leaders,” 
eighty-four percent (with sixty-three percent strongly agreeing) also agreed 
with the statement, “I’m tired of leaders compromising my values and 
ideals. I want leaders who will stand up to the other side.”4 Taking cues 
from the press release, media coverage repeated and amplified this 
apparent contradiction between respondents simultaneously wanting 
                                                                                                                     
1 October 2019 Civility Poll, GEO. U. INST. POL. & PUB. SERV. (Oct. 2019), 
http://politics.georgetown.edu/october-2019-civility-poll-2/. This poll is run semi-annually by the 
Institute of Politics at Georgetown University with Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning polling 
outfits. 
2 Compare THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 65 FINAL 
STUDY #16440, at 1, 3 (2019), http://politics.georgetown.edu/full-cross-tabs-and-questionnaire-october-
2019-2/, with THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 64 STUDY # 
16354, at 1, 3 (2020), http://politics.georgetown.edu/civility-poll-tables-cross-tabs-questionnaire-april-
2019/.  
3 THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 65 FINAL STUDY #16440, 
at 1, 3 (2019), http://politics.georgetown.edu/full-cross-tabs-and-questionnaire-october-2019-2/. The 
Georgetown Institute of Politics and Public Service Battleground Civility Poll from April 4, 2019 
showed a three percent decrease and one percent increase, respectively, again within the margin of 
error. See THE TARRANCE GRP. & LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, BATTLEGROUND 64 STUDY # 16354, at 
1, 3 (2020), http://politics.georgetown.edu/civility-poll-tables-cross-tabs-questionnaire-april-2019/ 
(displaying results of the April 2019 poll).  
4 GU Politics, New Poll: Voters Find Political Divisions So Bad, Believe U.S. Is Two-Thirds of 
the Way to “Edge of a Civil War”, GEO. U. INST. POL. & PUB. SERV. (Oct. 23, 2019), 
http://politics.georgetown.edu/press-releases/civility-press-release-oct-2019/.  
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compromise and not wanting one’s political leaders to compromise.5 Mo 
Elleithee, Executive Director of the Georgetown Institute of Politics and 
Public Service, says that this contradiction “creates mixed messages for 
even the most skilled political leader trying to decide whether to be a 
fighter or a dealmaker.”6 But how could at least two-thirds, if not as many 
as three-quarters, of the same respondents say that they wanted these two 
contradictory things?7 
This contradiction points to the benefits and drawbacks of civility, 
especially in terms of the promise of civil discourse and respectful debate it 
offers to many. The ostensible inconsistency with these two statements 
reflects one of the fundamental problems of civility and its “meaning 
clusters”8 that go far beyond mere politeness, but rather activate its more 
obscure definitions of the citizenry and civilization. Assertions of civility 
rely on certain assumptions about to whom one owes civility.9 For 
example, whether one should be civil to another individual or member of 
another group can depend on if one perceives these individuals or group 
members to share values and commitments to the nation.10 The practices, 
tactics, and strategies for how we might achieve civility can require strong 
advocacy in and of themselves, as opposed to the most common demand to 
just be polite. 
However, the increasing polarization of the U.S. electorate can lead to 
a more restrictive notion of civility, summoning the interrelated force of its 
archaic definitions of citizenry and civilization by limiting those to whom 
one should show civility. Consolidating this in-group and excluding others 
determine who is valued or disdained, a full citizen or second-class one, 
patriot or enemy.11 Under these conditions, civility’s flexible and 
wide-ranging definition may stretch to mean even its opposite. For 
example, Civility Poll respondents who wanted compromise and common 
ground might actually imply for respondents that those on the other side of 
the issue are responsible for reaching a compromise and finding common 
ground with their stated position. In other words, those on the other side of 
the debate should listen to me and to views like mine, expressed by my 
                                                                                                                     
5 Paul Bedard, Battleground: 7 in 10 Say US ‘On the edge of Civil War’, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 
23, 2019, 1:27 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/battleground-7-in-10-
say-us-on-the-edge-of-civil-war; Victor Westerkamp, Americans Believe We’re Two-Thirds of the Way 
to a Civil War, NTD (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.ntd.com/americans-believe-were-two-thirds-of-the-
way-to-a-civil-war_396411.html. 
6 GU Politics, supra note 4 (alteration in original). 
7 Id. Given the margin of error, the number of respondents who agreed with both statements could 
be as high as seventy-seven, and as low as sixty-five, albeit the range clearly signals a distinct majority.  
8 Virginia Sapiro, Considering Political Civility Historically: A Case Study of the United States 2 
(1999) (unpublished manuscript), http://blogs.bu.edu/vsapiro/files/2018/06/Considering-Civility.pdf. 
9 Id. at 5–6. 
10 Id. at 7. 
11 Id. at 9. 
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elected representative, but I and people who agree with me shouldn’t have 
to. Compromise describes what others do, therefore I may listen to those 
other perspectives but I will not change my position, as that would 
compromise my own values. I could justify this redefinition of 
compromise to mean not compromising by identifying the other side as not 
worthy of compromise by labeling these antagonists as criminal, 
unpatriotic, evil, subhuman—i.e., not worthy of civility. Thus, I only need 
to find compromise and common ground among those I consider citizens, 
patriots, voters, humans—essentially people who think like me. Moreover, 
I categorize as “humans” only those who think like me, or those with 
whom I would not have to compromise my values. 
Respondents could be reflecting a social desirability bias as “shy” 
anti-compromise and anti-common-ground citizens and voters who might 
not admit certain opinions to pollsters. Whites might be especially fearful 
of appearing racist in ways that might parallel women’s and racial 
minorities’ fears of being stereotyped,12 and Moss-Racusin et al. posit a 
“compensatory egalitarianism” in which “individuals may reassure 
themselves that although they did not select a minority candidate, they 
‘repaid’ this candidate with implicit antiprejudice attitudes on their 
behalf.”13 I posit that respondents might be sensitive to being perceived as 
not supporting democratic values or egalitarianism by being unwilling to 
find a compromise or common ground 
This bias skews polls by small amounts that can alter expectations of 
close runs and flip anticipated results, as occurred in the 2016 presidential 
election outcome.14 Known as the “Bradley effect,”15 scholars and pundits 
named this phenomenon after the 1982 gubernatorial race of California in 
which African American mayor Tom Bradley led by a comfortable margin 
in the pre-election polls but eventually lost by fewer than 100,000 votes, or 
1.2%.16 Researchers identified respondents’ concerns that they would be 
perceived as racist for not voting for Bradley, a candidate who could have 
                                                                                                                     
12 Phillip Atiba Goff, Claude M. Steele & Paul G. Davies, The Space Between Us: Stereotype 
Threat and Distance in Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 92 (2008). 
13 Corinne Moss-Racusin, Julie Phelan & Laurie Rudman, “I’m Not Prejudiced, but . . .”: 
Compensatory Egalitarianism in the 2008 Democratic Presidential Primary, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 543, 
546 (2010).  
14 Andrew Mercer et al., Why 2016 Election Polls Missed Their Mark, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT 
TANK (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/why-2016-election-polls-
missed-their-mark/; Joseph P. Williams, The Trump Effect, U.S. NEWS: REP. (July 1, 2016, 3:30 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-01/are-voters-too-embarrassed-to-say-they-support-
trump. 
15 Ronald J. Vogel & Phillip Ardoin, Ask Me No Questions, I’ll Tell You No Lies: Does the 
Bradley Effect Still Exist?, 15 RACE GENDER & CLASS 65, 66 (2008). 
16 Id.; John Canalis, Is the Bradley Effect Real? Deukmejian Says No, LONG BEACH PRESS 
TELEGRAM (Oct. 28, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.presstelegram.com/2008/10/28/is-the-bradley-
effect-real-deukmejian-says-no/. 
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been the first Black governor of California.17 This statistical issue of how 
researchers and pollsters should most accurately factor in bias to avoid 
tipping the scales results from the phenomena of “covering,” as Kenji 
Yoshino calls what he takes up from Erving Goffman’s notion of hiding or 
downplaying a disfavored, stigmatized identity, in this case, an anti-Black 
racist one.18 The generally unanticipated election of Donald J. Trump in 
2016 and the 2015 surprising majority vote of the British to withdraw from 
the European Union are only the most recent spectacular examples of 
covering: the Shy Trump voter or the Shy Brexit voter whose answers 
reflected this bias, and for whom pollsters did not adequately account.19  
Pollsters and jury selection consultants, among other experts, can 
attempt to ascertain more accurate opinions with indirect, rather than 
direct, questions. For example, in 2008 pollsters were confronted with the 
unprecedented question of whether registered Democrats would have a 
problem voting for a Black or female candidate, as was likely with Barack 
Obama and Hillary Clinton as the presidential nominee frontrunners. 
Pollsters had to ask indirect questions that more accurately predicted 
voting preferences. They knew they would get skewed results by asking 
participants directly if they were racist or sexist or even if they would 
support a qualified Black or female candidate, so instead pollsters had to 
develop versions of these questions that asked  if “most of my neighbors”20 
or “most people they knew” would support these presidential candidates 
and if “America was ready” for them.”21 Pollsters need to work around a 
perceived norm, or what respondents might see as the more socially 
desirable or civil answer, because respondents are covering (hiding or 
toning down) what they think are disfavored political views and identities 
and ones that might generate hostility and conflict. 
II. THE CULTURE WARS WERE CIVILITY WARS 
I posit civility as not only a confidence trick played on the U.S. public 
for decades, but also as referencing the general confidence in civility as a 
universal solution for many contemporary political ills. This use of civility 
usually appears as a default strategy and non-legal remedy for leveling 
hierarchies and inequalities.22 In this context, interpreting the above polls 
                                                                                                                     
17 Vogel & Ardoin, supra note 15, at 67. 
18 KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2007). 
19 Nick O’Malley, Donald Trump, Brexit, and the Shy Voter Theory, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Oct. 26, 2016, 8:57 AM), https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/donald-trump-brexit-and-the-
shy-voter-theory-20161026-gsao0a.html.  
20 Susan Page, Call Her Madame President, USA TODAY, Oct.10, 2005, at C1. 
21 Kathy Frankovic, Race, Gender and Bias in the Electorate, CBS NEWS (Mar. 17, 2008, 3:00 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/race-gender-and-bias-in-the-electorate/. 
22 LYNN MIE ITAGAKI, CIVIL RACISM: THE 1992 LOS ANGELES REBELLION AND THE CRISIS OF 
RACIAL BURNOUT 19–22 (2016). 
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assumes that voters’ frustrations with decreasing civility might change how 
they are voting or will vote.  
Civility has multiple purposes evoked by its range of definitions—in 
short: citizenry, civil society, and civilization.23 Political scientist Virginia 
Sapiro notes that “civility has been traditionally defined as civic virtues, 
community-building, and deliberative practices of good citizens.”24 Civility 
is often considered to be the foundation of deliberative democracies.25 It is 
thus “a concept, political goal, and measure.”26 Civility is a strategy and 
may also be an obstacle to maintaining a vibrant democracy as it can be a 
tool of exclusion used against those who are not deemed “civil.”27 
All these definitions of civility are at play or are in crisis in the 
all-capitals topline of the GU Politics Civility Poll press release: 
“VOTERS FIND POLITICAL DIVISIONS SO BAD, BELIEVE U.S. IS 
TWO-THIRDS OF THE WAY TO ‘EDGE OF A CIVIL WAR.’”28 While 
polarization deepened during the Obama and Trump Administrations, the 
concern of an imminent civil war alludes to the cultural and historical 
backdrop of another era, of another allegedly impending race war. 
Following the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and 1991 collapse of the Soviet 
Union, “political upheavals and civil wars . . . instigated an anxious 
outpouring of U.S. research on civil society and its contribution to the 
durability and integrity of democratic states.”29 The post-cold war era saw 
that “new social and political forces were at play, both domestically and 
internationally” and largely superseded what legal scholar Derrick Bell and 
historian Mary Dudziak have argued is “the ‘interest convergence’ of cold 
war politics and the modern civil rights movement [that] contributed to 
more democratic racial practices.”30 And although capitalism had 
ostensibly triumphed over communism,31 the 1992 violence in Los Angeles 
“punctured the illusion of [U.S.] exceptionalism”32 and its invincibility 
from civil unrest—in this case, over police brutality and racial inequalities. 
Paleoconservative Pat Buchanan referenced the 1992 Los Angeles 
“riots” as he concluded his serious challenge to the Republican presidential 
                                                                                                                     
23 Id. at 15. 
24 Id. at 28–29. 
25 Sapiro, supra note 8, at 3. 
26 ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at xv. 
27 Id. at 19–20. 
28 GU Politics, supra note 4. 
29 ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 14. 
30 ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 14. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518–33 (1980) (outlining 
the scholar’s interest convergence argument). See also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: 
RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 14, 258 (2000) (supporting Bell’s interest 
convergence argument). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 15. 
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incumbent by conceding to President George H.W. Bush at the 1992 
Republican National Convention in his famous “Culture War” speech:  
My friends, this election is about more than who gets what. It 
is about who we are. It is about what we believe, and what 
we stand for as Americans. There is a religious war going on 
in this country. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of 
nation we shall be as was the Cold War itself, for this war is 
for the soul of America.33 
Buchanan arrayed both Bill and Hillary Clinton against Bush, who “is on 
our side.”34 Addressing his primary voters who posed a significant 
challenge within the Republican Party to then-President Bush’s re-election 
campaign, Buchanan both describes and directs them in martial language: 
“And so, to the Buchanan Brigades out there, we have to come home and 
stand beside George Bush.”35 Emphasizing that this culture war is a 
physical one, and one “for the soul of America,” Buchanan closes his 
speech with the martial image of teenaged National Guard troops who have 
returned from the 1991 Persian Gulf War to fight against “a mob” during 
the 1992 Los Angeles “riots”: “And as those boys took back the streets of 
Los Angeles, block by block, my friends, we must take back our cities, and 
take back our culture, and take back our country.”36 
Civility was fueled by the master narrative of American progress, the 
exceptionalist Bildungsroman of the maturing nation adopting increasingly 
robust notions of democracy and equality. By calling that dominant 
perception of the nation into question, the 1992 Los Angeles Rebellion had 
a profound, though seldom acknowledged, influence on the way 
Americans thought of their country in the post-cold war, post-civil rights 
eras. For example, political scientist Robert Putnam’s popular essay and 
bestselling book of the same title, Bowling Alone, warned of a civic culture 
in this country declining at the very moment when newly democratic 
governments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere were looking to the United 
States as a model: 
Many students of the new democracies that have emerged 
over the past decade and a half have emphasized the 
importance of a strong and active civil society to the 
consolidation of democracy. Especially with regard to the 
postcommunist countries, scholars and democratic activists 
alike have lamented the absence or obliteration of traditions 
                                                                                                                     
33 Patrick Joseph Buchanan, Culture War Speech: Address to the Republican National Convention 
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of independent civic engagement and a widespread tendency 
toward passive reliance on the state. To those concerned with 
the weakness of civil societies in the developing or 
postcommunist world, the advanced Western democracies 
and above all the United States have typically been taken as 
models to be emulated. There is striking evidence, however, 
that the vibrancy of American civil society has notably 
declined over the past several decades.37   
In the mid-1990s, the civility debates reached their peak in public 
discourse among academics, politicians, journalists, and pundits; these 
“unresolved differences of civic values and virtues have been blamed for 
fracturing U.S. society, resulting in a so-called civility crisis.”38 The 
civility crisis had its roots in the legacy of affirmative action, the promises 
of President Johnson’s Great Society policies, and the sociopolitical tumult 
of the 1960s anti-war, anti-poverty, decolonial, lesbian and gay, feminist, 
and anti-racist movements.39 Historian Daryl Michael Scott identifies a 
racial neoconservative perspective that perceived liberals as:	
too apologetic for what they viewed as the riotous behavior 
of urban blacks, and [neoconservatives] emphasized the need 
for law and order. More important here, [neoconservatives] 
also tended to have serious reservations about preferential 
programs such as affirmative action and efforts to promote 
integration such as school busing. They reasserted the 
traditional racial liberal call for a color-blind state, which 
would protect only the civil rights of individuals.40	
Scott notes the perception of uncivil behavior, “riotous behavior,” and 
even the “serious reservations” over supporting equal opportunity as  
outcomes rather than as processes.41 The title of his study, Contempt and 
Pity, taken from W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk in its trenchant 
explanation of anti-Black attitudes, identifies how the prevalent notion of 
“pity” was Whites’ implicit reason for changing public sentiment during 
major civil rights landmarks, such as Brown v. Board, Great Society 
                                                                                                                     
37 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 
65 (1995); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
38 ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 16. 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE OF THE 
DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880–1996 xiv (1997).  
41 Id. 
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reforms, and civil rights acts. However, this feeling masked contempt for 
Black people, in what I posit was the civil face of hateful, racist feelings.42  
Inequality will be more indirectly channeled through ostensibly 
race-neutral governmental and institutional practices as historian Carol 
Anderson documents.43 The incivility of “white rage” is now diffused 
through structural discrimination, indirect rather than direct, hidden instead 
of overt:  
White rage is not about visible violence, but rather it works 
its way through the courts, the legislatures, and a range of 
government bureaucracies. It wreaks havoc subtly, almost 
imperceptibly. Too imperceptibly, certainly, for a nation 
consistently drawn to the spectacular—to what it can see. It’s 
not the Klan. White rage doesn’t have to wear sheets, burn 
crosses, or take to the streets. Working the halls of power, it 
can achieve its ends far more effectively, far more 
destructively.44 
Anderson identifies the political logics of process and procedure that 
perpetuates inequalities more efficiently and pervasively. Critical ethnic 
studies scholars Jodi Byrd et al. echo Anderson’s arguments in relation to 
economic inequality, exposing the presumed “apolitical” nature of 
bureaucratic, procedural, and administrative acts to facilitate 
“dispossession”; and this façade of being apolitical flourishes despite these 
acts’ origins and maintenance “as the result of law and policy.”45 
Moreover, non-enforcement of constitutional rights and legislation and the 
selective protections available to some but not all persons create further 
inequities. The failure of constitutional amendments such as the Fifth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth exemplifies the failure of enforcement since the 
nation’s founding alongside African chattel slavery, Indigenous genocide, 
and broken treaties. Civil rights acts of the 1960s have helped to close 
employment, educational, and voting gaps, among other things; however, it 
was the backlash against the laws that served to curtail their effectiveness 
and had a chilling effect on consistent enforcement. The racist destruction 
wrought by “halls of power” that Anderson references are not only 
political institutions, but also “still suffuse our social and economic system, 
                                                                                                                     
42 Id. at xi–xii, xviii. See also W.E.B. DU BOIS, Of Our Spiritual Strivings, in THE SOULS OF 
BLACK FOLK 37, 38 (David W. Blight & Robert Gooding-Williams eds., Bedford Books 1997) (1903) 
(“It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through 
the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and 
pity.” (footnote omitted)). 
43 CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL DIVIDE 3–4 (2016). 
44 Id. at 3. 
45 Jodi A. Byrd et al., Predatory Value: Economies of Dispossession and Disturbed 
Relationalities, SOC. TEXT, June 2018, at 10. 
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buttressed by the informal modes of social control even more powerful 
than the law,” as historian William Chafe diagnoses the ultimately limited 
effects of the civil rights acts of the 1960s.46 These informalities are often 
just as pernicious: “Although the means of keeping blacks in their place 
may now be implicit rather than explicit, they too often are just as effective 
as in the past.”47 
Philosopher Jonathan Schonsheck identifies a typology that helpfully 
disambiguates incivilities among individuals (rudeness) and groups (rasp), 
as well as the basic rejection of what Schonsheck posits are the 
“metavalues” (repudiation): toleration and mutual respect, the foundation 
of a democracy.48  
Rasp is the friction of jostling political, moral, religious, and 
ethnic groups that is inevitable in any multicultural “liberal 
democracy”—a system, or theory, or philosophy of 
government that cherishes the values of toleration and mutual 
respect. Not everyone, however, subscribes to toleration and 
mutual respect; the repudiation of these values generates the 
third, and most serious, category of incivility.49    
Civility is also an appealing paradigm because of its admonitions of 
individual behavior rather than institutional changes that shape behavior 
through legal mandates such as affirmative action or antidiscrimination 
statutes. Civility can also normalize the violence of “repudiation”: the 
“friction” and “jostling” of intolerance and disrespect. In their “Eleven 
Theses on Civility,” performance scholars Kyla Wanzana Tompkins and 
Tavia Nyong’o expose how this repudiation is hidden: “Civility discourse 
enforces a false equation between incivility and violence that works to 
mask everyday violence as a civic norm.”50 The problems with promoting 
civility as a panacea for political impasses are made more visible through 
an often unacknowledged subset of incivility—bullying—its 
normalization, and recent critiques of the research on this phenomenon. 
In Bully Nation: How the American Establishment Created a Bullying 
Society, Charles Derber and Yale Magrass begin their wide-ranging study 
of the economic and militaristic institutions that implicitly and explicitly 
                                                                                                                     
46 WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE 
BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM, at vii (1981). 
47 Id. 
48 Jonathan Schonsheck, Rudeness, Rasp, and Repudiation, in CIVILITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
ESSAYS ON CIVIC VIRTUE, TOLERATION, AND CULTURAL FRAGMENTATION 169, 169–72 (Christine T. 
Sistare ed., 2004). 
49 Id. at 169. 
50 Tavia Nyong’o & Kyla Wazana Tompkins, Eleven Theses on Civility, SOCIAL TEXT (July 11, 
2018), https://socialtextjournal.org/eleven-theses-on-civility/. 
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promote bullying behavior among Americans.51 Derber and Magrass 
provide critiques of anti-bullying programs in their emphasis on what they 
call the “psychiatric paradigm.”52 I am not only interested in Derber and 
Magrass’s research on bullying for its relationship to civility but also as a 
means of making civility’s shortcomings also visible. Derber and Magrass 
are critical of how the psychiatric paradigm gives rise to the following 
popular beliefs: bullies are often misjudged as individuals acting alone and 
who are spontaneously maladjusted or troubled rather than organized and 
strategic in their harassment; the social ill of bullying is relegated to the 
realm of children, juvenile behavior, and immature development; bullying 
is not what adults do nor what venerable state apparatuses such as “the 
economy, military, culture, family, schools” facilitate which “all help 
create and perpetuate the bullying milieu.”53 Incivility is similarly 
simplified as performed by individuals who are bad or criminal rather than 
strategic in deploying incivility, and incivility is generally condemned 
rather than examined for what its manifestation might expose about the 
issue or institution affected.  
III. INCIVILITIES, INEQUALITIES, INDIGNITIES, INHUMANITIES 
I have more fully developed the concept of “civil racism” elsewhere in 
the context of the mid-1990s “civility debates” which promoted individual 
behaviors as leading to more effective community building, or, on the 
extreme other hand, the death of nations.54 Civil racism acknowledges the 
growing field of civility studies that assesses the development or decline of 
our civil society in terms of social capital.55 I argue that civil racism marks 
the cultural and legal shift from the modern civil rights movement to the 
post-civil rights era; “the goal of equality is portrayed as an ethical choice 
between the formal (legal) processes and empirical evaluations of the[ir] 
outcomes,” so equal process versus equal outcomes.56 As a marker that 
distinguishes the post-civil rights era from earlier times, racism’s effects 
are “minimized” both in terms of its pervasive harm and its institutional 
purview: “Civil racism marks the ways in which racial discrimination has 
been allowed sanctuary in the private realms of individual, isolated 
behaviors.”57 Moreover, “discussions of remedies for racial discrimination 
                                                                                                                     
51 CHARLES DERBER & YALE R. MAGRASS, BULLY NATION: HOW THE AMERICAN 
ESTABLISHMENT CREATED A BULLYING SOCIETY 2 (2012). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See ITAGAKI, supra note 22, at 15–16 (discussing the benefits of civility in dialogue and social 
behavior in deterring social anomie). 
55 Id. at 6. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. For “minimization of racism” as a “central frame of color-blind racism,” see EDUARDO 
BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 142 (2001).  
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are marked as impolite and uncivil.”58 Civil racism emphasizes the racial 
character of civility: the hierarchy depends on what is considered 
appropriate racial behavior in life, at work, and in leisure.59 Given civil 
racism, one’s entitlement to rights and protections are based on one’s 
perceived good or bad behaviors rather than inalienable or natural as 
inherent to one’s humanity.60 
I define “civil racism” as the preservation of civility at the expense of 
racial equality.61 As an expression of structural racism, civil racism 
exhibits the active—though often unintentional—perpetuation of 
discrimination through one’s everyday engagement with the state and 
society.62 Thus, I am skeptical of the investment of time and resources in 
civility. I posit calls for civility as a heuristic that can often expose an 
individual’s or group’s investment in thwarting more equitable processes 
and outcomes. Oppressed individuals and groups call for full equality, 
dignity, and humanity—rarely civility. 
However, civility might entice some resistant stakeholders, possibly 
racial conservatives, centrists, and moderates into conversation with others 
holding different views. This rationale is often promoted, and marginalized 
speakers are often exhorted to behave civilly. Philosopher Hannah Arendt 
has famously commented on the need for one’s civil rights to be 
recognized before one has human rights, or the paradoxical right to have 
rights.63 We can read this in a variety of ways. If one doesn’t have equality, 
then there is no true civility (mutual respect or cooperation). In cultivating 
or exercising citizenship, civility only functions between and among 
equals. Otherwise it is condescension for the powerful and submission for 
the less powerful. Being civil has been used as a gatekeeper to equality: if 
one isn’t civil then one doesn’t deserve equality. 
My concern with a racist civility that is pursued at the personal or even 
institutional level was that it did not cost much if anything at all. In other 
words, there would be no material redistribution or even worse, a 
redistribution that flowed upward, just a friendlier face or personable 
interactions whatever one’s racist beliefs or society’s racist inequities. The 
emotional labor of civility was more often extracted from vulnerable 
populations who had to repeatedly overlook microaggressions or be forced 
                                                                                                                     
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 24 (explaining how invisible forms of discrimination influence the structure of civil 
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60 See id. at 21 (comparing proponents of civility and how they inadequately address existing 
social hierarchies). 
61 See id. at 6 (providing various definitions of civil racism). 
62 Id. 
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to “cover.”64 Kenji Yoshino interprets mainstream society, and indeed a 
number of court rulings, as failing to protect a mutable behavior that is not 
a protected civil right such as wearing no makeup, public affection 
between same-sex couples, or speaking Spanish at work when one is 
bilingual and hired for this fluency but the owners are not.65 And given the 
three cases just taken up by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding employment 
discrimination against LGBTQ+ workers, these unprotected mutable 
behaviors in a number of states would also apply to gender performances 
not corresponding to the sex on one’s birth certificate—as in the case of 
Aimee Stephens, who lived and dressed as a woman—or in actions such as 
joining a gay softball league or loving someone of the same gender and 
disclosing that identity or relationship in a conversation with a work 
client.66 
Returning to Arendt’s important description of cause-and-effect,67 if 
one is not seen as having civil rights, then one does not have human 
rights.68 If one is not perceived as being equal, then one can never be 
perceived as being civil. If one is not valued, then one can never be 
recognized or have a full self-expression that is respected and heard.69 This 
tension between civility and equality appears in two Supreme Court cases 
in attempts to limit the extent to whom civility applies. 
In Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, Guillermo Robles has a visual 
disability and must use a screen reader for his computer.70 However, he 
cannot engage with some parts of Domino’s Pizza’s online interface since 
screen readers cannot translate all of its website.71 The case questioned 
whether the accessibility of public spaces under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act applied to commercial websites.72 To extrapolate this, one 
cannot fully participate in online exchanges, whether economic, social, or 
political in a cyberspace that is inaccessible because websites and 
platforms cannot be translated by a screen reader.73 This structural 
inequality devalues Robles and others with disabilities by implying that 
Domino’s does not consider this group of customers worth communicating 
with despite the relatively low cost of revamping its website to be fully 
                                                                                                                     
64 YOSHINO, supra note 18, at 90, 130–31, 191. 
65 Id. 
66 Nina Totenberg, Showdown Over LGBTQ Employment Rights Hits Supreme Court, NPR (Oct. 
8, 2019, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/766386729/showdown-over-lgbtq-
employment-rights-hits-supreme-court. 
67 ARENDT, supra note 63, at 3, 131, 156. 
68 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
69 Id. 
70 Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2019). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 904. 
73 Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 16–17, 23, Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, 913 F.3d 898 
(9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-55504). 
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accessible—tens of thousands of dollars for a multi-billion dollar 
company.74 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes, Harris Funeral Homes was probably quite civil when it 
fired Aimee Stephens after she explained she would live and work as a 
transgender woman although she had been hired initially as a cisgender 
man.75 In fact, the civility and previous rapport between her and her 
employer, and the subsequent feelings of her employer betraying their civil 
relationship, was what encouraged her to pursue her employment 
discrimination case in the first place: “I’d given quite a few years to them, 
I had good reviews, we got along good—then all of a sudden it’s ‘We 
don’t need you anymore.’ I got mad enough to do something about it.”76 At 
trial, the defense for Harris Funeral Homes referred to Stephens’s dead 
personal pronouns of “he” and “him.”77 On appeal, the defense insisted that 
the owner would have fired a woman for violating the company’s dress 
code if she had worn pants instead of a skirt: one of the requirements of 
persuading the justices that the sex discrimination clause of Section VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not apply.78 
Trans+ activist and lawyer Richard Juang writes on the importance of 
recognition for trans+ individuals: “Being recognized within a liberal 
democracy means being valued, having one’s dignity protected, and 
possessing some access to public self-expression. The struggle for 
recognition’s key components—value, dignity, and self-expression—is a 
cornerstone of modern U.S. political, social, and cultural activity.”79 
Connecting Juang’s insights on trans+ rights to racial ones, “civil racism” 
that preserves civility over racial equality can also preclude dignity. The 
preservation of civility is also at the expense of human dignity. Given 
                                                                                                                     
74 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28, Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 
2019) (No. 17-55504); Kate Cox, Accessibility, the Future, and Why Domino’s Matters, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 20, 2019, 10:15 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/10/accessibility-the-
future-and-why-dominos-matters/. 
75 EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2018); 
Totenberg, supra note 66. 
76 Katelyn Burns, The Supreme Court Is Finally Taking on Trans Rights. Here’s the Woman Who 
Started It All, VOX (Oct. 7, 2019, 4:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/latest-
news/2019/10/7/20903503/trans-supreme-court-decision-employment-discrimination-aimee-stephens. 
77 See Defendant R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 11, EEOC v. 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (No. 2:14-cv-13710), 2014 
WL 6805999 (“First, Anthony is not, in fact, a woman. As discussed above, he is biologically, 
anatomically and legally, a man. He may assert -- against all objective evidence -- that he is a woman, 
but there is no medical or legal authority that would support him in that assertion. He may intend to 
undergo therapy and surgery that might to some extent change his physical appearance to resemble a 
female. But doing so would not make him a female and, in any event, he has not done so yet.” 
(emphasis added)). 
78 R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 567.  
79 Richard M. Juang, Transgendering the Politics of Recognition, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES 
READER 706, 706 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006).    
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recent frustrations with the limited universality and applicability of human 
rights and even equality, secular political theories have renewed interest in 
the concept of dignity. Through Black freedom struggles as Vincent Lloyd 
posits, dignity, in this case Black dignity, is achieved through collective 
struggle against White supremacy.80 Thinking civility, humanity, and 
dignity together reveals that dignity can be present or absent in contesting 
or conforming, respectively, to multiple vectors of oppression (racist, 
ableist, gender, cis-heteronormative, economic, religious, colonialist) in 
what Patricia Hill Collins constructs as the “matrix of domination.”81 In 
conceptualizing dignity, there is dignity through struggle against 
oppression, or where there is no struggle, there is no dignity. The presence 
or absence of dignity through struggle is unlike the hierarchies of human, 
in which even what constitutes the human is questioned from new 
materialist critiques, and has been historically hierarchized into what 
philosopher Sylvia Wynter terms “genres of being human,”82 or value 
which also can be graduated or measured into more or less than.  
CONCLUSION 
Looking at violence—whether racist, gendered, queer/transphobic, or 
ableist—in relation to civility transforms notions of justice and fairness and 
compels us to reevaluate the responsibilities of the individual and the state 
to protect rights and foster democracy. Examining perceptions of civility in 
relation to protest often exposes the limits of inclusion and participation 
promised by the Constitution. Analyzing civility can change how we might 
try to align our behaviors with our understanding of democratic practices. 
The types of occasion in which we promote civility reveal the ways in 
which we think society and the state function best, as well as how 
individuals and institutions encourage or coerce us to facilitate or thwart 
structures that maintain civil society. 
Civility is useful, but in a vastly limited sense that is little 
acknowledged by its proponents. If acts or people are called out for their 
incivility, then the incivilities reference—politely, of course—both the 
ugly acts of white supremacy, ableism, misogyny, or compulsory 
heterosexuality and the protest against them. Or the term incivility is used 
to weaken the claims of those accused of being uncivil. Civility can signal 
the demand to quell or ignore protest. Civility can also signal the 
obfuscation of an intent to silence or exclude. Thus, as popular terms in 
                                                                                                                     
80 Vincent Lloyd, Black Dignity, 68 CROSSCURRENTS 73, 76, 78, 89–90 (2018). 
81 PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE 
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 1, 299 (2d ed. 2000). 
82 Sylvia Wynter, Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the 
Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument, 3 CR: NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 257, 269, 
316–17 (2003). 
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wide use, civility and incivility are moreso codewords, tools, or 
instruments that mask a political agenda separate from movements towards 
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Note 
The Tragedy of Central European University: 
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its 
Threat to Academic Freedom 
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO 
The global proliferation of radical right political movements and the decline 
of democracy are defining features of our current moment. Authoritarian leaders 
ascend to power through the ballot box, but at once, they systematically 
consolidate control over the state and civil society. Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party is emblematic of illiberal democracy, a term 
originally coined by Fareed Zakaria. This Note applies Zakaria’s illiberal 
democracy to Hungary while adjusting the contours of his theory to better account 
for the role of anti-intellectualism and nationalism in the illiberal toolkit. This 
Note also investigates the Orbán government’s targeting of Central European 
University, one of the most notorious struggles between a university and an 
illiberal democracy for academic freedom. Central European University’s 
situation illuminates the ways in which illiberal régimes attempt to smother spaces 
of resistance, using ethno-nationalist rhetoric to characterize universities and 
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The Tragedy of Central European University: 
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its 
Threat to Academic Freedom 
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO * 
Every age has its own Fascism, and we see the warning signs 
wherever the concentration of power denies citizens the 
possibility and the means of expressing and acting on their 
own free will. 
Ogni tempo ha il suo fascismo: se ne notano i segni 
premonitori dovunque la contrentrazione di potere nega al 
cittadino la possibilità e la capacità di esprimere ed attuare 
la sua volontà.  
—Primo Levi1 
INTRODUCTION 
Far-right political parties have grown their influence globally by 
winning major, divisive elections in both recently democratized states and 
states that have long been considered cornerstones of liberal democracy.2 
Many of these parties emerged as a reaction to international unrest, 
including sweeping recessions and refugee crises. Guided by nationalism 
and populism, the far-right has shaken democracy to its core. Political 
parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz and Jobbik, Poland’s Law and Justice, 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, LL.M. Candidate, Human Rights & Social Justice; 
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D 2020; Bard College, B.A. 2017. I am incredibly grateful 
to my advisor, Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez, without whom I could not have properly theorized 
this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Fischl for his invaluable advice throughout the 
drafting process. I am forever indebted to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review, and like to thank 
Jillian Chambers, Hannah Kalichman, Adam Kuegler, Alexandria Madjeric, Carolyn Rennie, and 
Mallori Thompson in particular for their meticulous work, extraordinarily helpful feedback, and 
friendship. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents (Debra and Robert Zaccagnino), 
grandparents (Anne and Robert Blackburn), sister (Melissa Zaccagnino), and partner (James Ninia) for 
their never-ending support. 
1 PRIMO LEVI, A Past We Thought Would Never Return, in THE BLACK HOLE OF AUSCHWITZ 31, 
34 (Marco Belpoliti ed., Sharon Wood trans., 2005); PRIMO LEVI, Un passato che credevamo non 
dovesse ritornare piú, in L’ASIMMETRIA E LA VITA: ARTICOLI E SAGGI 1955-1987, at 47, 50 (Marco 
Belpoliti ed., 2002). 
2 See, e.g., Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-By-Country Guide, BBC (Nov. 13, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 (surveying electoral gains made by 
far-right parties in Europe). 
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and Italy’s Lega Nord have quickly risen to prominence.3 Likewise, 
far-right heads of government—including Donald Trump in the United 
States of America, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
in Turkey—have swiftly gained power and begun to curb safeguards to 
democracy, like free speech and electoral access.  
In many of these cases, the current political climate can be explained 
by the proliferation of illiberal democracy. Although illiberal democracies 
may at first appear to be a functioning “democracy,” upon closer look, it 
quickly becomes apparent that illiberal democracies are shells of their 
“liberal” counterparts.4 Illiberal democracies may retain some democratic 
political liberties, like free elections or separation of powers, but they lack 
strong protections of the civil liberties provided by constitutional 
liberalism in liberal democracies. The rise of illiberal democracy in 
Hungary, the focus of this Note, is perfectly illustrated by Fidesz’s ongoing 
attempt to push Central European University into exile and other unilateral 
attacks on academic freedom. In order to fully understand this complex 
situation, one must look not only to democratic theory, but to the history of 
Central Europe, Hungarian nationalism, and Fidesz’s manipulation of the 
rule of law. This Note situates the Hungarian case as a cautionary tale and 
attempts to comprehend how the trend of illiberal democracy can flourish 
in the most prosperous age for democracy to date, using academic freedom 
as a point of focus. Part I situates this global phenomenon within a 
theoretical framework of democratic wave theory and illiberal democracy. 
Part II applies Part I to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s rise to power in 
Hungary. Finally, Part III analyzes how Hungarian illiberal democracy has 
impacted academic freedom in the country. 
                                                                                                                     
3 See, e.g., Jens Becker, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary, 13 SEER: J. FOR LAB. & 
SOC. AFF. E. EUR. 29, 33 (2010) (“The European elections in 2009 had seen a writing on the wall 
regarding the future crash of the left, with FIDESZ obtaining 56.4 per cent of the votes against MSZP’s 
17.4 per cent. The elections of 2010 on 11 and 25 [of] April made this definitively clear.”); Michał 
Słowikowski & Michał Pierzgalski, The Party System and Voting Behavior in Poland, in CIVIC AND 
UNCIVIC VALUES IN POLAND: VALUE TRANSFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND CULTURE 41, 61 (Sabrina 
P. Ramet et al. eds., 2019) (“After the elections of 2015, the largest party in the parliament is now Law 
and Justice (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in both houses of the Polish parliament.”); 
CATHERINE FIESCHI, POPULOCRACY: THE TYRANNY OF AUTHENTICITY AND THE RISE OF POPULISM 
101 (2019) (“The year 2008 marks the beginning of populism’s full ideological development in Italy: 
[Movimento Cinque Stelle] began to capitalize on the deep transformation of the voters through its use 
of the Web, and the promise of a different, transparent and authentic bottom-up movement; while the 
Lega began to transcend its geographical limits and move southward with the aim of conquering 
Berlusconi strongholds through a discourse of common sense in the face of Italy’s main challenges . . . 
.”). 
4 Infra Part I.B. 
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I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE THIRD REVERSE WAVE, ILLIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY, AND THE NATION-STATE 
A. Democracy’s Third Reverse Wave 
In 1991, Samuel P. Huntington posited that democratization occurs in 
the form of waves. Huntington theorized that “[a] wave of democratization 
is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that 
occur within a specified period of time that significantly outnumber 
transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time.”5 Under 
Huntington’s wave theory, he also identifies the trend of the reverse wave. 
After each wave of democratization, there is a reverse wave, under which 
nation-states that “had previously made the transition to democracy 
reverted to nondemocratic rule.”6 Huntington acknowledges that it would 
be arbitrary to prescribe a rigid date range pinpointing each wave, but 
nonetheless poses an approximate era for each wave.7 Huntington 
subsequently proposes the following structure to describe the modern 
situation of democracy: 
First, long wave of democratization 
First reverse wave 
Second, short wave of democratization 
Second reverse wave  
Third wave of democratization.8 
Huntington’s first wave of democratization was indeed long, spanning 
between approximately 1828 to 1926.9 This first wave was influenced by 
the American and French revolutions that took place nearly a century prior 
and was defined by a substantial widening of suffrage, reduced plural 
voting, and the secret ballot.10 Under this first wave, twenty-nine 
democracies emerged.11 The first reverse wave arrived in 1922 with 
Mussolini’s (democratic) ascension to power and ended with the defeat of 
the Axis forces in the Second World War.12 The first reverse wave was 
characterized by “the shift away from democracy and either the return to 
                                                                                                                     
5 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 15 (1991). 
6 Id. at 16.  
7 Id. (“It is also arbitrary to attempt to specify precisely the dates of democratization waves and 
reverse waves. It is, nonetheless, often useful to be arbitrary . . . .”). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 16–17. 
10 Id. at 16.  
11 Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy’s First Wave, 2 J. DEMOCRACY 12, 12 (1991).  
12 HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 17–18.  
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traditional forms of authoritarian rule or the introduction of new 
mass-based, more brutal and pervasive forms of totalitarianism,”13 and 
tended to occur in countries that had adopted democratic forms of 
governance either before the First World War or during the interwar 
period.14 Countries that experienced nondemocratic régime change 
“reflected the rise of communist, fascist, and militaristic ideologies.”15 
Even in countries where democracy remained in place, antidemocratic 
movements gained strength.16  
Huntington’s second wave of democratization followed the Allied 
victory and extended until the early 1960s, where “Allied occupation 
promoted inauguration of democratic institutions,”17 and fledgling 
democracies emerged during the beginning of the end of colonialism.18 
Contrary to Europe’s democracies remerging under Allied occupation, “no 
real effort was made to introduce democratic institutions” during 
decolonization in Africa and South Asia.19 This led to mixed results: while 
some new states, such as Nigeria and India, established democracies that 
were maintained for at least a decade, in other states, democracy was 
tenuous and the institutions supporting it were shaky at best.20 By the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the second wave of democracy had ebbed and 
“political development[s] and regime transitions were taking on a heavily 
authoritarian cast.”21 Latin America experienced numerous coups d’état, 
primarily led by military régimes, which established bureaucratic 
authoritarianism22 throughout the region.23 Similar military coups d’état 
                                                                                                                     
13 Id. at 17.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 18.  
16 Id. (“In France, Britain, and other countries where democratic regimes remained in place, 
antidemocratic movements gained strength from the alienation of the 1920s and the depression of the 
1930s.”). 
17 Id. 




22 The term “bureaucratic authoritarianism” was first coined by Guillermo O’Donnell in 1973 to 
explain the novel type of military rule in Latin America.  
This form of rule has been interpreted as distinctively bureaucratic because national 
leadership was dominated by individuals who had risen to prominence not through 
political careers but through bureaucratic careers in large public and private 
organizations. . . . Decision-making styles among these leaders were commonly 
technocratic. This bureaucratic, technocratic orientation was generally accompanied 
by intense repression, which in most of the cases reached levels unprecedented in 
the region.  
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 93 (Joel Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001). The 
military-led coups in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), and Argentina (1976) are all examples of 
bureaucratic authoritarian military régimes. See, e.g., Remembering Brazil’s Military Coup 50 Years 
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occurred throughout nations in Asia and the Mediterranean region.24 At the 
same time, rapid decolonization caused democratic instability in new 
nations: “Thirty-three other African countries that became independent 
between 1956 and 1970 became authoritarian with independence or very 
shortly after independence.”25 This era of decolonization led to the largest 
multiplication of authoritarian régimes in history,26 accompanied by a 
worldwide decline in democratic governments. One study estimates that 
one third of the thirty-two functioning democracies in the world in 1958 
had become authoritarian by the mid 1970s.27 Huntington argues that this 
reverse wave was especially notable due to the fact that some nations 
undergoing nondemocratic régime changes had sustained democracy for 
over a quarter century.28 
Huntington’s third and final democratic wave began with the 
Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974 and extended through The Third 
Wave’s publication in 1991.29 During this time period, approximately thirty 
countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America replaced their authoritarian 
régimes with democracies.30 The wave began in Southern European 
nations—Portugal, Spain, Greece—and spread to the bureaucratic 
authoritarian régimes in Latin America and the military dictatorships in 
Asia throughout the 1970s and 1980s.31 By the end of the 1980s, “the 
democratic wave engulfed the communist world.”32 After forty-five years 
of Soviet occupation, Hungary transitioned to a multiparty system in 
                                                                                                                     
Later, NACLA (Apr. 1, 2014), https://nacla.org/news/2014/4/1/remembering-brazils-military-coup-50-
years-later (recounting Brazil’s military dictatorship); Daniel Sheehy, An Eyewitness Account of 
Pinochet’s Coup 45 Years Ago, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/eyewitness-account-pinochets-coup-45-
years-ago-180970241/ (discussing a scholar’s daily life under Pinochet’s régime); Uki Goñi, The Long 
Shadow of Argentina’s Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/opinion/the-long-shadow-of-argentinas-dictatorship.html 
(outlining the human rights abuses committed by Argentina’s military dictatorship). 
23 HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 19.  
24 See id. at 19–20 (discussing democratic backsliding and authoritarian régimes in Asian and 
Mediterranean countries in the 1950s through the 1980s). 
25 Id. at 20. 
26 Id. at 20–21.  
27 Id. at 21. Another report found that in 1962, thirteen governments were produced via coups 
d’état, and by 1975, thirty-eight were. Id. In 1960, nine out of ten South American nations that were 
former Iberian colonies had democratically elected governments. Id. But by 1973, only Venezuela and 
Colombia were left. Id. 
28 See id. (“This wave of transitions away from democracy was even more striking because it 
involved several countries, such as Chile, Uruguay (‘the Switzerland of South America’), India, and the 
Philippines, that had sustained democratic regimes for a quarter century or more.”). 
29 Id. at 21–27.  
30 Id. at 21.  
31 Id. at 21–23.  
32 Id. at 23.  
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1988.33 Likewise, Hungary’s Central and Eastern European neighbors 
began their own democratic transitions.34 The number of democratic states 
rose from thirty in 1973 to fifty-eight by 1990, increasing the percentage of 
democratic states from 24.6 percent to 45 percent.35 Soviet occupation was 
the principal obstacle to democratization for countries east of the Iron 
Curtain, and once removed, the region swiftly adopted democratic 
governments.36  
By 1990, many of the catalysts for the third wave of democracy had 
stalled; “[n]either the White House, the Kremlin, the Vatican, nor the 
European Community were in a strong position to promote democracy. . . 
.”37 At the same time, at least two of the new third wave democracies had 
already shifted back towards authoritarianism.38 While it is difficult to 
definitively predict the duration of the third wave and what conditions may 
give rise to the next reverse wave, Huntington draws three generalizations 
from prior reverse waves to aid in comprehending the possible form of the 
third reverse wave. First, Huntington argues that “the causes of shifts from 
democratic to authoritarian political systems were at least as varied as and 
in part overlap with the causes of shifts from authoritarianism to 
democracy.”39 Huntington provides a useful rubric of factors that 
contributed to the first and second reverse waves.40 The factors are as 
follows: 
(1) the weakness of democratic values among key elite 
groups and the general public; 
(2) economic crisis or collapse that intensified social conflict 
and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could only 
be imposed by authoritarian governments; 
(3) social and political polarization often produced by leftist 
governments attempting to introduce or appearing to 
introduce too many major socioeconomic reforms too 
quickly; 
(4) the determination of conservative middle- and 
upper-class groups to exclude populist and leftist 
movements and lower-class groups from political power; 
                                                                                                                     
33 Id.  
34 Id. (noting how such democratic transition included the Baltic republics and Poland).  
35 Id. at 26 tbl.1.1. Note that Huntington’s figures exclude nations with populations under one 
million. Id. 
36 Id. at 288–89. 
37 Id. at 289.  
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(5) the breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism 
or insurgency; 
(6) intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign 
government;  
(7) snowballing in the form of the demonstration effects of 
the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other 
countries.41 
Second, “transitions from democracy to authoritarianism were almost 
always produced by those in power or close to power in the democratic 
system.”42 The vast majority of these previous transitions away from 
democracy occurred as either military coups d’état under which 
democratically elected leaders were ousted or through “executive coups,”43 
where democratically elected heads of government concentrated power in 
the executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law.44 
Finally, in each reverse wave, “democratic systems were replaced by 
historically new forms of authoritarian rule.”45 Under the first wave, 
fascism differed from prior models of authoritarianism due to “its mass 
base, ideology, party organization, and efforts to penetrate and control 
most of society.”46 Likewise, bureaucratic authoritarianism can be 
distinguished from other forms of authoritarian military rule by its 
institutional character.47 Therefore, the authoritarianism set to emerge 
under the reverse wave theory should be expected to reinvent itself. 
Currently, the world is in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse 
wave. Democracy has statistically entered an international era of decline.48 
Freedom House has documented “global declines in political rights and 
civil liberties” from 2005 to 2018 in their annual Freedom in the World 
                                                                                                                     
41 Id. at 290–91. 
42 Id. at 291. This claim exempts régime changes that were produced by foreign actors. Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 292. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 3–5 
(2019), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-
compressed. pdf (“Freedom in the World has recorded global declines in political rights and civil 
liberties for an alarming 13 consecutive years, from 2005 to 2018. The global average score has 
declined each year, and countries with net score declines have consistently outnumbered those with net 
improvements.”); A Global Report on the Decline of Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/press/2018-04-17/global-report-decline-democracy (summarizing 
articles published in the May/June 2018 Foreign Affairs issue on democratic decline); VARIETIES 
DEMOCRACY INST., DEMOCRACY FOR ALL?: V-DEM ANNUAL DEMOCRACY REPORT 2018, at 6 (2018), 
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-
dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf (finding that autocratization has affected 2.5 billion people, or a third 
of the world).  
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rankings.49 The international rise of the far-right satisfies and builds upon 
Huntington’s three generalizations: the factors that may lead to democratic 
decline, the modes of régime transition, and the shifting image of 
authoritarianism. First, many of the issues contributing to the international 
rise of the far-right reflect the factors laid out by Huntington. These factors 
will be employed throughout the rest of this Note to analyze the 
preconditions for illiberal democracy. Huntington’s second generalization 
regarding the mode of transition is the least apt to analyze the rise of the 
far-right vis-à-vis illiberal democracy. Under the majority of illiberal 
democracies, entire far-right political parties have seized power not 
through coups d’état or executive coups, but through the democratic 
process. In Hungary, this reverse wave is more party-centric than 
executive-centric. And finally, illiberal democracy is the answer to 
Huntington’s claim that each reverse wave brings a novel form of 
authoritarianism. The following section will theorize illiberal democracy 
and the conditions that fomented its development with a focus on Orbán’s 
Hungary.  
B. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy 
The term “illiberal democracy” was originally coined by Fareed 
Zakaria in 199750 and was then later appropriated by Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán as an ideological image of Fidesz’s Hungary.51 The emergence of 
illiberal democracy in the twenty-first century is the modern form of 
authoritarianism necessary for the third reverse wave of democracy.52 
                                                                                                                     
49 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 48, at 4. 
50 Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22 (1997). 
51 Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 
2014, BUDAPEST BEACON (July 29, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-
speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/ (“Meaning, that Hungarian nation is not a simple 
sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in 
this sense, the new state we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny 
foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, [et cetera]. But it does not make this ideology a central 
element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead.”). 
52 Illiberal democracy does have a nomenclatural weakness—its name does not on its face convey 
the fascistic tendencies of many illiberal leaders. And, as a result, other terminologies also attempt to 
conceptualize this phenomenon. For example, Gáspár Miklós Tamás developed the concept of 
post-fascism to describe a “cluster” of behavior: 
[P]olicies, practices, routines, and ideologies that can be observed everywhere in the 
contemporary world; that have little or nothing to do, except in Central Europe, with 
the legacy of Nazism; that are not totalitarian; that are not at all revolutionary; and 
that are not based on violent mass movements and irrationalist, voluntaristic 
philosophies, nor are they toying, even in jest, with anti-capitalism. 
G.M. Tamás, On Post-Fascism, BOS. REV. (June 1, 2000), http://bostonreview.net/world/g-m-tamas-
post-fascism. Post-fascism in ideology bears resemblance to classical fascism because of its open 
hostility to universal citizenship embraced by the Enlightenment, instead believing that some classes of 
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Unlike its predecessors, illiberal democracy arises more subtly than 
traditional forms of authoritarian rule. As opposed to traditional 
authoritarianism53—defined by closed society,54 use of force, and formal 
censorship—illiberal democracies feign compliance with the general 
principles of democracy. Many of the national parties promoting illiberal 
democracy gain power through legitimate democratic means.55 Once 
elected, “they use the levers of democratic institutions to consolidate 
control, all while claiming popular support from the people to protect the 
nation from foreign or domestic threats.”56 While in power, these régimes 
parasitically sap the strength out of the democratic institutions through 
which they were elected. This Section explores the theoretical contours of 
illiberal democracy, contrasted with liberal democracy, to illustrate the 
individual case of Hungary. 
To properly define illiberal democracy, one must first examine the 
characteristics of a liberal democracy. Zakaria’s article and subsequent 
book describes a liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only 
by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of 
powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, 
                                                                                                                     
people do not deserve citizenship to the nation and the civic rights associated with membership. Id. 
This is particularly important as Enlightenment citizenship was equated with human dignity and by 
recognizing universal citizenship we, in turn, recognize those citizens as human. Id. When classical 
fascists and the post-fascists of today reject the citizenship of classes of people within the nation-state, 
fascists also reject their humanity. Id. Under classical fascism, “civic death was necessarily followed by 
natural death, that is, violent death, or death tout court.” Id. Post-fascism, however, replaces literal 
death with figurative death in an anti-Enlightenment illiberal democracy. The sovereign simultaneously 
grants citizenship to some residents of the nation-state while also refusing the humanity of others. Also, 
unlike classical fascism, “[p]ost-fascism finds its niche easily in the new world of global capitalism 
without upsetting the dominant political forms of electoral democracy and representative government.” 
Id.  
53 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 408–09 (1968) (“As techniques of 
government, the totalitarian devices appear simple and ingeniously effective. They assure not only an 
absolute power monopoly, but unparalleled certainty that all commands will always be carried out; the 
multiplicity of the transmission belts, the confusion of the hierarchy, secure the dictator’s complete 
independence of all his inferiors and make possible the swift and surprising changes in policy for which 
totalitarianism has become famous.”). 
54 See K. R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 49 (1945) (“It is one of the 
characteristic features of the magical attitude of a primitive tribal or ‘closed’ society that it lives in a 
charmed circle of unchanging taboos, of laws and customs which are felt to be as inevitable as the 
rising of the sun, or the cycle of the seasons, or similar obvious regularities of nature.”); cf. HENRI 
BERGSON, THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 229 (R. Ashley Audra & Cloudesley 
Brereton trans., 1935) (“The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for the 
rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defence, bound in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle. . . . 
Man was made for this society, as the ant was made for the ant-heap.”). 
55 ALINA POLYAKOVA ET AL., BROOKINGS, THE ANATOMY OF ILLIBERAL STATES: ASSESSING 
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and property.”57 Liberal democracies are also open societies58 that tend to 
value civic nationalism.59 Similarly, Freedom House’s annual Freedom in 
the World report splits its criteria for freedom into two separate rankings: 
political rights and civil liberties.60 States with the highest political rights 
rankings “enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair 
elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are 
competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, 
and the interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and 
government.”61 In order to attain a full forty-point ranking for political 
rights, states must score positively on criteria concerning the electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of 
government.62 In the realm of civil liberties, state treatment of the freedom 
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy and individual rights are considered criteria 
for a free state.63 These two indicators, political liberties and civil liberties, 
correspond to democracy and constitutional liberalism, respectively.64 
Liberal democracy can be divided into two elements: democracy and 
constitutional liberalism.65 While democracy primarily governs political 
                                                                                                                     
57 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22.  
58 Henri Bergson first described the concept of open society in 1935 and it was later expanded 
upon by Karl Popper’s 1945 critique of totalitarianism, The Open Society and Its Enemies. As opposed 
to a closed society, an open society is one in which “individuals are confronted with personal 
decisions,” base their decisions on intelligence, and are critical of the taboos readily embraced in closed 
societies. POPPER, supra note 54, at 152, 178. Popper argues that totalitarianism is a type of 
“reactionary movements which have tried, and still try, to overthrow civilization and return to 
tribalism.” Id. at 1. Under totalitarianism and closed societies, critical thinking becomes impossible 
because these societies rely on “the suppression of reason and truth” and the “brutal and violent 
destruction of all that is human.” Id. at 177. For Popper, this is the danger of totalitarianism: a return to 
closed societies that threaten humanity. Open societies, therefore, must support freedom of thought and 
expression and protect them through the rule of law.  
59 Many scholars of nationalism tend to “distinguish[] ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic,’ western and eastern, 
liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism.” ROGERS BRUBAKER, ETHNICITY WITHOUT GROUPS 5 
(2004). Like many topics in nationalism, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is 
difficult to define and, according to Brubaker, “normatively problematic,” but it is nonetheless worth 
discussing in the context of liberal democracy. Id. Under civic nationalism, “nationhood and 
nationalism have been linked to democracy, self-determination, political legitimacy, social integration, 
civil religion, solidarity, dignity, identity, cultural survival, citizenship, patriotism, and liberation from 
alien rule.” Id. at 132.  
60 MICHAEL J. ABRAMOWITZ, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: DEMOCRACY IN 
CRISIS 2 (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22–24. 
65 Id. at 22–23; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“Liberal principles—political 
ideas that espouse the importance of individual liberties, minority rights, and the separation of power 
across levers of government—and democratic institutions—processes that translate popular will into 
public policy through legitimate elections . . . .”). 
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rights, and is thus more process-oriented, constitutional liberalism’s focus 
on civil rights is goal-oriented.66 Zakaria explains that the term 
“constitutional liberalism” is a marriage between two interrelated concepts: 
“It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with 
the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberties. It is constitutional because 
it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.”67 
Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United 
States under thinkers including William Blackstone, Baron de 
Montesquieu, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Jefferson.68 The 
general concept of constitutional liberalism, despite some variance, boils 
down to the argument “that human beings have certain natural (or 
‘inalienable’) rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting 
its own powers, that secures them.”69 While the existence of constitutional 
liberalism in countries has led to the emergence of democracy, democracy 
does not necessarily give rise to constitutional liberalism.70 Merely 
arranging free elections and protecting other political rights does not 
guarantee that those who democratically come to power will protect the 
civil liberties enshrined by constitutional liberalism.  
Although democracy and constitutional liberalism are often associated 
as conjoined, the two are frequently in tension.71 In particular, democracy 
and constitutional liberalism tend to conflict on the scope of government 
authority: “Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, [and] 
democracy about its accumulation and use.”72 Democracy can undermine 
liberty without substantial safeguards for minority rights and liberties. John 
Stuart Mill warned of “the tyranny of the majority,” under which the 
democratically-elected majority could subvert the liberties protected by 
constitutional liberalism.73 Illiberal democracy, then, is symptomatic of this 
schism between democracy and constitutional liberalism.  
                                                                                                                     
66 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 25 (“Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the 
procedures for selecting government, but rather government’s goals.”).  
67 Id. at 26.  
68 Id. (“[Constitutional liberalism’s] canonical figures include the poet John Milton, the jurist 
William Blackstone, statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and philosophers such as 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, John Stewart Mill, and Isaiah 
Berlin.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 28 (“Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to 
bring constitutional liberalism.”). 
71 Id. at 30; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“The rise of illiberal political parties 
and leaders within electoral democratic systems illustrates the schism between the foundational 
principles and institutions of liberal democracies.”).  
72 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30. 
73 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (1956) (“[I]n political speculations ‘the tyranny of the 
majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its 
guard.”); id. at 3 (“By liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers.”); id. at 4 
(“To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, 
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Illiberal democracy, as is linguistically implied, is a form of 
faux-democracy whereby some legitimate democratic processes are present 
but without substantial safeguards of civil liberties as guaranteed by 
constitutional liberalism. This modern form of authoritarianism enshrines 
majoritarianism74 and absolute sovereignty75 as fundamental political 
values, which defy liberal democratic norms. Illiberal governments 
centralize authority and usurp power in a way that is “both horizontal 
(from other branches of the national government) and vertical (from 
regional and local authorities as well as private businesses and other 
nongovernmental groups).”76 The claim that “unchecked centralization has 
been the enemy of liberal democracy”77 is self-evident—Mussolini, for 
example, was a democratically elected fascist who quickly centralized 
power into totalitarian control.78 Likewise, “[i]lliberal democracies gain 
legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably 
democratic. Conversely, the greatest danger that illiberal democracy 
poses—other than to its own people—is that it will discredit liberal 
democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance.”79 Put 
another way, illiberal democracy “is democratic because it respects the will 
of the majority; illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”80 
Emerging illiberal democracies can be identified by their modus operandi 
that enshrines values of nationalism, majoritarianism, dictatorship of law, 
absolute sovereignty, and anti-intellectualism.  
                                                                                                                     
it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them 
down. . . . The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be 
suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty.”). 
74 ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: GOALS, STRATEGIES, 
AND METHODS OF MODERN AUTHORITARIANS 7 (2017), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH_Report_Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf 
(“A single idea of many authoritarians is the proposition that elections are winner-take-all affairs in 
which the victor has an absolute mandate, with little or no interference, from institutional checks and 
balances. . . . The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has instituted a thorough overhaul of the 
country’s constitution and national legislation with an eye toward measures that will insulate his party 
from future defeat.”). 
75 Id. (“A number of governments have invoked the doctrine of absolute sovereignty to rebuff 
international criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the persecution of the 
political opposition, and the repression of minority groups. They claim that the enforcement of 
universal human rights standards or judgments from transnational legal bodies represent undue 
interference in their domestic affairs and a violation of national prerogatives.”). 
76 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30. 
77 Id. at 32.  
78 John Foot & Christopher Hibbert, Benito Mussolini, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benito-Mussolini (last updated Jan. 10, 2020). 
79 Zakaria, supra note 50, at 42. 
80 MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FASCISM: A WARNING 172 (2018). 
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C. The Illiberal Toolkit: Nationalism, Anti-Intellectualism, and Other 
Illiberal Values 
1. Nationalism 
Modern nationalism guides much of the behavior exhibited by illiberal 
democracies and deeper exploration is necessary to fully understand its 
global rise. Illiberal democratic governments enshrine the needs of the 
community over individual rights.81 These governments are wont to 
conceive “the community” as not citizens of the polity, but instead appeal 
to nationalistic conceptions of “the community” that are demarcated by 
bloodline.82 Illiberal democracies differ from their liberal counterparts by 
subverting civil liberties traditionally delegated to “the people” by 
constitutional liberalism that is inclusive of all citizens, regardless of 
ethnic, religious, political, or other identities. Instead, these leaders 
narrowly tailor “the people” to mean those supportive of the illiberal 
government that belong to certain ethnic groups, while otherizing the 
rest.83 This anti-pluralism stokes the flames of ethnic nationalism while 
bulldozing the civic nationalism traditionally associated with liberal 
democracies. Ethnic nationalism, a manifestation of nationalism in which 
the nation-state is defined on the basis of ethnicity,84 is a core feature of 
illiberal democracies. 
Nationalism as an ideology is a modern phenomenon and is deeply 
prevalent throughout contemporary societies. Nationalism is “notoriously 
difficult to define.”85 In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson’s 
magnum opus, “the nation” is defined as “an imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”86 
This definition builds upon Ernest Gellner’s conception of nationalism as 
“not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations 
where they do not exist.”87 As such, the nation is a socially constructed 
                                                                                                                     
81 See id. (“An illiberal democracy is centered on the supposed needs of the community rather 
than the inalienable rights of the individual. It is democratic because it respects the will of the majority; 
illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”). 
82 See id. (“[T]he togetherness [Orbán] envisions is defined by bloodlines, not borderlines.”). 
83 See id. (discussing how illiberal democracies disregard the needs and rights of minorities). 
84 See, e.g., BRUBAKER, supra note 59, at 132 (“[Ethnic] nationalism has been associated with 
militarism, war, irrationalism, chauvinism, intolerance, homogenization, forced assimilation, 
authoritarianism, parochialism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, ethnic cleansing, even genocide; it has been 
characterized as the ‘starkest political shame of the twentieth century.’”). 
85 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD 
OF NATIONALISM 3 (rev. ed. 2006). 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168 (1964). Gellner later expanded on his theories 
of nationalism in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).  
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community that is imagined88 by those that identify as members of the 
group. The nation is imagined as a limited sovereign community: limited 
because its borders are finite,89 sovereign because of the influence of 
Enlightenment ideals on political values,90 and a community because of the 
deep comradeship prevalent amongst citizens of the nation-state.91 
Modernist theorists like Anderson contend that nationalism as an ideology 
was able to arise due to technological and socio-economic advances 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution.92 Anderson singles out 
print-capitalism as a precursor to the development of national 
consciousness—a shared sense of national identity.93 Print-capitalism 
unified local dialects into a language that members of a nation-state could 
all understand vis-à-vis mechanical reproduction94 made possible by the 
printing press and the proliferation of capitalism.95 Print-capitalism 
allowed nations to consolidate numerous vernaculars into a unified 
language representative of the nation, as will be seen with the 
Magyarization of Hungary.96 
Nation-states are socially constructed imagined communities that 
purport to unify groups of peoples based on shared identity within the 
confines of their finite borders. Under this framework of nationalism, 
                                                                                                                     
88 ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 6 (“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion.”). 
89 Id. at 7 (“The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other 
nations.”). 
90 Id. (“It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which 
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical 
dynastic realm.”). 
91 Id. (“Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. 
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions 
of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”). 
92 Id. at 46.  
93 Id. at 44–45 (“These print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three distinct 
ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and 
above spoken vernaculars. . . . Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the 
long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation. . . . Third, 
print-capitalism created languages of power of a kind different from the older administrative 
vernaculars. Certain dialects inevitably were ‘closer’ to each print-language and dominated their final 
forms.”). 
94 See also WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in 
ILLUMINATIONS 217, 219–20 (Harry Zohn trans., 1969) (“Around 1900 technical reproduction had 
reached a standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause 
the most profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its own among 
the artistic processes.”). 
95 See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 37–44 (tracing the development of mass and mechanical 
reproduction and its effect on the consolidation of languages). 
96 See infra note 113 (discussing the history of Magyarization in nineteenth century Hungary). 
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“[t]he formulation of the nation thus appears as the fulfillment of a 
‘project’ stretching over centuries.”97 As illiberal democracies narrow the 
perception of who belongs in their imagined community, two questions are 
raised. First, “[w]hat makes the nation a ‘community’?”98 And second, who 
are “the people” that are accepted into the community? The 
nation-as-community conceived of by Anderson is inherently tied to the 
fraternité expressed by those within the nation-state. Étienne Balibar99 
writes: 
Every social community reproduced by the functioning of 
institutions is imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the 
projection of individual existence into the weft of a collective 
narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on 
traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (even 
when they have been fabricated and inculcated in the recent 
past). But this comes down to accepting that, under certain 
conditions, only imaginary communities are real.100 
Therefore, the socially-constructed “community” is reified by the 
people that further the collective narratives and mythologies of the 
nation-state. Balibar argues that theoretically, this community of people 
recognizes itself as an entity or group distinct from other states prior to the 
foundation of the institutional state.101 But this is clearly contradictory and 
impossible to actualize. Therefore, the nation cannot precede the state:  
                                                                                                                     
97 ÉTIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS 
IDENTITIES 86 (Chris Turner trans., 1991).  
98 Id. at 93.  
99 Étienne Balibar wrote, “Thinking about racism led us back to nationalism, and nationalism to 
uncertainty about the historical realities and categorization of the nation.” Étienne Balibar, The Nation 
Form: History and Ideology, 13 REV. (FERNAND BRAUDEL CTR.) 329, 329 (1990). Balibar sought to 
understand how the nation-state arose and found current explanations to be unsatisfactory. The state 
refers to the institutional apparatuses of a country, while the nation connotes some sort of identity. 
Balibar argues that logically, states must have predated the nation-state and could not have arose 
simultaneously. Therefore, he held, “it was by becoming ‘national’ that the states transformed 
themselves, more or less completely, into what we call the modern state.” Id. at 330. Balibar theorized 
that nation-states are created in one of three ways:  
Either the states came into existence “endogenously,” seemingly autonomously, in 
tandem with a process of nationalizing the state that was already located in that 
territory, or they came into existence via “nationalist” (or “national liberation”) 
movements, by struggling against national states that already existed or were being 
created, or against “non-national” sovereign states (such as “multinational” empires, 
which thereby came to seem anachronistic). 
Id. at 331.  
100 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93.  
101 Id. 
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In reality, the idea of nations without a state, or nations 
“before” the state, is thus a contradiction in terms, because 
the state always is implied in the historic framework of a 
national formation . . . . But this contradiction is masked by 
the fact that national states . . . project beneath their political 
existence to a preexisting “ethnic” or “popular” unity.102 
As such, the nation must be a product of the state, which adopts the 
“nation” as its identity. By “becoming ‘national,’”103 the state transforms 
itself into “the modern state”:104 the nation-state.105 In order to become 
“national,” the nation-state must manufacture an identity to define the 
confines of the community: “The fundamental problem is therefore to 
produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself 
continually as a national community.”106  
For Balibar, who was investigating the nation-state to understand “the 
causes and ‘deep’ structures of contemporary racism,”107 that manufactured 
identity is “fictive ethnicity.”108 An imagined community can become a 
nation-state only if it is made up of persons that embrace the fraternité that 
binds together the community, which does not exist naturally within any 
state.109 A nation-state requires “the people” to be more than a mere 
abstraction and to share a common bond that legitimizes the “national” 
aspect of the nation-state.110 This is instituted through fictive ethnicity, 
especially in the case of ethnic nationalism. By constructing a fictive 
ethnicity that appeals to an imagined community and convinces 
community members of their shared “ethnicity,” the nation-state and the 
                                                                                                                     
102 Balibar, supra note 99, at 331. 
103 Id. at 330.  
104 Id. 
105 Balibar argues that the modern nation-state can be identified by: “its ideology and collective 
sovereignty; its juridical and administrative rationality; its particular mode of regulating social 
conflicts, especially class conflicts; and its ‘strategic’ objective of managing its territorial resources and 
population to enhance its economic and military power.” Id. at 330–31.  
106 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93. 
107 Balibar, supra note 99, at 329.  
108 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96.  
109 See id. at 93 (“A social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that, through a 
network of apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as homo nationalis from cradle 
to grave, at the same times he or she is instituted as homo œconomicus, politicus, religious. . . . [S]uch a 
people does not exist naturally, and even when it is tendentially constituted, it does not exist all the 
time. No modern nation possesses a given ‘ethnic’ basis, even when it arises out of a national 
independence struggle.”). 
110 See id. (“In the case of national formations, the imaginary which inscribes itself in the real in 
this way is that of the ‘people’. It is that of a community which recognizes itself in advance in the 
institution of the state, which recognizes that the state as ‘its own’ in opposition to other states and, in 
particular, inscribes its political struggles within the horizon of that state—by, for example, formulating 
its aspirations for reform and social revolution as projects for the transformation of ‘its national 
state’.”). 
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patriotism that accompanies it is reified.111 In the metamorphosis of the 
state into the nation-state, the population within the borders of the new 
nation-state is “ethnicized” in a chrysalis that treats the group “as if they 
formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, 
culture and interests which transcends individuals and social 
conditions.”112 Ethnicity is produced through two modes—language113 and 
race—and is established through various state institutions, including 
schooling.114 Fictive ethnicity is weaponized by nationalistic illiberal 
democracies and is instrumental in understanding who are “the people” 
that are admitted to illiberal régimes and the compatriots that are excluded. 
2. Majoritarianism, Dictatorship of Law, and Absolute Sovereignty 
Despite its resemblance to democracy, illiberal democracies, informed 
by ethnic nationalism, have mobilized alternative values that challenge 
post-Cold War democratic norms. First, illiberal leaders tend to embrace 
majoritarianism, the notion that the majority of a population should be 
granted primacy when determining the outcome of a decision.115 
Majoritarianism has long been rebuked by foundational democratic 
                                                                                                                     
111 Id. at 96 (“Fictive ethnicity is not purely and simply identical with the ideal nation which is the 
object of patriotism, but it is indispensable to it, for, without it, the nation would appear precisely only 
as an idea or an arbitrary abstraction; patriotism’s appeal would be addressed to no one. It is fictive 
identity which makes it possible for the expression of a preexisting unity to be seen in the state, and 
continually to measure the state against its ‘historic mission’ in the service of the nation, and as a 
consequence, to idealize politics.”). 
112 Id. 
113 In Hungary, the fictive ethnicity of the Magyar is deeply rooted in language. Hungarian is an 
extremely distinct language in the Finno-Ugric family whose closest relatives are Finnish and Estonian. 
Hungarian has no relation to the Slavic languages spoken in the nations surrounding Hungary. 
Finno-Ugric Languages, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Finno-Ugric-
languages (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). In the late nineteenth century, Hungary began the process of 
Magyarization, under which non-Magyar minorities in Hungary were forced to assimilate by adopting 
the Hungarian language and culture. See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 101–07 (detailing the process of 
Magyarization). Linguistic nationalism still exists in Hungary, and can be seen as a common theme in 
Orbán’s speeches. See, e.g., Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Orbán Viktor’s Ceremonial Speech on the 
170th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (Mar. 15, 2018) (“They want us to hand it over 
to foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who do not respect our 
culture, our laws or our way of life: people who want to replace what is ours with what is theirs.”); 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Address After Swearing the 
Prime-Ministerial Oath of Office (May 10, 2018) (“We are a unique species. We have a language that 
is unique to us. There is a world which we alone see and which we alone render through the prism of 
Hungarian language and culture. Without us human civilisation would certainly be deprived of a 
language, a view and a characterisation of the world. . . . I believe that Hungary, and the Hungarian 
language and culture, exert an enormous magnetic power, which will attract those Hungarians whom 
the wind has blown from the Carpathian Basin.”). 
114 BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96 (“History shows us that there are two great competing routes to 
this: language and race.”). 
115 Nicholas Capaldi, Majoritarianism, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/majoritarianism (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
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political philosophers and is exemplified in Mill’s “tyranny of the 
majority.”116 Majoritarianism is prevalent when illiberal democracies 
approach elections as a “winner-take-all affair[] in which the victor has an 
absolute mandate, with little or no interference from institutional checks 
and balances.”117 These governments will often disregard the existence of 
institutional checks on their authority—particularly with the judiciary—or 
actually dismantle the democratic checks that were already in place, as 
seen with Hungary.118 These actions delegitimize national legal systems 
and endanger pluralism both within governance and the country. Second, 
illiberal democracies will employ the “dictatorship of law,” originally 
coined by Vladimir Putin119 to describe “the adoption of laws that are so 
vaguely written as to give the authorities wide discretion in applying them 
to regime opponents.”120 Generally, these vague laws are paired with a 
weakened court system saturated with régime supporters that manipulate 
the legal system to carry out the régime’s political agenda.121 Finally, 
illiberal democracies frequently invoke the doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty in order to insulate the state from international obligations and 
“criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the 
persecution of political opposition, and the repression of minority 
groups.”122 Sovereignty rhetoric is also deployed against international 
organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Union, that 
challenge state actions that run counter to international law and legal 
norms.123 
3. Anti-Intellectualism 
The final characteristic of illiberal democracies is anti-intellectualism. 
The term “anti-intellectualism” was coined in Richard Hofstadter’s 
                                                                                                                     
116 MILL, supra note 73, at 7. 
117 PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7. 
118 See infra Part II.D (discussing the dismantling of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction by the 
Fidesz party).   
119 Russia’s Dictatorship of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/opinion/21sun2.html. Putin’s “dictatorship of law” is 
exemplified in the case of Boris Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch who had helped finance Yeltsen’s 
reelection. In 2003, Berezovsky was granted political asylum by the United Kingdom and in 2013 was 
found dead in his home. His death remains an open investigation. Mary Dejevsky, The Weird World of 
Boris Berezovsky: Alexander Litvinenko’s Inquest Has Provided an Intriguing Insight into the Dead 
Tycoon, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-weird-
world-of-boris-berezovsky-alexander-litvinenkos-inquest-has-provided-an-intriguing-insight-
10117927.html. 
120 PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7–8. 
121 Id. at 8 (“Such measures are typically paired with a court system that uses law merely to justify 
political instructions from the executive branch, making a mockery of due process and international 
conceptions of the rule of law.”). 
122 Id. at 7. 
123 Id. 
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Anti-Intellectualism in American Life to describe the “resentment and 
suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to 
represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize that value of life.”124 
Anti-intellectuals that operate within populist political structures espouse 
anti-elitist and anti-rationalist125 attitudes. Rational discourse is 
inextricably linked to values protected by constitutional liberalism, 
including those of free speech, assembly, and academic freedom.126 
Although Hofstadter’s book was written in response to McCarthyism in the 
United States,127 his general framework of anti-intellectual thought can be 
transferred to the disdain for the intelligentsia expressed by authoritarians 
around the world.  
Authoritarian governments instrumentalize anti-intellectualism to 
suppress political dissent by systematically removing the intelligentsia 
from power and public life.128 Critical discourse and free thought, core 
components of that intellectual life, can undermine authoritarian projects 
by vocalizing opposition. Hannah Arendt reflects: “Intellectual, spiritual, 
and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster 
initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political 
opposition.”129 Authoritarian governments “seek[] to undermine public 
discourse by attacking and devaluing education, expertise, and 
language.”130 By restricting access to education and spheres of critical 
                                                                                                                     
124 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 27 (1963). Hofstadter 
also recognizes the difficulty in defining the term: “One reason that anti-intellectualism has not even 
been clearly defined is that its very vagueness makes it more serviceable in controversy as an epithet.” 
Id. at 26.  
125 In this context, anti-rationalism is a refusal of the “commitment to the value of critical thought 
and reasoned discourse in general,” not to be confused with anti-rationalist philosophical 
doctrine. Daniel Rigney, Three Kinds of Anti-Intellectualism: Rethinking Hofstadter, 61 SOC. 
INQUIRY 434, 436 (1991). 
126 Id. at 440 (“Rational discourse has its social bases in a constitutional system that protects free 
speech and assembly, in an adversarial system of political and judicial decision-making, in the 
institutions of scientific and scholarly inquiry and academic freedom, and in an emerging class of 
intelligentsia for whom the ‘culture of critical discourse’ is a shared ideology.”). 
127 HOFSTADTER, supra note 124, at 17–18 (“Primarily it was McCarthyism which aroused the 
fear that the critical mind was at a ruinous discount in this country. Of course, intellectuals were not the 
only targets of McCarthy’s constant denotations—he was after bigger game—but intellectuals were in 
the line of fire, and it seemed to give special rejoicing to his followers when they were hit.”). 
128 For example, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic imprisoned philosopher and dissident, 
Václav Havel, numerous times between 1977 and 1989 before he became the first Czechoslovak 
president following the collapse of the communist régime. Vaclav Havel: Timeline of the Former Czech 
President, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 18, 2011, 1:46 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ czechrepublic/8964070/Vaclav-Havel-timeline-
of-the-former-Czech-president.html. Another example: Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist 
philosopher, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment under the Mussolini régime where he died in 
a medical clinic while serving his sentence. Antonio Gramsci, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Antonio-Gramsci (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
129 ARENDT, supra note 53, at 339. 
130 JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM 36 (2018). 
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debate, the capacity for intelligent discourse is limited, allowing the 
government to promote their single, “legitimate” ideology.131 The very 
presence of critical academic discourse threatens the collective narratives 
and mythologies constructed to support the nation-state, especially when 
these narratives are recently constructed and do not conform to actual 
history.  
When respected, free intellectual criticism may hold more weight than 
other forms of opposition, because of its ability to destabilize the flimsy 
theoretical grounds that authoritarian régimes use to legitimize their rule. 
Régimes, however, can also use a perversion of the university to their 
advantage to prop up fascistic ideology.132 The university campus has 
become a battleground site for illiberal attacks on free thought, both at 
home and abroad.133 Professors, students, disciplines, and universities are 
frequently targeted by illiberal régimes as dangerous voices that work to 
“indoctrinate” the nation’s children.134 At the same time, régimes suppress 
critical viewpoints and manipulate the education system to reify mythic 
narratives of the nation-state as fact. Under these hyper-nationalist 
régimes, “the function of the education system is to glorify the mythic past, 
elevating the achievements of members of the nation and obscuring the 
perspectives and histories of those who do not belong.”135 Disciplines such 
as gender studies are frequently attacked by far-right nationalist 
movements as undermining the traditions of the nation and its patriarchal 
ideology136 and instead, disciplines that indoctrinate “hierarchal norms and 
national tradition”137 are exalted by the régime. Higher education generally 
is depicted as an elitist institution symbolic of excess.138 By rejecting and 
                                                                                                                     
131 See id. (“In fascist ideology, there is only one legitimate viewpoint, that of the dominant 
nation.”). 
132 See id. (“Education therefore either poses a grave threat to fascism or becomes a pillar of 
support for the mythical nation.”). 
133 See infra note 367 (describing recent attempts by governments to limit academic freedom). 
134 Marxist thought tends to become the academic bogeyman for the far-right. Take, for example, 
“dangerous” university, course, and professor watchlists, like those promulgated by David Horowitz. 
See STANLEY, supra note 130, at 38–39 (“In 2006, Horowitz published a book, The Professors, naming 
the ‘101 most dangerous professors in America,’ a list of leftist and liberal professors, many of whom 
were supporters of Palestinian rights. In 2009, he published another book, One-Party Classroom, with a 
list of the ‘150 most dangerous courses in America.’”).  
135 Id. at 47.  
136 See id. at 42–43 (analyzing motives of the far-right in attacking gender studies). Particular 
anti-intellectual attacks on feminism and gender studies date back to Nazi-peddled myths that 
“feminism was a Jewish conspiracy to destroy fertility among Aryan women.” Id. at 43–44. 
137 Id. at 48. 
138 See id. at 37, 56 (“The media largely ignored these motivations [of the Black Lives Matter 
movement] and, representing protesting black students as an angry mob, used the situation as an 
opportunity to foment rage against the supposed liberal political excesses of the university. . . . In 
fascist politics, universities are debased in public discourse, and academics are undermined as 
legitimate sources of knowledge and expertise, represented as radical ‘Marxists’ or ‘feminists’ 
spreading a leftist ideological agenda under the guise of research.”); see also HOFSTADTER, supra note 
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mocking the value of academic expertise, the régime disrupts reality and 
inserts its own one-dimensional “reality.”139 When the régime “is 
successful, its audience is left with a destabilized sense of loss, and a well 
of mistrust and anger against those who it has been told are responsible for 
this loss.”140 By delegitimizing and forcibly targeting academics and 
universities, illiberal régimes aim to stall the possibility for robust debate 
and silence their critics. As such, anti-intellectualism remains in the toolkit 
of modern authoritarian leaders and their illiberal democracies. This is 
exemplified in the targeting of higher education institutions by modern 
authoritarian leaders in Central European countries, such as Hungary and 
Poland, as well as all over the world.  
II. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION 
A. What is Central Europe? 
This Paper investigates how illiberal democracy has developed in 
Hungary. To analyze how illiberal democracy has proliferated in Hungary, 
it is imperative to understand the historical conditions under which norms 
of governance and national image have developed in the region. But first, 
this begs the question: What is Central Europe? 
Hungary is located in Central Europe—a region of small nation-states 
whose very existence is constantly under threat from larger surrounding 
powers.141 Since the inception of the Cold War, Europe is often viewed as 
a dichotomy between Western and Eastern Europe, leaving little regard for 
the nations that lie somewhere in between.142 Following the Second World 
War, nations whose cultures were traditionally associated with Western 
European values, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, found themselves 
on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Czech author Milan Kundera 
described this experience in “The Tragedy of Central Europe.”143 As a 
result of the sudden partition of some Central European nations, “three 
                                                                                                                     
124, at 53 (“Intellectuals, it may be held [by anti-intellectuals], are pretentious, conceited, effeminate, 
and snobbish; and very likely immoral, dangerous, and subversive.”). 
139 Id. at 57. 
140 Id. 
141 See Milan Kundera, Die Weltliteratur: How We Read One Another, NEW YORKER (Jan. 1, 
2007), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/die-weltliteratur (“What distinguishes the 
small nations from the large is not the quantitative criterion of the number of their inhabitants; it is 
something deeper. For the small nations, existence is not a self-evident certainty but always a question, 
a wager, a risk; they are on the defensive against History, that force which is bigger than they, which 
does not take them into account, which does not even notice them.”). 
142 Stephen Shulman, Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of 
Nationalism, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 554, 582–83 (2002) (“[T]he traditional civic-West/ethnic-East 
argument is a gross simplification of concepts of nationhood in the West, Central Europe, and Eastern 
Europe.”). 
143 Milan Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 26, 1984, at 33. 
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fundamental situations developed in Europe after [the Second World War]: 
that of Western Europe, that of Eastern Europe, and, most complicated, 
that of the part of Europe situated geographically in the center—culturally 
in the West and politically in the East.”144 Kundera characterized Central 
Europe as being “[b]oxed in by the Germans on one side and the Russians 
on the other”145 and as “the least known and the most fragile part of the 
West,”146 despite Central Europe’s wide contributions to the “European 
canon” from intellectuals such as Sigmund Freud, Béla Bartok, and Franz 
Kafka. Following the First World War, Central Europe was “transformed 
into a region of small, weak states, whose vulnerability ensured first 
Hitler’s conquest and ultimately Stalin’s triumph.”147 Kundera argues that 
Central Europe is defined not by political power, but by its culture: “the 
great common situations that reassemble peoples, regroup them in ever 
new ways along the imaginary and ever-changing boundaries that mark a 
realm inhabited by the same memories, the same problems and conflicts, 
the same common tradition.”148 Despite the vast cultural contributions 
made to “Western European culture” by Central Europe, as soon as the 
Iron Curtain closed around Central Europe, Western Europe was incapable 
of understanding the region as anything more than its politics, which was 
decidedly Eastern European.149 But, Soviet usurpation was far more than a 
political struggle—it was also an attack on Central European civilization 
itself. The revolts in response to these existential attacks on Central 
European civilization were led by the intelligentsia150 as a “struggle to 
preserve [Central European] identity—or, to put it another way, to preserve 
their Westernness.”151 But, because the region became regarded as an 
Eastern political régime, “Europe [had not] noticed the disappearance of its 
cultural home because Europe no longer perceive[d] its unity as a cultural 
unity.”152 This struggle for identity was completely ignored by Western 
Europe and, yet again, Central Europe was forgotten by its cultural 
brethren.153 Kundera’s tragedy—that Central European nations had all but 
                                                                                                                     
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 34.  
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 35.  
149 Id. at 37.  
150 Id. These revolts “were prepared, shaped, realized by novels, poetry, theater, cinema, 
historiography, literary reviews, popular comedy and cabaret, philosophical discussions—that is, by 
culture.” Id. 
151 Id. at 34.  
152 Id. at 36. 
153 Id. 
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vanished from the map of Western Europe—rests not on the Soviet Union, 
but on Western European nations for abandoning them.154 
Kundera ultimately defines Central Europe as “[a]n uncertain zone of 
small nations between Russia and Germany.”155 Unlike their neighbors, 
“the small nation is one whose very existence may be put in question at 
any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it.”156 At the time 
of writing, all of Central Europe, except Austria, had been swallowed up 
by the Soviet Union.157 Kundera argues that once the majority of Central 
Europe was subjugated by the Soviet Union, the region was forgotten by 
Western Europe.158 Leading up to the true independence of Central 
European states, the region faced immense political strife: Nazi invasion, a 
long stretch of failed revolutions, and finally, Soviet domination. Even 
prior to the Second World War, Hungary’s struggles were often 
overlooked by the larger European community. Unlike larger Western 
nations, such as the United Kingdom, France, or Germany, the histories of 
these small Central European nations have been “turbulent and 
fragmented.”159 Their histories, including Hungary’s, have been ones of 
frequent invasion and in turn, “[t]heir traditions of statehood have been 
weaker and less continuous than those of the larger European nations.”160 
Hungary’s history includes long occupations by the Mongols, the Ottoman 
Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, the Third Reich, and the Soviet Union.161 
Unlike their western neighbors, Central European nation-states experience 
constant existential threat. István Bibó aptly reflects: 
“The death of the nation” or “the annihilation of the nation” 
rings empty in West European ears; Westerners can imagine 
extermination, subjection, or slowly going native, but 
political “annihilation” overnight is sheer bombast to them, 
yet it is a palpable reality for the nations of Eastern Europe. 
Here there is no need to exterminate or expel a nation to 
                                                                                                                     
154 Id. at 38 (“The real tragedy for Central Europe, then, is not Russia but Europe: this Europe that 
represented a value so great that the director of the Hungarian News Agency was ready to die for it, and 
for which he did indeed die. . . . He did not suspect that the sentence he was sending by telex beyond 
the borders of his flat country would seem outmoded and would not be understood.”). 
155 Id. at 35.  
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 36. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 34. 
160 Id. 
161 Hungary Timeline, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
country_profiles/1054642.stm. 
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make it feel endangered; it is enough to call its existence into 
doubt with a sufficiently aggressive rhetoric.162 
This persistent existential threat to independent nationhood has 
impacted the democratic development of Central Europe and “has been the 
decisive factor in making democracy and democratic development waver 
in these countries.”163 The embedded identity of the existential anxiety of 
the nation-state guides political and legal decision-making and may even 
interfere with Hungary’s democratic prospects.  
B. Hungarian Political History (Hapsburg—1989) 
Developments in Hungarian history uniquely positioned the nation to 
be susceptible to the rise of the far-right. Wilkin contends that “the roots of 
illiberalism in the modern world-system are a reaction, in part, to the threat 
that liberalism presented to established social hierarchies, secular or 
religious”164 in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Elements of 
illiberalism have been persistent throughout Hungarian political history. 
Wilkin argues that four major periods of history shaped the development of 
the Hungarian nation-state and its relationship to illiberalism. First, the 
restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, following the defeat of the democratic Hungarian Revolution of 
1848, was reactionary and anti-modern.165 Monarchical systems are, 
unsurprisingly, adverse to the classical liberal values that threaten the 
social hierarchies entrenched in traditional monarchies.166 Second, the 
crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War bred 
animosity within the nation-state after “it suffered drastic loss of territory 
and population through the Treaty of Trianon.”167 Hungary’s experience 
during the inter-war period mirrors that of other Central Powers, like 
Germany, whose reactionary fascist forces rose to power as a response to 
the aftermath of the war.168 This massive loss of territory “left a lasting 
                                                                                                                     
162 ISTVÁN BIBÓ, The Miseries of East European Small States, in THE ART OF PEACEMAKING 130, 
150 (Iván Zoltán Dénes ed., Péter Pásztor trans., 2015). 
163 Id. at 151.  
164 Peter Wilkin, The Rise of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy: The Orbánization of Hungarian Political 
Culture, 24 J. WORLD-SYS. RES. 5, 9 (2018). 
165 Id. at 13. 
166 Id. at 13–14 (“[The Hungarian monarchy was] understandably[] deeply hostile to liberal ideas 
of universality and equality, preferring instead to entrench social life in traditional social hierarchies 
shaped through the church and respect for secular authority in the forms of the King and the 
aristocracy.”). 
167 Id. at 14.  
168 ARENDT, supra note 53, at 308 (“After the first World War, a deeply anti-democratic, 
prodictatorial wave of semitotalitarian and totalitarian movements swept Europe; Fascist movements 
spread from Italy to nearly all Central and Eastern European countries . . . .”). Also note, 
Austro-Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and two-thirds of its population. Treaty of Trianon, 
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legacy of resentment amongst the country’s right-wing social forces, which 
still manifests itself rhetorically today with both Fidesz and Jobbik.”169 
Third, Hungary’s experience with fascism and Nazism during the Second 
World War impacted the rise of illiberal democracy in the country today by 
bringing anti-Semitism, racism, and other prejudices to the fore.170 The 
Second World War presented an opportunity for Hungary to reclaim its 
lost territory; but, by 1944, Hungary had become a puppet state for Nazi 
Germany after a coup d’état by the far-right fascist Arrow Cross Party.171 
Finally, after the defeat of the Axis forces in the Second World War, the 
Soviet Union army invaded Hungary and instituted another authoritarian 
régime. Between 1945 and 1989, Hungary was occupied by Soviet forces 
that quashed democratic revolutions172 and decimated civil society.173 
These eras of Hungarian history shaped its development as a nation-state in 
the longue durée and influenced the rise of Orbán’s illiberal democratic 
project.  
C. Fledgling Democracy: The Interim Years (1989–2010) 
Prime Minister Orbán’s rise to power directly resulted from the 
missteps of the governments in power during the democratic transitionary 
period.174 Just as democracy emerged, neo-fascist and anti-Semitic 
                                                                                                                     
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Trianon (accessed Mar. 19, 
2019). 
169 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 14.  
170 Id. at 15 (noting the role that Hungarians and the Hungarian government played in the Final 
Solution). 
171 JACK R. FISCHEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE HOLOCAUST 122–23 (1999). Ferenc 
Szálasi, the Prime Minister of Hungary and leader of the Arrow Cross Party, was found guilty for war 
crimes and was sentenced to death. Militiamen of the Arrow Cross Party conducted a reign of terror 
that resulted in the violent murder of many Hungarian Jews. Hungary After the German Occupation, 
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hungary-
after-the-german-occupation (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). By the end of the Second World War, an 
estimated 563,000 Hungarian Jews died at the hands of the Arrow Cross Party and the Nazi régime. Id. 
Wilkin notes that Szálasi’s “enthusiasm for the Final Solution was implacable. . . . [A]t times SS 
officers in Hungary had to restrain the Hungarian forces from their enthusiastic slaughter of the Jewish 
population.” Wilkin, supra note 164, at 15.  
172 See Ben Cosgrove, A Rip in the Iron Curtain: Photos From the Hungarian Revolution, 1956, 
TIME (Oct. 22, 2013), http://time.com/3878232/the-hungarian-revolution-of-1956-photos-from-the-
streets-of-budapest/ (collecting photographs from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). 
173 See Péter Krasztev, Social Responses to the “Hybridization” of the Political System: The Case 
of Hungary in the Central and Eastern European Context, in THE HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL 
OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 167, 171 (Péter Krasztev et al. eds., 2015) (“The historian 
Stephen Kotkin has called state socialist societies ‘uncivic societies,’ and the Hungarian example 
certainly proves this: the Kádár regime was efficient enough to make opposition seem futile and thus 
eliminate social solidarity and autonomy, and these attitudes still live on today.”). 
174 András Bozóki, Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism, in THE 
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (Péter Krasztev et al. 
eds., 2015) (“This antiliberal turn did not emerge out of the blue: it was a direct response to the hectic 
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movements, fueled by nationalism, simultaneously rose to mainstream 
discourse.175 This Section will explore how internal failures in Hungarian 
government and external factors influenced the rise of illiberal democracy 
under Orbán by using Huntington’s factors176 that contributed to prior 
reverse waves of democracy. The most relevant factors for this period of 
time are: (1) the weakness of democratic values; (2) severe economic 
setbacks; (3) social and political polarization; (4) the exclusion of 
non-elites by elites; and (5) the breakdown of law and order.177 
The weakness of democratic values and increasing political 
polarization in the transitional period were instrumental in prompting the 
rise of the far-right. The post-Cold War Hungarian democratic process was 
deeply flawed. Bozóki identifies three institutional factors that contributed 
to Orbán’s success: the qualified majority vote, informal rulemaking, and 
partocracy.178 The Hungarian Founding Fathers placed an emphasis on 
“strengthen[ing] the new democratic order, its stability, and its 
governability”179 when drafting the new democratic institutional system. 
The Founding Fathers attempted to achieve these goals by instituting 
required qualified majority votes in many arenas of the decision-making 
process.180 Bozóki writes: 
These measures created a democracy in which, between 
elections, the ruling government’s power became almost 
cemented. It became nearly impossible to remove an 
incumbent government from the outside; however, this 
simultaneously made effective governance more difficult. 
The government in power, due to the large number of 
qualified majority rules, had to rely on the opposition to 
make decisions on basic issues. Paradoxically, the 
constitution thus both greatly increased the power and 
limited the political responsibility of the government.181  
By overvaluing stability, the constitutional system that existed between 
1990 and 2010 created systematic inefficiencies that, in turn, contributed to 
the devaluing of democracy. Bozóki also remarks that Hungary’s history of 
occupation “produced a political culture characterized by a prevalence of 
                                                                                                                     
reforms implemented by previous governments between 2006 and 2010, as well as the ensuing 
corruption and economic crisis.”). 
175 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18. 
176 HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 290–91. 
177 Id. 
178 Bozóki, supra note 174, at 5–9.  
179 Id. at 5.  
180 Id. (“[T]he Founding Fathers believed that they could safeguard freedom by increasing the 
number of decisions that required a qualified majority vote.”). 
181 Id. 
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informal practices and a lack of institutional accountability.”182 In order to 
cope with occupation, a dual system of contradictory formal and informal 
rules developed whereby the official rules of the occupier would be 
followed while finding loopholes and cutting corners so as to undermine 
official rule.183 This dual rule system persisted throughout the Kádár era of 
communism and, Bozóki argues, made the system more bearable than 
those of its neighbors.184 Because of Hungary’s long history of occupation, 
Bozóki contends that “in 1989 Hungarians broke only with the institutional 
system of dictatorship, not with the customs and informal procedures 
associated with that system.”185 While this dual rule system was vital 
during occupation, the persistent culture of rule-bending delegitimized 
democratic rule in post-occupation life. Finally, “partocracy,” the form of 
government by which a single party rules hegemonically,186 is culturally 
endemic in Hungarian politics and at odds with democratic norms.187 The 
anti-pluralism that current day Hungary is experiencing is not novel to 
Orbán’s régime and in fact predates it. Political parties, including those on 
the left, dominate all aspects of the political process: public discourse, 
civic duties, and candidate nominations were all controlled by the major 
political parties.188 Thus, the Hungarian democratic system, in its most free 
state, was highly politicized and plagued by the excessive control of areas 
of public life that should have remained free from government interference 
                                                                                                                     
182 Id. at 6.  
183 Id. (“Hungarians learned that they only had to feign obedience to the rules imposed upon them 
by foreign invaders: below the surface, they established a system of informal rules governing society 
and culture. . . . Therefore, Hungarians learned to get their way around these rules in a conniving 
fashion, finding loopholes and cutting corners, and this behavioral pattern remains deeply engrained in 
Hungarian society.”). 
184 Id. (“The reason [the regime] became more livable is that the system often did not take its own 
rules seriously. . . . Under Kádárism, citizens grew accustomed to those procedures that made the 
dictatorship bearable. For Hungarians, the old system was not nearly as bad as it had been for the Poles, 
the Czechs, or the Romanians.”). 
185 Id. 
186 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18–19 (“Hungary’s political system [was] dominated by either 
neoliberal parties such as the reform communists and liberal parties (MSZP and SZDSZ) who governed 
between 1994–[19]98 and 2002–2010; or conservative-nationalist coalitions led initially by the MDF 
who governed from 1990–[19]94, with Fidesz in office between 1998–2002, leading a coalition 
including the Christian Democrats and the Smallholders Party.”). 
187 See Bozóki, supra note 174, at 7 (“During the second decade of democracy in Hungary, party 
politics superseded almost all other aspects.”).  
188 See id. at 7–8 (“Public discourse was based on party allegiance. . . . It was the parties that 
organized movements; it was the parties that established public benefit foundations, professional 
groups, and civic circles. . . . The particular features of the Hungarian political system—including the 
collection of candidate nomination slips, the high threshold to enter parliament, the large number of 
regulatory areas in which a qualified majority is required in order to create new laws, the opacity of 
political party financing, the privileged position of political party foundations, and so on—facilitated 
the survival of existing parties and made it difficult for new political forces to enter parliament.”). 
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but were instead controlled by the dominant political party.189 Partocracy 
only served to further polarize the Hungarian public in an already turbulent 
time, creating an atmosphere of a “cold civil war” between those on the left 
and right.190 Unchanged, all three practices made the chances of a lasting, 
stable democracy dead on arrival. 
Throughout the late 1990s and persisting to the current day, Hungary 
has faced many economic crises. As the formerly communist nation 
transitioned to democracy, Hungary also transitioned to capitalism. 
Hungary slowly privatized and the transition resulted in an unstable 
economy.191 Hungary experienced rapid deindustrialization, widening 
regional inequalities.192 As a result of this rough transition, Hungary 
became increasingly reliant on external financial investments, primarily 
from the European Union and Japan.193 In Hungary’s first decade of 
democracy, the country “experienced periods of massive contraction,”194 
but began to steady itself in the new millennium.195 This quasi-stability was 
quickly quashed by the unpopular austerity measures pushed through by 
the MSZP-SZDSZ government196 in 2006 and the global recession in 
2008.197 Tóth and Grajczjár speculate that “the recovery period was too 
short to solve the internal societal tensions, poverty and underemployment, 
to bridge the wide gap between the eastern and western parts of the 
country, and to stop the deterioration of public institutions.”198 These 
austerity measures promoted by elite members of the MSZP-SZDSZ 
coalition ran contrary to what the majority of Hungarians actually 
desired.199 The political scene only became more polarized when a 
confidential speech by then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in 
                                                                                                                     
189 Id. at 8–9 (“The Hungarian system was characterized by a highly politicized society and by the 
excessive sway that political parties held in various areas of public life.”). 
190 Id. at 8 (describing the depths of political polarization in Hungary as a result of partocracy). 
191 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 20. 
192 Id. at 18. 
193 Id. at 20.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 The MSZP-SZDSZ was a coalition government between the Hungarian Socialist Party 
(Magyar Szocialista Párt) and the Alliance of Free Democrats’ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a 
Magyar Liberális Párt) party which held a close majority before Fidesz won a majority. Csaba 
Nikolenyi, Strategic Co-Ordination in the 2002 Hungarian Election, 56 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1041, 1041 
(2004). 
197 Bozóki, supra note 174, at 11.  
198 András Tóth & István Grajczjár, The Rise of the Radical Right in Hungary, in THE 
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 133, 158 (Péter Krasztev & 
Jon Van Til eds., 2015).  
199 Wilkin, supra note 164, at 19 (“The problem was that these austerity policies were against 
what the majority of the Hungarian population actually wanted at the time.”). 
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Balatonőnszöd was leaked.200 In the speech, Gyurcsány said that he and the 
MSZP-SZDSZ government “had knowingly lied to the public concerning 
the economic situation in Hungary,”201 causing an eruption of “violent 
street protests”202 on the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution.203 This 
economic crisis was intensified by the global recession and occurred 
“when the government was rapidly losing its political credibility 
domestically.”204 The mishandling of the economic crisis decimated 
support for MSZP and opened the door for far-right parties to rise to 
prominence.205 In addition to Fidesz, the Jobbik party, a radical far-right 
party that has been described as neo-fascist,206 emerged during the 
economic crises.207 By the 2010 parliamentary elections, support for MSZP 
dropped to 20 percent208 while Jobbik captured 16.67 percent of the vote, 
becoming the third largest party in parliament.209  
Finally, during the interim period of democratization, far-right parties 
peddled “law and order” narratives that targeted the Roma.210 Tóth and 
Grajczjár argue that anti-Roma “law and order” rhetoric entered public 
discourse in 2006 after a tragic murder was committed by a group of Roma 
in Olaszliszka.211 This event was the catalyst for an outpouring of 
anti-Roma sentiments, with Jobbik leading this discourse as “protector of 
                                                                                                                     
200 Philipp Karl, Network Analysis of Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary, in MINORITIES UNDER 
ATTACK: OTHERING AND RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 221, 222 
(Sebastian Goll et al. eds., 2016). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 137. 
204 Bozóki, supra note 174, at 11.  
205 Id. at 3, 4. 
206 Jobbik, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/ 
files/threat_pdf/Jobbik-12172018.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
207 PETER KREKÓ ET AL., BROOKINGS, ANTI-MUSLIM POPULISM IN HUNGARY: FROM THE 
MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-in-
hungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/. 
208 Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 137. 
209 Id. at 139.  
210 The Roma are a richly diverse, historically nomadic group of people who likely originated in 
northern India and migrated towards Europe in approximately the tenth or eleventh centuries. 
Throughout their history, the Roma have been subjected to abuse, enslavement, and extermination. In 
Romania, the Roma were enslaved between the fourteenth century until the 1850s. In Nazi Germany, 
between 250,000 and 500,000 Roma perished in the Holocaust. An additional note: while the Roma are 
also referred to as “Gypsies,” this is a widely recognized slur and will be omitted from quoted 
materials, except for in the case of direct quotes from far-right speeches. Samira Shackle, Roma 
Holocaust: Amid Rising Hate, ‘Forgotten’ Victims Remembered, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ features/roma-holocaust-rising-hate-forgotten-victims-
remembered-191029173851099.html; see Adrian Marsh, Gypsies, Roma, Travellers: An Animated 
History, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (June 5, 2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/gypsies-
roma-travellers-animated-history (detailing the history of the Roma people). 
211 Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 138. 
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‘the honest, hardworking common people’”212 against “Gypsy crime.”213 
The Jobbik propagation of this racist discourse was ultimately successful in 
widening their voter base and bringing far-right politics to the fore: 
“[M]any [Hungarians] felt themselves being finally liberated from the 
left-liberal stranglehold of political correctness and allowed themselves to 
give vent to long-suppressed resentment, naming the causes of their real or 
imagined grievances.”214 In 2007, Jobbik spurred the creation of the 
Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda),215 a paramilitary group dedicated to the 
“defence” of Hungary against “Gypsy criminality.”216 Other anti-Roma 
extremist groups, such as Véderő and Szebb Jövőért, scheduled marches so 
hostile and aggressive that they caused Roma populations to evacuate 
towns, such as Gyöngyöspata, in fear for their safety.217 This xenophobic 
mainstream law and order rhetoric is echoed in the contemporary far-right 
discourse surrounding the refugee crisis.218 
D. Rise of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy (2010–present) 
The tumultuous period of democratic transition preceding Fidesz’s 
régime greatly contributed to the party’s triumph.219 The nascent illiberal 
democracy became cemented as Hungary’s new system of governance 
through sweeping unilateral legal reforms. These reforms enshrined the 
illiberal principles of majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, dictatorship of 
law, nationalism, and anti-intellectualism.220 The following section will 
examine how Orbán instrumentalized the law to claim the government for 
his own party and apply it to the typical characteristics of an illiberal 
democracy. The cumulative effect of these reforms is demonstrated in 
Freedom House’s decision to downgrade Hungary’s freedom ranking from 
“free” to “partially free” in 2019.221 These legal reforms attacked six arenas 




215 The Magyar Gárda was disbanded by Metropolitan Court of Budapest in 2009. After 
unsuccessful appeals in the national judicial system, the Magyar Gárda brought their case to the 
European Court of Human Rights and alleged that the national decision violated freedom of assembly 
as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights. The court held that Article 11 was not 
violated and upheld the judgments of the Hungarian national courts. Vona v. Hungary, App. No. 
35943/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) paras. 16–18, 72. 
216 Id. para. 10. 
217 Karl, supra note 200, at 223. 
218 See infra Part II.D. 
219 See supra Part II.C. 
220 Id. 
221 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: HUNGARY (2019), 
https://freedomhouse.org/ country/hungary/freedom-world/2019 (“Hungary’s status declined from Free 
to Partially Free due to sustained attacks on the country’s democratic institutions by Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, which has used its parliamentary supermajority to impose restrictions on 
or assert control over the opposition, the media, religious groups, academia, NGOs, the courts, asylum 
 
 
2021] THE TRAGEDY OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY 1219 
of democracy: the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the presidency, 
independent institutions, the media, and civil society.  
Before Orbán’s Fidesz came into power, Hungary “was a liberal 
democracy characterized by a multiparty system, free elections, 
representational government, a strong opposition, free media, strong, and 
credible institutions that protected the rule of law (i.e., the Constitutional 
Court and Ombudsman’s Office), and independent courts.”222 In stark 
contrast, the Orbán government approaches law not as an entity to be 
respected, but as a body to be manipulated in order to fit the needs of 
Fidesz’s political agenda.223 This is first and foremost exemplified with 
Fidesz’s unilateral rewriting of the Constitution. The framers of the old 
Constitution, drafted after the fall of communism, had two concerns when 
structuring the new government: first, “a fractured parliament in which 
small parties would be unable to form stable majority coalitions” and 
second, “a deeply entrenched constitution that would be too hard to change 
once the new democrats figured out how they wanted to design their 
political institutions.”224 The resulting constitution was one that favored 
larger parties with a provision allowing parliament to alter any part of the 
Constitution so long as they secure a two-thirds majority.225 This fatal flaw 
in the Constitution revealed itself after Fidesz secured 53 percent of the 
popular vote, translating into 68 percent of the seats in parliament.226 This 
meant that Fidesz was now capable of unilaterally amending the 
Constitution. In their first year in power, Fidesz amended the Constitution 
twelve times, altering more than fifty separate provisions and weakening 
any and all checks and balances.227 Fidesz used their two-thirds majority 
power to erase the last measure restraining constitutional amendments: the 
requirement of “a four-fifths vote of parliament to set the rules for writing 
a new constitution.”228 The elimination of this rule allowed Fidesz to draft 
a completely new constitution while barring any opposing voices from 
sitting at the table. 
                                                                                                                     
seekers, and the private sector since 2010.”). Cf. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: 
HUNGARY (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2018 (displaying a 72/100 
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222 András Bozóki, Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary, 19 DEBATTE: J. CONTEMP. 
CENT. & E. EUR. 649, 649 (2011).  
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224 Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling 
the Constitution, in THE HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 37, 
37 (Péter Krasztev & Jon Van Til eds., 2015).  
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Now in control of the executive and legislative branches, Fidesz’s next 
target was the Constitutional Court. Before Fidesz’s reign, the 
Constitutional Court was a powerful check on the government.229 First, 
Fidesz utilized its newfound amendment powers to change the judicial 
nomination process by allowing the party in power to nominate candidates 
to be elected to the court by a two-thirds majority, completely eliminating 
pluralism from the process.230 The Constitution had previously “required a 
majority of parliamentary parties to agree to a nomination and then a 
two-thirds vote of parliament’s members to elect the nominee to the 
court.”231 Second, Fidesz attacked the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction 
after it declared a retroactive tax law that punished members of the former 
MSZP-SZDSZ government unconstitutional232 and retaliated by “amending 
the Constitution and limiting the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.”233 
Parliament barred the Constitutional Court from reviewing any law about 
fiscal matters unless it affects “rights to life, dignity, data privacy, thought, 
conscience, religion, and citizenship.”234 Finally, the Fidesz government 
packed the Constitutional Court and delegated themselves the power to 
name seven of the fifteen judges as well as the chairperson of the 
Constitutional Court.235 As to be expected, all of the nominees are 
Fidesz-affiliates.236 
In addition to the Constitutional Court, Fidesz uprooted the 
appointment procedure for judgeships in every single court in the country. 
Before Fidesz, lower court judges were independently appointed by a panel 
of their fellow judges.237 Under the new system, Fidesz established the 
National Judicial Office (KIH) to oversee the judiciary and holds “the 
power to select new judges, to promote or demote any judge, to begin 
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230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. (“In order to plug gaping budget holes, the Fidesz government established a 98 percent 
retroactive tax on the customary departing bonuses of those who had left public employment in the 
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233 Bozóki, Occupy the State, supra note 222, at 651.  
234 Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 39. Bánkuti et al. note that the Constitutional Court is 
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2021] THE TRAGEDY OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY 1221 
disciplinary proceedings, and to select the leaders of each of the courts.”238 
The president of the KIH has a nine year term and is selected by a 
two-thirds majority vote in parliament, again guaranteeing that the head of 
this “independent” body would be a friend of Fidesz.239 In this case, current 
Chairperson Tünde Handó is quite literally “a close friend of Prime 
Minister Orbán and the wife of József Szájer,” the Vice President of Fidesz 
and principal architect of the new constitution.240 In contrast to other legal 
systems, Chairperson Handó also has the sole authority to reassign cases 
throughout the country at will.241 As such, the legitimacy of the entire 
Hungarian judicial system has been decimated in under a decade. 
The checks delegated to the president’s office and purportedly 
independent accountability institutions have also been delegitimized. First, 
under the old constitution, the president’s main check was that of the 
suspensive veto power.242 In the case of the president’s office, parliament 
simply elects hardline Fidesz supporters, like Pál Schmitt and János Áder, 
who refuse to veto Fidesz legislation.243 Second, Hungary’s old 
ombudsman system comprised of “four separate ombudsmen with separate 
staffs and independent jurisdictions”244 that monitored human rights issues. 
Now, there is a single parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights 
that operates with a severely reduced staff.245 The Data Protection 
Supervisor was abolished and a new, non-independent office was 
established.246 In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union found 
that in doing so, Hungary failed to fulfill its obligations under the 1995 
Data Protection Directive.247 Third, the State Audit Office, once an 
independent body with the power to investigate the misuse of public funds, 
is now led by a former Fidesz MP with no professional auditing 
experience.248 Fourth, the National Election Commission (NVB), the 
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independent body charged with regulating election law, has been filled 
with a Fidesz majority.249 In addition to monitoring elections and drawing 
electoral maps,250 the NVB also has the power to decide what referenda 
will be voted on in elections.251 This is particularly notable as referenda are 
one of the most substantial areas that civil society can attempt to influence 
the Fidesz government.252 Finally, the new constitution created the Budget 
Council that may “veto any budget produced by parliament that adds even 
a single forint [(0.004¢)] to the national debt.”253 The terms for Budget 
Council officials exceed that of a standard parliamentary election cycle, 
therefore allowing the Budget Council to “exercise dead-hand control over 
future elected governments.”254 Even worse, “if parliament fails to agree on 
a budget by March 31 of each year, then the president may dissolve 
parliament and call new elections.”255 If the Budget Council utilizes its 
veto power right before the deadline, it could force a new election.256 Thus, 
Fidesz’s partocracy extends beyond the three branches of government and 
invades purportedly independent institutions as well.  
Fidesz has usurped power horizontally by controlling the vast majority 
of mainstream media. The Fidesz government established the National 
Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH), a regulatory agency 
and an “independent” Media Council, charged with monitoring media 
outlets and fining outlets that do not have “balanced” news 
programming.257 Like other “independent” government agencies, Orbán 
appointed a former Fidesz MP to lead the NMHH, and parliament elected 
Fidesz loyalists fill all the seats on the Media Council.258 Although the 
Hungarian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press,259 the public television broadcaster is biased in favor of Fidesz and 
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actively undermines the opposition; Fidesz selectively awards advertising 
contracts and radio station frequencies to supporters and pressures critical 
news outlets into silence or closes them.260 Népszabadság, the largest 
opposition newspaper, was unexpectedly suspended from operation after it 
uncovered Fidesz scandals and its parent company was subsequently sold 
to Optimus Press, a firm owned by Fidesz allies.261 The firm has no plans 
to reopen Népszabadság.262 Fidesz affiliates and pro-government media 
currently dominate the market,263 and much of the opposition media has 
been pushed to the internet.264 Approximately 90 percent of all media in 
Hungary is owned by either the government or allies of Fidesz and use 
their publications to push pro-government views.265 For example, a study 
by Democracy Reporting International and Mérték Media Monitor studied 
broadcasts by television stations about the refugee resettlement program 
referendum in Hungary, supported by the European Union, and found that 
91 percent of programming by public television stations took anti-
referendum positions.266 Currently, Freedom House has ranked Hungary’s 
freedom of the press as only “partly free.”267 
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260 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017: HUNGARY (2017), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/59fc67e6a.html. Additionally, the “donation” of most major media 
outlets—over four hundred—to a pro-Fidesz foundation run by Orbán’s childhood friend is yet another 
example that Orbán’s “economic patriotism” is merely a guise for his crony capitalism. Of course, this 
mass donation to the Central European Press and Media Foundation must be approved by regulatory 
authorities (led by Orbán appointees). If approved, “the deal will place most leading private Hungarian 
outlets under the control of a single, state-friendly entity.” Patrick Kingsley, Orban and His Allies 
Cement Control of Hungary’s News Media, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), 
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fourteen pro-Fidesz oligarchs, with Lőrinc Mészáros owning 205 media titles. Bátorfy Attila, 
Infographic: Explore the Media Empire Friendly to the Hungarian Government, ATLATSZO (May 30, 
2018), https://english.atlatszo.hu/2018/01/16/infographic-explore-the-media-empire-friendly-to-the-
hungarian-government/. 
266 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017, supra note 260. 
267 Id. 
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Hungarian civil society is also under siege. Like Fidesz’s strategy with 
the media, the party prevents civil society from genuinely functioning by 
smothering oppositional NGOs and replacing them with Fidesz allies or by 
discrediting them based on their affiliation with George Soros.268 Scholars 
have argued that Hungary’s “historically based tradition of a strong central 
state, the restored (or rather surviving) authoritarian hierarchies . . . 
successfully hindered the emergence of civil independence and 
autonomy.”269 Prior to the Fidesz régime, civil society traditions in 
Hungary were beginning to grow, for example, with the success of 
impartial government watchdog groups.270 Many of these civil society 
organizations have a high resource dependency and rely on government 
grants to operate.271 Once Orbán took power in 2010, “the system of 
partiality became legitimized, and grant distribution became overtly biased 
as a ‘necessary restoration’ of the national and traditional value system, 
which strictly excluded a number of values, critical voices, and watchdog 
views.”272 In effect, the Orbán government was able to “dismiss” 
opposition organizations by withdrawing funding and “replace” them with 
new organizations run by Fidesz allies.273 Government Decree 49/2011 
(III.30.) was enacted to achieve similar aims by ordering “direct provision 
of financial support through some of the ministries to 525 organizations, 
visibly recognizable from their names as NGOs that highlight national, 
family, and other traditional values and share these with the government 
parties.”274  
Fidesz is keen to target “opponent” NGOs that are funded through 
Soros’s charitable contributions and Open Society Foundations. The 
Hungarian far-right perpetuates anti-Semitic myths claiming that Soros is 
part of an international conspiracy to force “globalism” on unwilling 
nations vis-à-vis civil society organizations.275 In 2018, Fidesz passed a 
law informally known as the “Stop Soros” law that both imposes “a 25 
                                                                                                                     
268 See infra Part IV.B for a more in-depth discussion of George Soros and Fidesz.  
269 Ágnes Kövér, Captured by State and Church: Civil Society in Democratic Hungary, in THE 
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 81, 84 (Péter Krasztev & 
Jon Van Til eds., 2015). 
270 See Zsolt Enyedi, Democratic Backsliding and Academic Freedom in Hungary, 16 PERSP. ON 
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271 Kövér, supra note 269, at 82–83.  
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274 Id. at 83–84. 
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percent tax on foreign donations to NGOs that back migration”276 and also 
criminalizes the vague practice of “promoting and supporting illegal 
migration.”277 This is another instance in which the illiberal value of 
absolute sovereignty appears. In a recent speech, Orbán said: “We are up 
against media outlets maintained by foreign concerns and domestic 
oligarchs, professional hired activists, troublemaking protest organizers, 
and a chain of NGOs financed by an international speculator, summed up 
by and embodied in the name George Soros.”278 We can again observe the 
law and order rhetoric, similar to the anti-Roma beliefs discussed earlier,279 
but this time deployed as a weapon against humanitarian aid organizations. 
The rhetoric put forth by Fidesz and Prime Minister Orbán is steeped 
in ethnic nationalism and easily distributed as propaganda vis-à-vis the 
enormous amount of media either owned by the state or by Fidesz allies. 
The content of these messages is comprised “of nationalism and Christian 
and patriarchal family values with demands for law and order.”280 The 
Constitution’s preamble has been revised to emphasize themes of 
“Christian values, national history, and a united nation as a cultural and 
political community with state interests.”281 Much of Orbán’s rhetoric 
invokes notions of “the family,” both with regard to valuing the ethnic 
Hungarian nuclear family282 as well as referring to the nation-state as a 
                                                                                                                     
276 Krisztina Than, Civil Organizations in Hungary Brace for Government Crackdown on NGOs, 
REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-ngos/civil-
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foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who 
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borders are lost: slowly but surely they are consumed. External forces and 
international powers want to force all this upon us, with the help of their allies here 
in our country.  
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279 See supra Part II.C (discussing how “far right parties peddled ‘law and order’ narratives that 
targeted the Roma”). 
280 András Bozóki, The Illusion of Inclusion: Configurations of Populism in Hungary, 
in THINKING THROUGH TRANSITION: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIAN PASTS, AND 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1989, at 275, 308 (Michal Kopeček & Piotr 
Wciślik eds., 2015). 
281 Id. 
282 See, e.g., Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open 
University and Student Camp (July 29, 2018) (“Our second tenet is that every country has the right to 
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family to be protected.283 Frequently, Orbán characterizes Hungary as a 
homogenous Christian nation under siege by refugees—and that 
“migration and mass population movements are bad, dangerous things 
which [Hungary] want[s] no part of. . . . In consequence [of migration] we 
will not be able to keep Hungary as it has been for the past 1,100 years.”284 
Orbán’s speeches conjure images of the Hungarian fictive ethnicity: that of 
a traditional white, Christian Magyar that embraces traditional values and 
rejects the moral decline of the West. This fictive Hungarian rejects the 
multiculturalism “imposed” on them by the West: “We must state that we 
do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not want our 
own colour, traditions and national culture to be mixed with those of 
others. . . . We do not want to be a diverse country. We want to be how we 
became 1,100 years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.”285 This fictive 
ethnicity can be seen in play when a 2010 law granted citizenship rights, 
including the right to vote in elections, to ethnic Hungarians living in 
neighboring countries. Although many of these newly enfranchised ethnic 
Hungarians have never visited the country, they account for approximately 
ten percent of the electorate and vote for Fidesz at a rate of 95 percent.286 
The Orbán administration is also in the process of reconstructing 
Hungary’s history. The much-hated Treaty of Trianon that caused Hungary 
to lose two-thirds of its territory after the First World War has become a 
rallying cry for the far-right. In 2016, the central square of Pomaz, a small 
town outside of Budapest, was renamed “Trianon Square” and features a 
monument that is a map of greater Hungary prior to its loss of territory.287 
Since Orbán’s 2010 election, the régime has sought to rewrite the nation’s 
past vis-à-vis the construction of monuments that glorify what were once 
                                                                                                                     
defend the traditional family model, and is entitled to assert that every child has the right to a mother 
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283 See, e.g., Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., “State of the Nation” Address (Feb. 10, 2019), 
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284 Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the 
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election-2018/ (“In Hungary’s 2014 election, over 95 percent of votes cast by non-domestic citizens 
went to Fidesz.”). 
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considered dark times in history. These include monuments celebrating 
Miklós Horthy, a right-wing leader and ally of Hitler, and the 2018 
replacement of a statue of Imre Nagy, the martyred leader of the 1956 
Revolution, with Gyula Gömbös, a fascist Prime Minister during the 
interwar period.288 Other monuments erected under the régime downplay 
Hungary’s culpability in the Holocaust.289 Orbán and Fidesz are in the 
midst of constructing a new collective mythology of the nation-state, 
through both legal instruments and national symbols, in order to support 
their régime of illiberal democracy. Their new conception of what 
constitutes a Hungarian and Hungarian values has been deployed against 
intellectuals and academia in order to delegitimize their opposition and 
tighten their grip on public discourse. 
E. Emergency and Temporal Uncertainty in Hungarian Illiberal 
Democracy 
Orbán, like authoritarian leaders across the globe, received another 
opportunity to consolidate power when the novel coronavirus arrived in 
Hungary.290 On March 30, Parliament approved the “Corona Bill,” 
allowing Orbán to indefinitely rule by decree with effectively unchecked 
power.291 Under rule by decree, Orbán may bypass the national assembly 
completely.292 The law granting rule by decree also stalled all elections and 
created two to five year prison sentences for those that “distort facts” or 
publish “false information.”293 Abuse of emergency power is not 
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292 Verhofstadt, supra note 291. 
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INSIGHT (Mar. 31, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/31/hungary-no-longer-a-democracy-after-
coronavirus-law/. 
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unfamiliar to Orbán. The government, for example, has renewed the state 
of emergency declared for a “crisis situation due to mass migration” eight 
times since the European refugee crisis began in 2015.294 Subverting the 
division between emergency and normalcy serves two functions: to expand 
executive authority beyond legislature oversight and to normalize the 
régime. Through enduring vacillations between emergency and normalcy, 
“the authorities may turn to rule by decree as easily as switching on a 
lightbulb.”295 
When authoritarian governments fabricate indefinite emergency, 
diminished speech and protest rights often follow. For Orbán, the Corona 
Bill serves as an effective mechanism to suppress speech while painting 
dissenters as active threats to the health of the nation. Opposition MP 
Tímea Szabó argued that in reality, the Corona Bill lends “a free hand to 
do away with even what’s left of the press and practically imprison 
journalists, doctors, and opposition lawmakers if we say things that you 
don’t like—namely, the truth.”296 Since the “fake news” and assembly 
components of the Corona Bill passed, police launched about one hundred 
investigations against individuals, though cases have yet to make their way 
into court.297 The Fidesz government has also instrumentalized COVID-19 
precautions to limit protest and assembly. For example, protesters in a 
series of car demonstrations against Orbán’s rule by decree were subjected 
to extreme fines of up to 750,000 forints (about $2,500).298 Protesters were 
fined under an array of charges ranging from violating traffic laws to 
COVID-19 assembly restrictions.299 Under illiberal rule, official sites of 
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public discourse such as media300 and universities301 are no longer free. The 
advent of COVID-19 allows illiberal leaders to restrict access to the 
abstract and literal town square under the façade of public health.302 
This state of public health emergency also granted Fidesz the ability to 
quickly pass expansive measures unrelated to COVID-19. On March 31, 
just one day after the Corona Bill passed, Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt 
Semjén, introduced and passed an omnibus bill proposing fifty-seven 
legislative changes.303 Although this bill was passed under the guise of 
COVID-19, in reality, it functions to further consolidate power.304 First, the 
bill financially enriches Orbán and his allies by ordering the construction 
of Orbán’s pet projects: “the construction of new museum buildings in one 
of the capital’s biggest public parks”305 and a new Budapest-Belgrade 
railway.306 Second, the bill expands illiberal control over the arts by 
packing the theater supervisory board with government appointees.307 
Third, the bill attempted to suspend municipal autonomy.308 Finally, the 
bill “forces trans people to have the same gender as they were assigned at 
birth and bans gender reassignment altogether.”309 This aspect of the bill 
not only functions as a literal attack against transgender Hungarians, but 
also as an abstract attack against their identities.310 Denying trans existence 
as deviant to the traditional heteropatriarchal norms of the Hungarian 
nation-state serves to Otherize from “the people” of the imagined 
community.311 This dual role of the new law serves two purposes: cast 
aside trans people as non-members of the community and routinely out 
them in regular aspects of national life.312 
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On June 16, proposed legislation ending Orbán’s rule by decree passed 
unopposed.313 The Orbán government issued about one hundred decrees 
since March, many of which are completely unrelated to COVID-19 
measures.314 This brief reprieve would not last for long: Keeping in line 
with tradition, Parliament again pushed the nation into a state of 
emergency. This time, Parliament passed legislation allowing Orbán to 
enter a “state of medical emergency” and revert back to rule by decree 
absent a mandated end date.315 Under a state of health emergency, the 
government may restrict fundamental rights for a maximum of six months, 
but critics argue that they may be extended indefinitely in practice.316  
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee wrote that the formal June 20 end 
to rule by decree “is nothing but an optical illusion: if the Bills are adopted 
in their present form, that will allow the government to again rule by 
decree for an indefinite period of time, this time without even the minimal 
constitutional safeguards.”317 This looming state of emergency destabilizes 
any normalcy that existed before the régime. Crisis legitimizes 
authoritarian control. “When the coronavirus arrived in Hungary, Orbán 
used it to illustrate that he was already fully in control of his system.”318 
These states of emergency are cast as an offensive against the perceived 
invasions of disease or the Other319 into the imagined community.320 The 
aim is that the régime citizens will more readily accept losing civil 
liberties—the “liberalism”321 of the old liberal democratic order—and the 
tightening authoritarian grasp will begin to feel natural. Orbán’s illiberal 
democracy is emblematic of this threat. Suspended in the strings of state 
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emergency, the régime order reifies amorphous crises into accepted 
domination. As such, after the pandemic, we emerge only to find that the 
system had long collapsed, replaced by hollow illiberal democracies.  
III. THE INTERSECTION OF ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM, ILLIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
A. Lex CEU: A Background 
Central European University (CEU) is a highly-ranked graduate 
research university in Budapest founded in 1991 by George Soros, Václav 
Havel, and other intellectual members of the democratic opposition as a 
direct response to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.322 Their vision was 
to establish a university dedicated to promoting the values of open society 
and democracy as envisioned in Karl Popper’s philosophy.323 Since its 
founding, Central European University has been regarded as a liberal 
intellectual bastion of Central Europe and Hungary. Central European 
University is accredited both in Hungary and in the state of New York and 
leads all other Hungarian universities in receiving European research 
grants. As such, it has become the target of Prime Minister Orbán’s attacks 
on freedom of thought, academic freedom, and liberal opposition.  
In April of 2017, the Hungarian parliament adopted amendments to the 
existing Act CCIV of 2011 on National Higher Education (“Lex CEU”).324 
The new criteria for foreign universities operating in Hungary directly 
targeted only Central European University.325 The most onerous 
component of Lex CEU is the requirement of an international agreement 
between Hungary and the university’s country of origin (in CEU’s case, 
America).326 This requirement is particularly problematic as it “practically 
means that the right to conduct educational activities will no longer depend 
on professional criteria (e.g., on the decision of accreditation boards), but 
on the preferences of the government.”327 This law also requires that all 
foreign-accredited universities provide higher education services in their 
country of origin and “restricts the possibility for non-European 
universities to enter into cooperation with Hungarian universities.”328 
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Finally, Lex CEU “eliminates exemptions for work permits and requires 
that the name of the university differs clearly from the name of already 
registered universities even in foreign languages.”329 If a university fails to 
comply with any aspect of Lex CEU, it will lose its license to operate.330 
Although the stipulations of this amendment appear to be neutral, they 
disparately impact Central European University. CEU is an 
American-chartered university that is connected to the Hungarian higher 
education system via a legal entity called Közép-európai Egyetem.331 The 
university has a substantial population of non-European professors, 
primarily from America and Canada, that relied on the recently eliminated 
work permit exception.332 In order to fulfil the requirement of an 
international agreement, the successful negotiation of two treaties—one 
between Hungary and New York state and the other between Hungary and 
the United States federal government—were now required by January 1, 
2018, giving CEU less than a year to comply.333  
The Orbán government faced immense backlash in response to this 
absurd law. On April 2, 2017, approximately 10,000 people marched 
throughout Budapest to parliament in support of CEU.334 Then, on April 4, 
parliament voted in favor of Lex CEU in spite of a petition to the 
government with over 30,000 signatures from 134 different countries.335 
Finally, on April 9, an estimated 80,000 demonstrators took to the streets 
in peaceful protest, with hundreds of international universities and over 
twenty Nobel laureates expressing solidarity.336 Central European 
University worked with the state of New York and launched an academic 
exchange program at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York. 
Despite complying with Lex CEU and successfully negotiating a mutually 
accepted draft agreement with Governor Cuomo, the Orbán government 
refused to ratify the treaty. This left the university in legal limbo by 
extending the deadline of compliance to January 1, 2019, prompting 
international condemnation.337 Without approval by the Orbán government, 
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the university has been forced to shutter its United States-accredited 
operations in Budapest and move its students to a satellite campus in an old 
state hospital on the outskirts of Vienna, Austria for the fall 2019 academic 
year.338  
B. Anti-Intellectualism and Illiberal Democracy: A Hungarian Reprise 
Illiberal democracies, our modern authoritarianism, are deeply 
anti-intellectual. As discussed in Part I, critical intellectual discourse poses 
a direct threat to authoritarian control.339 Illiberal leaders like Orbán that 
espouse populism in their political platform are wont to espouse 
anti-intellectual rhetoric. Populism can be defined as “[a] thin-centered 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt 
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people.”340 Historically, the intelligentsia 
have been classified as “the elite” and have become the scapegoat for the 
ire of populist leaders. Other than the general inaccessibility of expensive 
university degrees to the masses, academia and its intelligentsia are 
targeted to suppress anti-régime discourse and preemptively neutralize the 
opposition. This line of thought makes Central European University an 
ideal target for Orbán. CEU is an institution that was founded with a 
                                                                                                                     
worldwide protest. On April 19, nine American senators, including John McCain and Chuck Schumer, 
sent a letter to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, arguing that the legislation threatens academic freedom 
and calling on him to work with CEU to find a solution. The most important political statements came 
from the European People’s Party (EPP, the center-right bloc in the European Parliament) and the 
spokesperson for German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The U.S. State Department also expressed its 
clear support for CEU and for academic freedom, and rejected the threat to an American university 
abroad. . . . Parallel to American diplomatic efforts, the European Commission condemned the law as a 
violation of EU regulations and core European values, including academic freedom.”); see also Letter 
from Sen. Dick Durban, Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, Sen. Chris Murphy, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, Sen. Amy 
Klobuchar, Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Sen. Cory A. Booker, Sen. Edward J. Markey, 
Sen. Bernard Sanders, U.S. Senate, to Ambassador David B. Cornstein (Dec. 20, 2018) (on file with 
Sen. Dick Durban) (supporting CEU and academic freedom in Hungary); Letter from Dr. Laura Schultz 
et al., Professor Cognitive Sci., MIT, to H.E. Réka Szemerkényi, Ambassador of Hung. to the U.S. et 
al. (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with Central European University) (letter from 1061 cognitive scientists in 
support of Central European University); Statements of Support, CENT. EUR. U., 
https://www.ceu.edu/istandwithCEU/support-statements (accessed Mar. 23, 2019). 
338 CEU Forced Out of Budapest: To Launch U.S. Degree Programs in Vienna in September 
2019, CENT. EUR. U. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ceu.edu/article/2018-12-03/ceu-forced-out-budapest-
launch-us-degree-programs-vienna-september-2019; see also Rosa Schwartzburg, School’s Out 
Forever, SLATE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/authoritarians-education-
universities-hungary-brazil-
populism.html?via=rss_socialflow_facebook&fbclid=IwAR3kYxKbgCTBPcNHo4be6f 
icbi661ewsRhOgwXvdcCn2d_n3FWetNn5VBk0 (describing CEU’s ousting to Vienna). 
339 ARENDT, supra note 53, at 339. 
340 CAS MUDDE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 29 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 
eds., 2017). 
 
1234 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:3 
dedication to open society, with programs such as their Nationalism and 
Gender Studies departments341 that directly, and loudly, challenge illiberal 
democracy. Universities are particularly dangerous to authoritarians 
because their purpose “is [to] produce knowledge that is often critical of 
the established ways of doing things . . . . And in the social sciences it’s 
quite dangerous . . . because the knowledge that’s produced is calling into 
question the habits and ‘ordinary ways’ that we go about doing things.”342 
Likewise, the government-controlled press launched a campaign against 
the “intellectual elite” that attacked philosophers associated with the Georg 
Lukács School, like Ágnes Heller, by falsely claiming that they had 
received overly generous government research grants.343 Authoritarians 
rely on the closure of critical discourse to create a one-dimensional arena 
of thought that is uncritical of the régime in order to successfully quell 
opposition and maintain societal control. 
Anti-intellectualism, especially in Europe, is inherently tied to 
anti-Semitism. Arendt’s history of anti-Semitism in Origins of 
Totalitarianism notes that European nation-states were hostile to Jewish 
intellectuals in particular as an attempt to prevent Jewish assimilation in 
the nineteenth century.344 But by the early twentieth century, the most 
notable Central European intellectuals were Jewish: Sigmund Freud, 
Edmund Husserl, Gustav Mahler, Franz Kafka, and so on.345 George Soros, 
the primary founder of Central European University, is a Hungarian-born 
Jewish financier and billionaire and has been the subject of anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theories by the Hungarian far-right. Most recently, Fidesz has 
launched a taxpayer-funded346 campaign against Soros and the European 
Union that includes peddling the myth that Soros was “allegedly 
                                                                                                                     
341 Nationalism Studies Program, CENT. EUR. U., https://courses.ceu.edu/unit/nationalism 
(accessed Jan. 12, 2020); Department of Gender Studies, CENT. EUR. U., 
https://courses.ceu.edu/unit/gender (accessed Jan. 12, 2020). 
342 Schwartzburg, supra note 338 (quoting interview with Joan Wallach Scott, Professor Emerita 
at the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study). 
343 Bozóki, The Illusion of Inclusion, supra note 280, at 306.  
344 ARENDT, supra note 53, at 32 (“From then on, the nation-state, equipped with conservative 
arguments, drew a distinct line between Jews who were needed and wanted and those who were not. 
Under the pretext of the essential Christian character of the state—what could have been more alien to 
the enlightened despots!—the growing Jewish intelligentsia could be openly discriminated against 
without harming the affairs of bankers or businessmen. This kind of discrimination which tried to close 
the universities to Jews by excluding them from the civil services had the double advantage of 
indicating that the nation-state valued special services higher than equality, and of preventing, or at 
least postponing, the birth of a new group of Jews who were of no apparent use to the state and even 
likely to be assimilated into society.”). Ultimately, this project was a failure: “What the nation-state had 
once feared so much, the birth of a Jewish intelligentsia, now proceeded at a fantastic pace.” Id. at 52. 
345 Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, supra note 143, at 35.  
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responsible for the wave of migrants to Europe.”347 Deputy Prime Minister 
Zsolt Semjén claimed in a recent radio interview that: “[T]he Soros-type 
extreme liberalism which hates Christian traditions and, if possible even 
more, nation states,”348 is dangerous to Hungarians, and he went on to 
conclude that “leftist and liberal parties needed to import millions of 
foreigners in order to defeat their nationalist opponents and, in cooperation 
with immigrant Islamic forces, to rule the nations of Europe.”349 Jobbik 
spokesman Ádám Mirkóczki pushed this narrative even further by 
claiming that high-ranking Fidesz politicians, including Orbán, are 
implicated in this conspiracy theory due to the Soros funding that they 
received for their educations.350 The anti-Soros conspiracy theory directly 
entered the parliamentary debate on Lex CEU when “the minister 
responsible for education stated that ‘we are committed to use all legal 
means at our disposal to stop pseudo-civil society spy groups such as the 
ones funded by George Soros.’”351 Although Central European University 
would still have been a likely target of the Fidesz régime, Soros’s 
involvement threw fuel into the fire. 
C. Illiberal Legal Challenges to Academic Freedom 
Since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was elected in 2010, the Fidesz 
government has centralized education and enacted a wide array of laws that 
shrink academic freedom in the country.352 Fidesz has pushed through a 
gradual overhaul of the public education system, slowly growing 
government influence over school curricula.353 In 2014, legislation was 
adopted that permits government-appointed chancellors to make significant 
financial decisions at public universities,354 and in some cases, the Minister 
of Education has even “imposed his own candidate for rector of 
universities and political appointees without any academic record were 
promoted to professorship at state-controlled universities.”355 Likewise, a 
slash in government funding for the Hungarian Academy of Science and 
                                                                                                                     
347 Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1069. 
348 Id. 
349 Id. (summarizing the Semjén interview).  
350 Fidesz Gets a Reminder Who Was Funded By George Soros, JOBBIK (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.jobbik.com/fidesz_gets_a_reminder_who_was_funded_by_george_soros (“He added that 
when Szilárd Németh identified Soros’ protégés as organizations and individuals to be ‘cleaned away’, 
the Fidesz politician forgot to mention that from 1984 through 1994 the Hungarian-born US 
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Stumpf, Zoltán Cséfalvay, József Pálinkás, János Áder or László Kövér.”). 
351 Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1070. 
352 Id. at 1071. 
353 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: HUNGARY, supra note 221. 
354 Id.  
355 Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1071.  
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general reallocation of significantly less funds for academic research 
institutions threatens institutional closures in the near future.356 Fidesz 
leveraged the Corona Bill to forcibly transfer control over the University of 
Theater and Film Arts (SZFE) to a private foundation, prompting students 
to occupy campus buildings, professors to resign, and tens of thousands to 
protest in Budapest.357 The battle for academic freedom in Hungary has 
manifested itself as a culture war between the nationalistic illiberal 
democracy and the liberal intelligentsia.  
At the same time that the Orbán government refused to acknowledge 
Central European University’s compliance with Lex CEU, Prime Minister 
Orbán signed a decree revoking accreditation and funding for gender 
studies departments, effectively banning the discipline.358 This decree only 
targets programs from two universities in Hungary: Central European 
University and Eötvös Loránd University.359 Effective immediately, the 
accreditation of all gender studies programs has been revoked, although the 
government is allowing currently enrolled students to finish their 
programs. Anti-intellectual and misogynistic rhetoric surrounding the 
gender studies ban date back to Fidesz’s seizure of power. In 2015, László 
Kövér, one of the founders of Fidesz, stated:  
We don’t want the gender craziness. We don’t want to make 
Hungary a futureless society of man-hating women, and 
feminine men living in dread of women, and considering 
families and children only as barriers to self-fulfillment … 
And we would like if our daughters would consider, as the 
                                                                                                                     
356 Szabó András Péter, Greetings from the Sinking Boat of Hungarian Academia, INDEX (trans. 
Zoltán Kovács, Feb. 8, 2019), https://index.hu/english/2019/02/08/greetings_from_the_sinking_boat 
_of_hungarian_academia/. 
357 See supra Part II.F (discussing the Corona Bill and Hungarian states of emergency). SZFE is a 
prestigious 155-year-old university that has educated prominent Hungarian artists. In March, the Fidesz 
government passed the Corona Bill, which included a provision “that transferred ownership of the 
public university to a private foundation. The government also appointed a new board of trustees—
actions that raised fears that the university, long a target of the government, will be forced to hew more 
closely to Mr. Orban’s nationalistic and conservative vision for Hungary.” Benjamin Novak, Student 
Blockade Protests Viktor Orban’s Reach at a Top Arts University, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/06/world/europe/hungary-students-blockade-orban.html. At the 
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university’s autonomy.” Hungarian Students, Artists Protest Government’s Takeover of Famed Film 
School, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY’S HUNGARIAN SERV. (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://www.rferl.org/a/hungarian-students-artists-protest-government-s-takeover-of-famed-film-
school/30901261.html (internal quotations omitted). 
358 Anna Zsubori, Gender Studies Banned at University—the Hungarian Government’s Latest 
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highest quality of self-fulfillment, the possibility of giving 
birth to our grandchildren.360 
Kövér went even further earlier that year to argue that “‘genderism’ is 
‘an intellectual founding of such a human experiment that is nothing better 
than, let’s say, eugenics in Nazi times.’”361 It is obvious that the 
government’s decision to ban certain academic fields—and compare them 
to Nazism—stems not from a genuine desire to improve the academic 
endeavors of universities but to control freedom of thought based on 
political ideology. Nationalist populist movements tend to yearn for a 
return to “traditional” society and reject modernism, and as such, embrace 
“traditional” gender roles.362 Hungary is a very patriarchal country invested 
in traditional family structures,363 and Fidesz’s politics “signals opposition 
to the moral-cultural transformation of developed societies.”364 The gender 
studies ban is emblematic of the culture war between the Fidesz 
government and Central European University. The ban primarily affects 
Central European University, an institution that is one of the most diverse 
universities in the world365 and embodies the spirit of open society, 
multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism. Accordingly, the ban, and its 
targeting of CEU, functions as the Fidesz government’s rebuke of the 
moral decline366 of the West. Academic institutions in other illiberal 
democracies have experienced similar treatment, especially with regard to 
teaching gender studies and other related subjects.367 This war on academia 
                                                                                                                     
360 Id. (alteration in original). 
361 Id. 
362 See Joane Nagel, Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of 
Nations, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 242, 251–53 (1998) (discussing the distinct roles that men and 
women tend to play in nationalist narratives). 
363 See Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe, PEW RES. CTR. 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/social-views-and-morality/ (finding that 
Hungarians tend to hold conservative views on LGBTQ+ and gender issues: 54 percent believe that 
homosexuality should not be accepted by society, 27 percent favor same sex marriage, and 77 percent 
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364 Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1069. 
365 CEU Named #2 Most International University in the World by THE, CENT. EUR. U. (Apr. 27, 
2017), https://www.ceu.edu/article/2017-04-27/ceu-named-2-most-international-university-world. 
366 See Orbán, supra note 282 (“[I]n liberal Europe being European means nothing at all: it has no 
direction, and it is simply form devoid of content.”). 
367 In Russia, the European University at St. Petersburg lost its license to teach for two years due 
to an administrative ruling that began with a complaint by MP Vitaly Milonov, who was the key author 
of the homophobic 2013 “gay propaganda” bill. Milonov said of the university: “[An alleged student 
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Private Universities?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 
Europe/2017/0328/Why-is-someone-trying-to-shutter-one-of-Russia-s-top-private-universities. In 
Turkey, at least 146 academics face individual and separate trial hearings for signing a 2016 petition 
condemning Turkey’s treatment of Kurds on the southeastern border and calling to resume peace talks 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. This petition was initially signed by a group of 1128 academics 
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is not only ideological, but wrapped up in the very legal institutions of 
Hungary. Further, Lex CEU flies in the face of the Hungarian Constitution, 
which purports to protect academic freedom from government intrusion, 
and is a reminder of the hollowness of democratic institutions in illiberal 
democracies.368 
Orbán and Fidesz’s attacks on Central European University exemplify 
illiberal democratic principles in action. As has been demonstrated, the 
majoritarian Fidesz partocracy quickly seized control of all government 
organs, including purportedly independent ones, in order to bypass all 
opposition checks in every stage of the democratic process. Fidesz’s reach 
has extended beyond democratic institutions to control virtually all 
mainstream media and restrict the operation of civil society to further 
insulate the régime from opposition.369 In addition to manipulating the law, 
they are controlling societal norms to produce the Magyar fictive ethnicity 
and suppress non-conservative discourse.370 At the same time, Hungarian 
history is actively being rewritten in a manner that glorifies past fascist 
leaders and stokes anger over the perceived injustices of the Treaty of 
Trianon.371 Orbán invokes principles of absolute sovereignty when he 
                                                                                                                     
known as Academics for Peace. A number of these signatories are facing between one and five years’ 
imprisonment for “spreading terrorist propaganda.” Over 360 academics have been fired from their 
jobs and barred from teaching. Turkey: Academics on Trial for Signing Petition, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
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“aggressive promotion of gender ideology.” Schwartzburg, supra note 338. The Thai junta has detained 
American academics and maintains a watchlist of academics and researchers. Suluck Lamubol, Junta 
Steps Up Harassment of International Academics, U. WORLD NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.universityworldnews.com/ post.php?story=20190301083420506. In Egypt, Alexandria 
University has required that thesis proposals for masters and doctoral students adhere to the 
government’s incomplete Vision 2030 development plan. Ashraf Khaled, Concern Over Freedoms as 
University Curbs Thesis Topics, U. WORLD NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20181205120855294. 
368 “Article X: (1) Hungary shall ensure the freedom of scientific research and artistic creation, the 
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369 See supra notes 260–70 and accompanying text. 
370 See supra notes 278–82 and accompanying text. 
371 See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text. 
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treats Central European University as yet another invasion of the West and 
its “degenerate” ideology and paints Hungary as a nation that is still being 
constantly invaded, this time by liberals under George Soros’s watch.372 
Orbán has also deployed the “dictatorship of law” when passing Lex CEU 
as a direct assault on the “elite intelligentsia” that, through critical 
discourse and academia, threaten the legitimacy of the illiberal 
democracy.373 Far-right nationalist and anti-intellectual rhetoric 
characterizes Central European University and its intellectuals as a danger 
to “the people” of Hungary, pitting them against each other in a culture war 
that CEU did not sign up for. 
While the situation in Hungary is grim, action can be taken. 
Individuals can continue to protest Fidesz’s régime and draw international 
attention to Hungary. Right now, “activists on the ground are setting up 
underground education lectures and organizing queer theory readings and 
poetry nights in people’s living rooms and basement bars.”374 Independent 
media and the academic community can further support democracy and 
academic freedom by publicizing the situation in Hungary and supporting 
communities and individuals under threat. Likewise, the international 
community can pressure illiberal democracies through diplomatic 
measures. Political and economic unions such as the European Union can 
adopt measures condemning the actions of illiberal democratic states and 
impose sanctions on noncompliant governments. On September 12, 2018, 
the European Union voted to pursue disciplinary action against Hungary 
under Article 7 of the European Union Charter. This is the first time that 
the EU has pursued action invoking Article 7, which lays out the ways that 
EU bodies can act if a member state violates the core values of the 
European Union.375 On March 20, 2019, the European People’s Party376 
suspended Fidesz from the party in response to their campaign attacking 
Soros and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, as well 
as its actions against Central European University. EPP President Joseph 
Daul stated: “We cannot compromise on democracy, rule of law, freedom 
of press, academic freedom or minorities’ rights. And anti-EU rhetoric is 
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What’s Happening Here, BUSTLE (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/im-a-gender-studies-
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375 Maïa de la Baume & Ryan Heath, Parliament Denounces Hungary’s Illiberalism, POLITICO, 
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unacceptable. The divergences between EPP and Fidesz must cease.”377 
Fidesz must end the anti-Junker and Soros campaign, solve the legal 
dispute over Central European University, and “recognize the damage it 
caused and refrain from similar action”378 in order to regain full 
membership to the EPP. As a result from pressure by the EPP, on March 
20, Orbán and Prime Minister Söder of Bavaria exchanged letters 
supporting a partnership between CEU and the Technical University of 
Munich on the condition that CEU be allowed to remain in Budapest.379 At 
the time of writing, Orbán has yet to give CEU a legal guarantee to remain 
in operation and “an international agreement guaranteeing the freedom of 
CEU to operate in Budapest as a US degree granting institution”380 is 
needed before celebration. If Central European University is ultimately 
successful, it will be a testament to the sway of influence that European 
institutions still hold over this illiberal democracy. Even if Central 
European University is allowed to remain in Budapest, Hungary’s 
democratic institutions are still under siege and many other liberties 
enshrined under constitutional liberalism are still threatened.  
CONCLUSION 
We are currently in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse wave. 
After decades of democratic prosperity, global democracy has entered a 
“decade of decline.”381 Between 2006 and 2016, Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World report discovered that 105 countries suffered net 
declines in their scores, while 61 demonstrated improvement. Given these 
grim statistics, we have undoubtedly entered Huntington’s third reverse 
wave. Based on the first and second reverse waves, Huntington concluded 
that each reverse wave will give rise to a new form of authoritarianism. 
Illiberal democracy is that form of authoritarianism.  
Illiberal democracy differs from other forms of authoritarianism due to 
the fact that some semblance of a democratic system remains. In many 
cases, the authoritarian government comes to power through the 
democratic process. However, once elected, they quickly consolidate 
control, and greatly weaken democracy and the safeguards of civil liberties 
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as guaranteed by constitutional liberalism. These régimes tend to value 
majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, and the dictatorship of law while 
embracing nationalism and anti-intellectualism. When illiberal 
democracies operate under these values that run counter to the very nature 
of democracy, their democratic institutions become hollow and operate in 
name only. At the same time, illiberal democracies fail to protect the 
individual with liberties typically ascribed to constitutional liberalism and 
instead value the perceived needs of the community. This definition of 
community, however, is guided by nationalism. Illiberal democratic 
leaders determine which citizens are worthy of belonging to their imagined 
community—and thus the nation-state—through fictive ethnicity and 
national mythologies. For populist leaders like Orbán, “elite” intellectuals, 
non-ethnic Magyars, and the opposition are not welcome. Intellectuals 
pose a specific threat to authoritarians because critical discourse threatens 
to destabilize their régimes. Taken together, we can begin to recognize the 
warning signs of an illiberal democracy.  
Huntington’s second generalization is particularly interesting as 
applied to Hungary’s illiberal democracy and is worth expanding. 
Huntington contends that transitions from democracy to authoritarianism 
tend to take place either through a military coup d’état or through an 
executive coup whereby a head of government concentrates power in the 
executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law. As 
opposed to concentrating power on an individual executive, Hungary’s 
partocracy has concentrated Fidesz’s power. Fidesz controls all three 
branches of government, independent government institutions, and the 
media, and while strangling civil society and academia. And, not a single 
action Fidesz has taken has been illegal under national law. Therefore, 
Huntington’s second generalization should be expanded to include the 
centralization of power by a group or party. 
Finally, the large majority of Huntington’s factors under the first 
generalization have manifested themselves in Hungarian illiberal 
democracy. During the period of democratic transition, political scandals, 
majoritarianism, and partocracy weakened public regard for democratic 
values. Instability was intensified during this period due to the numerous 
economic crises experienced during Hungary’s transition to capitalism and 
in the 2008 economic recession. Third, the country is politically polarized, 
in part due to partocracy, the failures of MSZP, and Orbán’s inflammatory 
rhetoric. Fourth, MSZP’s missteps pushing through austerity measures and 
other initiatives that were unpopular with the general public fueled populist 
desires. Fifth, the use of law and order rhetoric, first with regard to the 
Roma and then the refugee crisis, has sparked ethno-nationalist sentiments 
and moved racist discourse into the political mainstream. Sixth, Hungary’s 
long history of occupation by nondemocratic régimes and the dramatic loss 
of territory resulting from the Treaty of Trianon, strengthened calls for 
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absolute sovereignty. Now, Fidesz has identified the European Union, 
“Western values,” and George Soros as the next invaders. Finally, the 
illiberal democratic régime has snowballed and propagated itself both in 
neighboring nation-states and internationally. 
Hungary’s polarized political condition is exemplified in the clash 
between Orbán and Central European University. This clash pits Central 
European University—a symbol of Western liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism—against Orbán’s ethno-nationalist illiberal democracy. 
Other attacks on academic freedom, like the gender studies ban, slashed 
funding for research institutions, and campaigns against the Hungarian 
intelligentsia, demonstrate the serious threat that is posed to not only 
academic freedom in Hungary, but also academic freedom globally as 
illiberal democracies spread. There is some hope, however. Central 
European University’s ousting caught international attention, prompting 
criticism and solidarity from individuals, academia, powerful politicians, 
and government institutions. Orbán experienced severe backlash from the 
European Union for his actions—facing Article 7 disciplinary 
proceedings—as well as from the conservative European People’s Party 
that suspended Fidesz from the party. The European People’s Party’s 
actions even went so far as to prompt a dialogue between Orbán and EPP 
leaders that may result in the university being permitted to stay in Budapest 
and remain U.S. accredited. 
For some reason, academic freedom in Hungary has received immense 
international attention that has been critical in CEU’s fight to exist in 
Hungary. Perhaps academia is more alluring than amendments to 
parliamentary procedure or executive power. Perhaps the international 
community still holds high regard for universities. Or perhaps people have 
rallied around Central European University for another reason. If CEU is 
successful, the outcome could provide us with a potential strategy to 
protecting academic freedom in Hungary and in other illiberal 
democracies, and even allow us to glean perspective on how illiberal 
democracies operate. 




